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INTRODUCTION

Every year hundreds of thousands of convicted criminal defendants are
sentenced for their crimes, often through the implementation of a broad range of
laws of relatively recent vintage such as mandatory minimum provisions and
regulations of judicial discretion like the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.' The

* Assistant Professor, Florida State University College of Law. I thank Rob Atkinson,
Sara Beale, Stephanos Bibas, Kyron Huigens, Nancy King, Greg Mitchell, Peter Oh, Rachel
Priester, Jim Rossi, J.B. Ruhl, Chris Slobogin, Howard Wasserman, and Ron Wright for
their comments and suggestions.
1. The United States Department of Justice reports that 65,656 defendants were
convicted of felonies in federal courts in 2000 and 927,717 defendants were convicted of
felonies in state courts in 1998, the most recent years for which the respective data is
compiled. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF
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policies underlying these sentencing laws are perhaps the most hotly contested
issues in all of criminal procedure, with legislative amendments and calls for
reform being made every year. 2 Despite their tremendous importance and the
constant political activity concerning them, however, the constitutionality of these
laws is surprisingly uncertain-the United States Supreme Court has heard an
astounding eight cases in six years on that single issue. With the stroke of a pen, a
majority of the Court could redefine the constitutional criminal procedure of
sentencing, strike down many or all of these sentencing laws, and potentially
overturn the sentences imposed on millions of federal and state defendants
nationwide.4
6
5
After the decisions in Jones v. United States and Apprendi v. New Jersey,

which invalidated criminal sentences on Sixth Amendment grounds because the
defendant's maximum penalty had been enhanced by findings of fact made by the
sentencing judge rather than the trial jury, many observers predicted that the Court
had embarked on a journey that would lead it to do exactly that. 7 The strident
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 2001, at 414, 444 (Ann L. Pastore & Kathleen Maguire eds.,
2002).
2. See, e.g., Jeffrey S. Parker & Michael K. Block, The Limits of Federal Criminal
Sentencing Policy; or, Confessions of Two Reformed Reformers, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV.
1001, 1004 (2001); KATE STITH & Jost A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING
GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS (1998); see also, e.g., Harris v. United States, 536 U.S.
545, 570-72 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring) (criticizing use of statutory mandatory minimum
penalties); Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises
Upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1, 1 (1988). In March and April 2003, for
example, Congress nearly enacted fundamental changes to the federal sentencing guidelines
as a rider to child protection legislation, although the scope of the amendments was reduced
in conference committee. See Mark H. Allenbaugh, Who's Afraid of the Federal Judiciary?
Why Congress' Fear of Judicial Sentencing Discretion May Undermine a Generation of
Reform, CHAMPION, June 2003, at 6 (describing adoption and provisions of "Feeney
Amendment" to Pub. L. No. 108-21 (2003)); Alan Vinegrad, The New Federal Sentencing
Law, 15 FED. SENTENCING REP. 310, 310-14 (2003) (same).
3. In order of decision, those cases are: Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S.
224 (1998); Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721 (1998); Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227
(1999); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000); United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625
(2002); Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545 (2002); Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002);
State v. Blakely, 47 P.3d 149 (Wash. 2003), cert. grantedsub nom., Blakely v. Washington,
124 S. Ct. 429 (2003).
4. A constitutional holding invalidating a sentencing law would not necessarily provide
relief to all defendants previously sentenced under that law because the decision might not
be applied retroactively to already-final convictions, and many defendants likely would find
their claims precluded by procedural doctrines on direct review or collateral attack. See, e.g.,
Nancy J. King & Susan R. Klein, Apres Apprendi, 12 FED. SENTENCING REP. 331 (2000)
(discussing procedural barriers to relief).
5. 526 U.S. 227 (1999).

6. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
7. See, e.g., Andrew J. Fuchs, Note, The Effect of Apprendi v. New Jersey on the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Blurring the Distinction between Sentencing Factors and
Elements of Crime, 69 FORDHAM L. REv. 1399, 1400 (2001); Ethan Glass, Comment,
Whatever Happened to the Trial By Jury? The Unconstitutionality of Upward Departures
Under the United States Sentencing Guidelines, 37 GONZ. L. REv. 343, 359-62 (2001/2002);
Thomas M. Morrow, Note, Apprendi v. New Jersey: In the "Sleeper Decision of 2000," the
Supreme Court Restores Constitutional Protections to (Some) Criminal Defendants, 38

Hous. L. REv. 1065, 1087-91 (2001); Elizabeth A. Olson, Comment, Rethinking Mandatory
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dissents in those 5-48 cases lamented as much. They objected to the Court's
"watershed change in constitutional law," 9 for "cast[ing] doubt on sentencing
practices and assumptions followed not only in the federal system but also in many
States," 0 and decried that it would "unleash a flood of petitions by convicted
defendants seeking to invalidate their sentences in whole or in part on the authority
of' these cases."1 The prediction about the effect on federal court dockets, at least,
certainly came true: within two years, there were thousands of Apprendi claims
raised at all levels,' 2 and six circuits announced en banc decisions related to
Apprendi.13

Two years later, however, the Court slammed on the brakes, seemingly
stopping the impact of Apprendi in its tracks. In Harris v. United States' a
different five-justice majority' 5 ruled that it was constitutional for the imposition of
an enhanced mandatory minimum sentence to be based on a determination by the
sentencing judge and not on a trial jury finding. This holding apparently preserved
the constitutionality of most modem sentencing laws, in particular statutory
mandatory minimum sentences and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. The Court's
newly promulgated doctrine distinguished between findings of fact that establish or
increase a convicted defendant's maximum sentence on the one hand, and findings
of fact that determine or increase the defendant's minimum punishment on the
other. Yet while the results of Apprendi and Harris each commanded a narrow
majority of the Court, at least five justices also agreed that the distinction between

Minimums After Apprendi, 96 Nw. U. L. REv. 811, 814 (2002); Freya Russell, Casenote,
Limiting the Use of Acquitted and Uncharged Conduct at Sentencing: Apprendi v. New
Jersey and Its Effect on the Relevant Conduct Provision of the United States Sentencing

Guidelines, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1199, 1224-29 (2001); Mark H. Allenbaugh, Grid & Bear It,
35; Alan Ellis et al., Apprehending and Appreciating Apprendi,
at 17, 19, 21-22; Jon M. Sands & Steven G. Kalar, An Apprendi
Primer: On the Virtues of a "Doubting Thomas", CHAMPION, Oct. 2000, at 18, 20, 24, 6668.
Others predicted the Apprendi decision would have more modest effects. See, e.g.,
CHAMPION, Mar. 2002, at
CRIM. JUST., Winter 2001,

Susan N. Herman, Applying Apprendi to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: You Say You
Want a Revolution?, 87 IOWA L. REV. 615, 621-24 (2002); Alan C. Michaels, Truth in
Convicting: Understandingand Evaluating Apprendi, 12 FED. SENTENCING REP. 320 (2000);
Jeffrey Standen, The End of the Era of Sentencing Guidelines: Apprendi v. New Jersey, 87
IOWA L. REV. 775, 792-801 (2002).

8. See infra note 49 and accompanying text.
9. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 524 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
10. Jones, 526 U.S. at 254 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
11. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 551 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also King & Klein, supra
note 4 (discussing procedural obstacles for federal and state defendants seeking to raise
Apprendi claims).

12. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 619-21 (2002) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing
77% increase in second or successive habeas petitions and 1802 Court of Appeals decisions
on account of Apprendi, and 18% of all certiorari petitions as including an Apprendi claim).
13. See United States v. Thomas, 274 F.3d 655 (2d Cir. 2001) (en banc); United States
v. Vasquez, 271 F.3d 93 (3d Cir. 2001) (en banc); United States v. Promise, 255 F.3d 150
(4th Cir. 2001) (en banc); United States v. Buckland, 289 F.3d 558 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc);
Browning v. United States, 241 F.3d 1262 (10th Cir. 2001) (en banc); United States v.
Sanchez, 269 F.3d 1250 (11th Cir. 2001) (en banc).
14. 536 U.S. 545 (2002).
15. See infra notes 102-03 and accompanying text.
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the two results was illogical. 16 Even though his vote was dispositive, Justice Scalia,
one of the Court's most prolific opinion-writers, was silent in Harris.7 And the
Harrisdissenters condemned the end of the supposed incipient Sixth Amendment
revolution with the same vigor that their now-victorious counterparts had feared its
arrival. 18 For an issue of such surpassing importance to the legislative design of
criminal sentencing laws, the Court's inability to find a stable justification for its
constitutional doctrine is deeply troubling.
The intellectual quandary found in the Court's opinions in the Apprendi line of
cases results from imprecision in analyzing the constitutional issue. In adjudicating
the constitutionality of the various sentencing provisions it has considered, the
Court has analyzed the constitutional question solely in terms of the Jury Trial
guarantee of the Sixth Amendment and has relied almost exclusively upon an
originalist method of interpreting that clause. This narrowly drawn analysis is
confounded by a factual and historical posture that dooms the inquiry from the
start, and has led the Court to its present intractable divisions over the
constitutional law of sentencing.
The Court's holdings in Apprendi and Harris are eminently defensible as a
matter of constitutional law---and entirely logical-when analyzed in the proper
way. Rather than focusing only on the Sixth Amendment, the constitutional law of
sentencing must be examined through a much broader perspective. In addition to
the trial jury and sentencing judge, the powers held by the legislature and
prosecutor also must be considered. Similarly, instead of the original understanding
of a single clause, the constitutional law of sentencing derives from structural
reasoning about the allocations of power to those
four institutions found in the
9
criminal procedure provisions of the Constitution.
This broader analysis is the constitutional structure of criminal procedure
established by the Constitution's text. At the core of the Constitution's institutional
balance of power in criminal procedure is the concept of a criminal defendant's
offense of conviction: the crime that is enacted, charged, tried to verdict, and
punished. Many well-known constitutional protections, including the Sixth
Amendment right to trial by jury, apply to one or more of the first three stages of a
criminal offense. The constitutional issue raised by the Apprendi line of cases

16. See infra note 103 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 100, 123-24 and accompanying text; see also Stephanos Bibas, Back
from the Brink: The Supreme Court Balks at Extending Apprendi to Upset Most Sentencing,
15 FED. SENTENCING REP. 79 (2002) (analyzing Justice Scalia's position in Harris).
18. See, e.g., Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 577, 579, 582 (2002) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
19. Reliance on broader perspectives of constitutional structure instead of focusing on
specific clauses in isolation has become an increasingly prominent method of constitutional
argument in recent years. See generally CHARLES L. BLACK, A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM:
HUMAN RIGHTS, NAMED AND UNNAMED (1999); CHARLES L. BLACK, STRUCTURE AND
RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1969); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980); Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112
HARv. L. REV. 747 (1999); Rebecca L. Brown, Accountability, Liberty, and the Constitution,
98 COLUM. L. REV. 531 (1998); Laurence H. Tribe, Saenz Sans Prophecy: Does the
Privileges or Immunities Revival Portend the Future--Or Reveal the Structure of the
Present?, 113 HARV. L. REV. 110 (1999) (discussing structural constitutional reasoning
underlying Supreme Court's derivation of individual right to travel as enforced in Saenz v.
Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999)).
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involves the relationship of the concept of the offense of conviction to the
sentencing stage of a criminal case.
Analyzing the structural framework of constitutional criminal procedure
demonstrates two fundamental conclusions about the constitutional law of
sentencing. One is that a defendant's sentefice is unconstitutional if it exceeds the
maximum penalty provided for the offense of conviction established by the guilty
verdict--the principle safeguarded by the Apprendi rule. The other is that
sentencing laws that regulate the determination of a defendant's sentence within the
maximum penalty provided by the offense of conviction are consistent with the
constitutional structure of criminal procedure and therefore are constitutional---the
doctrine promulgated in Harris.
The constitutional structure analysis concludes that some allocation of power
among the four institutions-legislature, prosecutor, trial jury, and sentencing
judge-is both unavoidable and necessary. More significantly, subject to the
narrow constitutional limitation provided by the Apprendi-Harris rule, the
legislature is the institution vested with the authority to determine that allocation
with respect to the definitions of criminal offenses and the imposition of sentences
for their violations. One legislature might enact offenses and a sentencing scheme
in which nearly all power to determine a defendant's sentence rests in its hands and
those of the prosecutor. By contrast, another legislature might do the opposite and
enact a system in which the sentencing judge plays a nearly dispositive role in
setting the defendant's punishment. The constitutional structure analysis explains
why the Constitution equally permits both of these choices (and others) and
justifies the outcomes of Apprendi and Harris far more persuasively than the
Court's opinions. Within the wide bounds permitted by the constitutional structure
of criminal procedure, the legislature may design and implement a wide variety of
sentencing laws without violating the Constitution.
Part I of this Article summarizes the historical developments that led to the
Apprendi line of cases. After reviewing the constitutional history of sentencing, it
describes how recent statutory innovations created the new constitutional question
the Court faces. It then analyzes the Apprendi line of cases and describes the Sixth
Amendment interpretive impasse that has arisen in the Court's decisions.
Part II explains the constitutional structure of criminal procedure and applies
that analysis to the problem of the constitutional law of sentencing presented in the
Apprendi line of cases. It justifies both the Apprendi rule and the Harrisrule and
rebuts several counter-arguments. Finally, it describes the consequences of the
constitutional structure analysis for the future of the constitutional criminal
procedure of sentencing.
I. THE APPRENDI LINE OF CASES
Compared to many other areas of criminal procedure, there is remarkably little
constitutional law governing the procedures for sentencing criminal defendants
convicted of non-capital crimes. In the last two decades, however, legislatures

20. The Court has developed a significant body of doctrine mandating special Eighth
Amendment rules for sentencing hearings in capital cases. See, e.g., Ring v. Arizona, 536
U.S. 584, 606 (2002) (citing Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 522-23 (Thomas, J., concurring)); id. at
610 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 614 (Breyer, J., concurring). For a discussion of effects
that the Court's Sixth Amendment holdings in Apprendi and Ring may have on the Court's
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have enacted sweeping changes to the laws governing the factfinding and
decisionmaking that occurs when a specific offender's particular sentence is
determined. These new enactments reshaped the law and practice of sentencing
procedure in manners previously unknown in the country's history. In turn, the
Supreme Court was forced to reexamine its limited prior forays into the
constitutional criminal procedure of sentencing in light of these new laws. As it did
so, the Court struggled with the same difficult interpretive problems that arise
whenever legal, social, or technological innovations outrun a Constitution written
in the late eighteenth century. 21
A. Brief Summary of the ConstitutionalHistory of Sentencing

The constitutional protections applicable to the trial of criminal offenses, at
which the defendant's guilt or innocence is adjudicated, have long been clear. Most
importantly, after indictment by a federal grand jury or the filing of state charges
through an appropriate instrument, the defendant has the right to a trial by jury at
which the prosecution must prove guilt of the charged offense beyond a reasonable
doubt. 22 These protections--proper charge, jury trial, and standard of proof-apply
to each constituent component of the offense: the so-called "elements" of the
offense.2 3 For example, if a drug offense consists of (1) knowingly (2) possessing24
(3) with intent to distribute (4) between 500 and 5000 grams of powder cocaine,
then the prosecution must establish each of these four elements under those
procedures. Over the years, the Court frequently has encountered appeals in which
one or more of these procedures was not followed for one or more elements of an
offense, 25 and sometimes has reviewed statutes that circumvented these
requirements.2 6

Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, see Adam Thurschwell, After Ring, 15

FED. SENTENCING

REP. 97 (2002).

21. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001); Turner Broad. Co. v. FCC,
512 U.S. 622 (1994); see also infra note 218 and accompanying text.
22. See, e.g., Harris,536 U.S. at 549; id at 574-75 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Apprendi,
530 U.S. at 476-77 & n.3. The defendant may waive the right to trial by jury in favor of a
bench trial, although there is no constitutional right to do so. See FED. R. CRiM. P. 23(a)

(conditioning bench trial on prosecution consent); United States v. Singer, 380 U.S. 24, 36
(1965) (upholding constitutionality of Rule). The Sixth Amendment right to jury trial does
not attach to petty offenses, for which less than six months' imprisonment is available. See
Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 73 (1970).
23. See, e.g., Harris,536 U.S. at 549 ("Legislatures define crimes in terms of the facts
that are their essential elements, and constitutional guarantees attach to these facts.");
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 478.
24. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B)(ii)(I) (2002); see also United States v. Cotton,
535 U.S. 625, 628-29, 632, 633 n.3 (2002).
25. See, e.g., United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 627 (2002) (omission of element of
offense from indictment); Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 4 (1999) (failure to submit
element of offense to petit jury).
26. See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684
(1975); Leslie Yalof Garfield, Back to the Future:Does Apprendi Bar a Legislature's Power
to Shift the Burden of Proof Away from the Prosecution by Labeling an Element of a
TraditionalCrime as an Affirmative Defense?, 35 CONN. L. REv. 1351 (2003) (discussing
implications of Apprendi line of cases for earlier affirmative defenses precedents); see also,
e.g., Harris,536 U.S. at 557-58; Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 484-85 & n.12.
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On the other hand, for the vast majority of the nation's history, constitutional
criminal procedure had very little effect on the sentencing process. In the early
years of independence many criminal offenses carried mandatory determinate
sentences, such as a specified length of imprisonment.27 In such a context,
"sentencing" was merely a pro forma imposition of that preordained penalty. By
the mid-nineteenth century, Congress and most state legislatures had abandoned
fixed penalties and replaced them with a punishment range for each offense, from
which the sentencing judge would select the most appropriate penalty for each
offender in the exercise of the judge's discretion.28 In the twentieth century, when
the rehabilitative model of criminal punishment was predominant, executive branch
parole officers could release a defendant upon his correction before the expiration
of the judicially imposed term of incarceration.29 In this era of indeterminate
sentencing, the judge's discretion was virtually unlimited.3 ° Moreover, so long as
the judge imposed a lawful sentence in compliance with the statute, appellate
review ordinarily was unavailable. 31 Likewise, for much of this period there was
virtually no meaningful federal review of state criminal convictions, much less the
sentences imposed.
Beginning in about the early 1980s, a large systemic change in sentencing law
and practice occurred. Legislatures across the country began to abolish
indeterminate sentencing and extensive judicial discretion in favor of determinate
sentencing guidelines and mandatory minimum sentences. 33 Parole and the
rehabilitative model of criminal punishment similarly were discarded in many
jurisdictions, including the federal system. 34 Legislatures also introduced a right to
appeal a sentence that did not comply with (or misapplied) the applicable
sentencing laws or guidelines. 35 Nonetheless, just as under the prior indeterminate
sentencing regimes, an enormous range of relevant conduct and other factors
continued to be taken into consideration at sentencing. The consequences of those
findings of fact for the defendant's sentence now were governed by determinate

27. See, e.g., Harris, 536 U.S. at 558 (citing Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 481); Apprendi, 530
U.S. at 479-80 & n.7; Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 364 (1988); cf. STrrH &
CABRANES, supra note 2, at 9.

28. See, e.g., Harris,536 U.S. at 558 (citing United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446
(1972)); Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 481 (citing Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 246
(1949)); STrrH & CABRANES, supra note 2, at 10-13.
29. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 363-64 (1989); ST=r &
CABRANES, supra note 2, at 18-22.
30. See, e.g., Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389, 397-98 (1995); Williams v. New
York, 337 U.S. 240, 246 (1949); STrrH & CABRANES, supra note 2, at 9-22, 28-29.
31. See, e.g., United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447. Cf. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at
481-82 & n.9 (asserting that maximum statutory penalty for offense of conviction was
restraint on lawful sentence by judge); STITH & CABRANES, supra note 2, at 9, 170-7 1.
32. See, e.g., United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 629-30 (2002); Wainwright v.
Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 78-81 (1977).
33. See, e.g., Harris,536 U.S. at 558-59; Douglas A. Berman, Appreciating Apprendi:
Developing Sentencing Procedures in the Shadow of the Constitution, 37 CRIM. L. BULL.
627, 629-36 (2001); Susan R. Klein & Jordan M. Steiker, The Search for Equality in
Criminal Sentencing, 2002 Sup. CT. REv. 223, 227-39; STITH & CABRANES, supra note 2, at
38-48.
34. See, e.g., Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 367; STITH & CABRANES, supra note 2, at 38-48.
35. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (2000); Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 368.
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sentencing provisions or guidelines, rather than judgments made in exercise of the
judge's discretion.36
This new sentencing regime, which was unlike anything that preceded it in our
37
nation's history, was bound to be-and was-challenged on many grounds.
Combined with the previously unavailable appeals of sentences that the new
system also generated, the constitutional issues that became the Apprendi line of
cases appeared for the first time.
B. Emergence of New ConstitutionalIssues
Under the historical system of wide judicial discretion at sentencing, the basic
premise of the Supreme Court's constitutional law of sentencing was well settled:
"Judicial factfinding in the course of selecting a sentence.., does not implicate the
indictment, jur-trial, and reasonable-doubt components of the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments." 8 As the Court in Jones v. United States explained, the extensive
historical practice of judicial discretion conclusively repudiated the argument that
"every fact with a bearing on sentencing must be found by a jury [as an element of
the offense]; we have resolved that general issue and have no intention of
questioning its resolution." 39 Once the elements of the offense were proven beyond
a reasonable doubt to the jury at trial, the sentencing judge constitutionally could
find additional facts at sentencing in the course of determining the appropriate
punishment for the offender.
What changed in the new era, therefore, was the very kind of laws used to
govem judicial decisionmaking in the sentencing process. Legislatures enacted
provisions, either comprehensive guidelines systems or stand-alone statutory
sections, which had a precise and definite effect on the calculation of the
defendant's sentence but by their terms were not elements of substantive criminal
offenses--they were based on findings of fact made by a preponderance of the
evidence by the sentencing judge, rather than beyond a reasonable doubt by a trial
jury. 40 Because such laws had never existed before, the Supreme Court confronted
an entirely new constitutional issue: whether judicial factfinding in applying the
determinate sentencing laws to defendants was equivalent for constitutional

36. See, e.g., Harris,536 U.S. at 560; United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 156 (1997)
(per curiam); Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389, 399 (1995); STrrH & CABRANES, supra
note 2, at 66-77.

37. See, e.g., Witte, 515 U.S. at 406 (rejecting Double Jeopardy challenge); Mistretta,
488 U.S. at 396-97, 412 (rejecting separation of powers challenge to United States
Sentencing Commission that promulgated Federal Sentencing Guidelines used to sentence
petitioner); United States v. Cardenas-Alvarez, 987 F.2d 1129, 1134 (5th Cir. 1993)
(rejecting Eighth Amendment disproportionality and Equal Protection challenges to
Guidelines sentence); United States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084, 1102 (3d Cir. 1990)
(requiring clear and convincing evidence for application of significant upward departure
under Guidelines).
38. Harris,536 U.S. at 558.
39. 526 U.S. 227, 248 (1999); see also, e.g., Harris,536 U.S. at 549-50; Apprendi, 530

U.S. at 524 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
40. See, e.g., Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 363-68 (challenging Federal Sentencing
Guidelines); McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 81-82 & n.1 (1986) (challenging
mandatory minimum in stand-alone statutory sentencing provision); cf. Harris, 530 U.S. at
550-51 (challenging mandatory minimum in offense-defining statute).
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purposes to the previously approved factfinding under an indeterminate sentencing
regime.
In McMillan v. Pennsylvania, the Court coined the label "sentencing factors"
to describe these new determinate sentencing provisions and suggested that they
were presumptively constitutional. 41 The statute in McMillan authorized the
sentencing judge to find by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant
visibly had possessed a firearm during his offense, and mandated imposition of a
minimum sentence of five years' imprisonment upon that finding.42 The Supreme
Court rejected the defendant's argument that the visible-firearm-possession finding
had to be made as an element of the offense and held that apglication of that
"sentencing factor" to the defendant's sentence was constitutional.
After McMillan initially sustained the constitutionality of sentencing factors in
principle, two significant problems emerged. First, as in Jones, legislatures began
to write statutes that had unclear meanings---provisions that might be interpreted as
defining either several crimes and their "elements," or instead a single crime with
accompanying "sentencing factors." Second, as in Apprendi, defendants argued that
some provisions, although denominated as "sentencing factors" that would be
proven by a preponderance of the evidence to the sentencing judge, had an effect
on their sentences that, for constitutional purposes, should be interpreted as
creating an "element" of an aggravated criminal offense that must be proven
beyond a reasonable doubt to the trial jury. Thus, despite McMillan, the Court had
not resolved definitively the constitutionality of all varieties of the new determinate
sentencing laws that legislatures had adopted. 44 The Apprendi line of cases arose as
additional statutes were challenged and new constitutional arguments were raised.
45

C. Apprendi Doctrine Appears

In 1998, the Supreme Court decided Almendarez-Torres v. United States,46 the
first case in what became the Apprendi line of cases. The federal immigration crime
at issue in Almendarez-Torres provided for an enhanced maximum sentence if the
offender had prior felony convictions, and the defendant received a longer term of

41. 477 U.S. at 86, 90; see also Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 485 (stating that in McMillan
"this Court, for the first time, coined the term 'sentencing factor"').
42. See McMillan, 477 U.S. at 81-82 & n.l.
43. See id. at 84-93.
44. See Benjamin J. Priester, ConstitutionalFormalismand the Meaning of Apprendi v.
New Jersey, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 281, 284-85, 302-03, 306 (2001); STrrH & CABRANES,
supra note 2, at 2-3, 22, 149.
45. These decisions are analyzed in greater detail in other sources. See, e.g., Stephanos
Bibas, Judicial Fact-Findingand Sentence Enhancements in a World of Guilty Pleas, 110
YALE L.J. 1097, 1103-23 (2001) [hereinafter Bibas, Fact-Finding];Andrew M. Levine, The
Confounding Boundaries of "Apprendi-land": Statutory Minimums and the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 29 AM. J. CRIM. L. 377, 390-409 (2002); Priester, supra note 44, at
282-83; Benjamin J. Priester, Sentenced for a "Crime" the Government Did Not Prove:
Jones v. United States and the Constitutional Limitations on Factfinding by Sentencing
FactorsRather Than Elements of the Offense, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 249, 251-58
(1998) [hereinafter Priester, Sentenced].
46. 523 U.S. 224 (1998). The same reasoning and result appeared as a side issue in a
later 1998 decision, Monge v. California, a Double Jeopardy case involving a recidivism
sentence enhancement. See 524 U.S. 721, 729 (1998); id. at 740-41 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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imprisonment than he otherwise could have without the recidivism finding.47
Although the prior convictions had not been alleged or established under the
procedures applicable to elements of the offense, five justices concluded that the
Due Process Clause's mandate of fundamental fairness was not violated by
imposing the longer sentence on a recidivist as a sentencing factor. 48 Four justices
dissented, maintaining that the original understanding
of the Sixth Amendment
49
right to trial by jury required the contrary result.

In Jones50 and Apprendi51 (decided in 1999 and 2000 respectively), the tables
were turned. In Jones, the federal carjacking crime provided for enhanced
maximum sentences depending on the harm suffered by the victim; the defendant
was sentenced under the subsection applicable to causing serious bodily injury,
which had not been alleged or established as an element. 52 In Apprendi, the state
hate crime enhancement appeared in a separate statute written expressly as a
sentencing factor (with factfinding by a judge at sentencing by a preponderance of
the evidence), but it had the effect of extending the defendant's sentence for the
underlying firearms offense beyond the maximum available without that finding.53
Five justices applied an originalist Sixth Amendment interpretation to overturn
both defendants' sentences, ruling that the factual findings at issue had to be made
as elements of the offense rather than as sentencing factors. 54 In his Apprendi
concurring opinion, Justice Thomas repudiated his prior acceptance of the
fundamental fairness position and joined the Sixth Amendment originalism side.55
The four dissenting justices in Apprendi continued to apply the Due Process Clause
fundamental fairness analysis
and concluded there was no violation of that
56
principle in either case.
47. See Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 227 (discussing 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (1994)).
48. See id. at 247; Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 552-54 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also
Priester, supra note 44, at 292-96; Priester, Sentenced, supra note 45, at 263-66, 283.
49. See Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 248-49 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also
Priester, supra note 44, at 286-92; Priester, Sentenced, supra note 45, at 266-67, 283-84. The
fundamental fairness majority was Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Kennedy,
Thomas, and Breyer; the originalist dissent was Justices Stevens, Scalia, Souter, and
Ginsburg.
50. 526 U.S. 227 (1999).
51. 520 U.S. 466 (2000).
52. See Jones, 526 U.S. at 230-32 (interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1992 & Supp. V)).
53. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 468-69, 474.
54. See id. at 497; Jones, 526 U.S. at 252. A case decided three weeks before Apprendi
presented "a similar situation" to Jones concerning the construction of a different federal
criminal statute, but the Court decided the case on statutory interpretation grounds with only
passing mention of the constitutional issue. Castillo v. United States, 530 U.S. 120, 124
(2000) (construing 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (1988 & Supp. V)) ("[E]ven apart from the
doctrine of constitutional doubt ...[we] conclude that the relevant words create a separate
substantive crime."). A week later the Court likewise made only brief mention of Jones. See
Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255, 273 (2000) (construing 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a)-(b) (1994
& Supp. IV)) ("[T]he constitutional questions that would be raised by interpreting the
valuation requirement to be a sentencing factor persuade us to adopt the view that the
valuation requirement is an element.") (citing Jones, 526 U.S. at 239-52).
55. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 520 (Thomas, J., concurring) (calling his prior position,
"an error to which I succumbed"); see also id. at 499-523 (Thomas, J., concurring); Priester,
Sentenced, supra note 45, at 296 nn.231-32.
56. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 547, 552-54 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting); Jones, 526 U.S.
at 268-71 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Interestingly, the groups of justices do not correspond to
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1. The Apprendi Rule

The Apprendi constitutional rule is the following: "Other than the fact of a
prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the
prescribed statutory maximum, whether the statute calls it an element or a
sentencing factor, must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable
doubt."57
Thus, the label given to the fact by the legislature is not dispositive if the effect
of the finding of fact is to increase the sentence beyond the otherwise available
maximum penalty. 58 For this reason, the key components of the Apprendi rule are
is and what it means for a
determining what the "prescribed statutory maximum"
59
finding of fact to "increase" the sentence beyond it.
The Court defined the Apprendi rule in terms of the Sixth Amendment right to
a jury trial, and more specifically the right to have the jury make the findings of
fact that all the elements of the offense have been proven.4 In Apprendi, the Court
described this principle as "the facts reflected in the jury verdict.",6' In his
concurring opinion, Justice Scalia restated the principle as "the right to have the
jury determine those facts that determine the maximum sentence the law allows. 62
Thus, under Apprendi the determination of the prescribed statutory maximum
sentence is based upon the jury's findings of fact.
First, a court applying the Apprendi rule must determine which facts the jury
found beyond a reasonable doubt when it entered a guilty verdict. The jury
instructions given by the trial judge, which list the elements of the offense and tell
the jury that it must find each element to convict, are the determinative source. 63
the conventional wisdom of the justices' political blocs. See infra notes 120-24 and
accompanying text. But see Mark Tushnet, The Conservatism in Bush v. Gore, in BUSH v.
GORE: THE QUESTION OF LEGMMACY 171 (Bruce Ackerman ed., 2002) (discussing Bush v.
Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000)) ("When the Court reached the dispositive question in Bush v.
Gore, the Justices divided along what everyone perceived to be partisan lines."). The
originalist majority in Apprendi was Justices Stevens, Scalia, Thomas, Souter, and Ginsburg;
the fundamental fairness dissenters were Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor,
Kennedy, and Breyer.
57. Harris, 536 U.S. at 550 (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490) (emphasis added;
internal quotations omitted); see also United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 627 (2002);
Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 600 (2002); Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 476 (quoting Jones, 526
U.S. at 243 n.6).
58. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494; see also, e.g., Ring, 536 U.S. at 605; id. at 602

(citing Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 482-83).
59. See Harris,536 U.S. at 550 (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490); see also Priester,
supra note 44, at 286-301.
60. The right to have the jury's findings of fact made by proof beyond a reasonable
doubt derives from the Due Process Clause. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970);
see also, e.g., Harris, 536 U.S. at 549; id. at 575 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Apprendi, 530

U.S. at 477.
61. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 483; see also, e.g., Ring, 536 U.S. at 588-89, 597; Harris,

536 U.S. at 557; Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 482 n.9.
62. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 499 (Scalia, J., concurring); see also, e.g., Ring, 536 U.S. at
604; Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 495; id. at 519 (Thomas, J., concurring); Monge v. California,
524 U.S. 721, 737-39 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
63. See Jones, 526 U.S. at 243-44; see also, e.g., Ring, 536 U.S. at 588-89, 592-93;
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 470-71, 474 (elements established by guilty plea to count 18); United
States v. Zidell, 323 F.3d 412, 428 (6th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 178 (2003);
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Therefore, if the jury instructions omitted a fact--and accordingly the jury was not
told that it must find the fact to convict--then that fact is not reflected in the jury's
verdict. 64 Evaluating the jury instructions and the jury's verdict (for example,
acquittals on certain counts and convictions on others) establishes which facts the
65
jury found as elements of the offense.

United States v. Wheat, 278 F.3d 722, 739-40 (8th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 850
(2002); cf. United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 628 (2002) (noting pre-Apprendi jury
instruction regarding drug quantity).
Like other defects in jury instructions, Apprendi errors are not per se reversible error.
The failure to instruct the jury on an element of the offense may be a harmless error not
requiring reversal. See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 17 (1999) (holding, in case where
materiality element of fraud charge was omitted from jury instructions, that "where a
reviewing court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that the omitted element was
uncontested and supported by overwhelming evidence, such that the jury verdict would have
been the same absent the error, the erroneous instruction is properly found to be harmless");
see also id. at 35 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing for narrower scope of harmlessness for
erroneous jury instructions on elements of offenses). When the omitted element is a fact that
increases the statutory maximum sentence, such as an aggravating factor for purposes of
imposing a death sentence, that Apprendi error likewise may be harmless. See Ring, 536
U.S. at 609 n.7 (remanding capital case where pecuniary-gain and heinousness aggravating
factors were not decided by jury for determination whether "any [Apprendi] error was
harmless because a pecuniary gain finding was implicit in the jury's verdict" convicting
defendant of felony murder in the course of an armed robbery); see also, e.g., United States
v. Matthews, 312 F.3d 652, 665-67 (5th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 938 (2003);
United States v. Peters, 283 F.3d 300, 314 (5th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 934 (2002).
Similarly, an Apprendi error often will fail to meet the strict requirements of plain error
review when the defendant failed to properly preserve an objection to the error. See Cotton,
535 U.S. at 631-33 (defective indictment). This is particularly true where evidence of the
fact at issue is "overwhelming and uncontroverted." Id. at 634; see also, e.g., United States
v. Guevara, 298 F.3d 124, 126-28 (2d Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 936 (2003); Wheat,
278 F.3d at 740-42.
On the other hand, it is important to distinguish harmless error review and plain error
review cases from those in which there is in fact no Apprendi error because the relevant
finding of fact did not increase the defendant's sentence beyond a prescribed statutory
maximum. See Cotton, 535 U.S. at 628, 632, 633 n.3 (noting that findings of drug quantity
did increase defendants' sentences above 20-years maximum in 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C),
resulting for some defendants in a sentence of life imprisonment under § 841(b)(1)(A)); see
also, e.g., Zidell, 323 F.3d at 427-28 (defendant's sentence within statutory range); Peters,
283 F.3d at 314.
64. See Ring, 536 U.S. at 609; Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490; Jones, 526 U.S. at 243 n.6;
see also, e.g., Zidell, 323 F.3d at 427-28 (failing to label fact as element in jury instructions
was harmless where instructions nevertheless required jury to find fact beyond a reasonable
doubt); United States v. Barbosa, 271 F.3d 438, 456-57 (3d Cir. 2001); cf.Cotton, 535 U.S.
at 628-29, 632 (discussing Apprendi error in failure to allege in indictment element of
offense of drug quantity, and noting that jury instruction also did not treat drug quantity as
an element); Castillo v. United States, 530 U.S. 120, 128 (2000) (supporting conclusion that
statutory fact was element of offense and not sentencing factor by noting that "a judge's
later, sentencing-related decision that the defendant used the machinegun, rather than, say,
the pistol, might conflict with the jury's belief that he actively used the pistol, which factual
belief underlay its firearm 'use' conviction").
65. By convicting the defendant of an offense pursuant to the judge's instructions, the
jury thereby makes explicit findings of fact that each instructed element was proven beyond
a reasonable doubt-e.g., that the defendant "used" a firearm in connection with a crime of
violence. See Castillo,530 U.S. at 128 (describing possible situation of "the jury's belief that
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Second, the court compares these jury findings to the facts contained in the
relevant criminal statute under which the defendant has been charged. The statute
ordinarily will include facts that constitute the various conduct, circumstances, and
results comprising the crime.66 To the extent that the statute links specific facts to
specific maximum sentences, the facts necessary for each such maximum sentence
are elements of the offense.67 In this way, the court determines the "prescribed
statutory maximum" sentence and whether the sentence has been unconstitutionally
"increased" above that level by a finding of fact not made as an element of the
offense.
For example, the federal carjacking statute construed in Jones provided a
fifteen-year maximum sentence for carjacking, which was defined, in essence, as
taking a motor vehicle from the person of another by force or intimidation while
possessing a firearm.68 In addition, the statute provided a maximum sentence of
twenty-five years if serious bodily injury resulted, and a maximum sentence of life
if death resulted. 69 In Jones, the Court held that because the jury had not been
instructed on serious bodily injury, and its verdict therefore did not include a
finding of serious bodily injury, the prescribed statutory maximum sentence
authorized by the jury's verdict was fifteen years, and accordingly the defendant's
sentence of twenty-five years violated the (subsequently named) Apprendi rule.70
Similarly, in Apprendi, the defendant's sentence was unconstitutional because the
findings of fact admitted in the guilty plea established elements authorizing a
prescribed statutory maximum sentence of ten years while the fact used to justify
the defendant's sentence of twelve years had been proven only as a sentencing
factor. 7' Thus, when a statute includes multiple maximum sentences, each level
creates
a separatethat
offense
(likepurports
the three
of carjacking
Jones).72factor,
Likewise,
notwithstanding
a statute
on tiers
its face
to create a in
sentencing
the

he actively used the pistol, which factual belief underlay its firearm 'use' conviction"). It
also is possible that the jury's explicit findings of fact may necessarily imply that the jury
also found additional facts that the instructions did not actually include-in which case the
Apprendi violation would be harmless. See Ring, 536 U.S. at 609 n.7 (remanding for
harmlessness determination relating to possible "implicit" finding in verdict) (citing Neder,
527 U.S. at 25 (same)); see also Neder, 527 U.S. at 35 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (agreeing that
"[t]he failure of the court to instruct the jury properly... can be harmless, if the elements of
guilt that the jury did find necessarily embraced the one omitted or misdescribed")
(emphasis in original).
66. Cf MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.13(9) (1985).
67. See Ring, 536 U.S. at 597, 602; Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 474, 484; see also, e.g.,
Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 550, 557 (2002) ("Apprendi said that any fact
extending the defendant's sentence beyond the maximum authorized by the jury's verdict
would have been considered an element of an aggravated crime.. . by those who framed the
Bill of Rights."); Cotton, 535 U.S. at 632; Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 483 n.10 (referring to
"statute of indictment"); Priester, supra note 44, at 301-03.
68. Jones, 526 U.S. at 230 (construing 18 U.S.C. § 2119(1)).
69. See id.
70. See Ring, 536 U.S. at 600-01; Jones, 526 U.S. at 231; see also id. at 229, 251-52.
71. See Ring, 536 U.S. at 601-02; Harris,536 U.S. at 564-65 (quoting Apprendi, 530
U.S. at 494); Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 468-69, 491-92.
72. See Jones, 526 U.S. at 243-44 & n.6, 252; Priester, supra note 44, at 287-90, 301-
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proof of the fact nevertheless must be an element if the maximum sentence is
increased (like the hate crime enhancement in Apprendi).7
Significantly, the Apprendi rule requires that a finding of fact be an element of
the offense only if the finding increases the statutory maximum sentence as
determined by this two-stage analysis. Sentencing factors that regulate the sentence
imposed, but do not produce a sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by the
offense elements established by the jury's verdict, are consistent with the Apprendi
rule.74 Such sentencing factors may be proven by a preponderance of the evidence
to the sentencing judge so long as the statutory maximum sentence determined by
the two-stage analysis is not exceeded. 75 The Court accordingly adopted a narrow,
formalistic reading of the Sixth Amendment that preserves the jury's function as
the adjudicator of the worst possible fate the defendant faces.76
The Apprendi dissenters rejected the proposition that the jury's verdict of
guilty for a particular offense, and the findings of fact underlying that verdict, have
any significance for Sixth Amendment purposes." Under their view, "the Sixth
Amendment permits judges to apply sentencing factors-whether those factors lead
to a sentence beyond the statutory maximum (as in Apprendi) or the application of
a mandatory minimum (as [in Harris])."78 These justices instead would frame the
constitutional review of a defendant's sentence solely in terms of whether the
sentence comports with the requirement of fundamental fairness in the Due Process
Clause.79
2. The Recidivism Exception
The Apprendi rule contains a significant proviso that creates a limited
exception to the scope of the rule. The proviso-"other than the fact of a prior

73. See Ring, 536 U.S. at 602-04; Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 474, 491-96; Priester, supra
note 44, at 301-03.
74. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 478, 494 & n.19; see also, e.g., Ring, 536 U.S. at 611-12
(Scalia, J., concurring); Harris,536 U.S. at 549-50.
75. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 483 n. 10, 485. Sentencing factors that do not increase the

sentence beyond the prescribed statutory maximum therefore need not be proven as elements
of the offense. Harris,536 U.S. at 564 (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 483 n.10); Apprendi,
530 U.S. at 476, 481, 494 & n.19; id. at 519 (Thomas, J., concurring); Jones, 526 U.S. at
248.
76. The Apprendi rule ensures that "the jury's role . . . [does not] shrink from the
significance usually carried by determinations of guilt to the relative importance of low-level
gatekeeping." Jones, 526 U.S. at 243-44. Justice Scalia put the point more bluntly: "the
dissenters . . . are unable to say what the right to trial by jury does guarantee if, as they
assert, it does not guarantee ... the right to have a jury determine those facts that determine
the maximum sentence the law allows." Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 498-99 (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (emphasis in original).
77. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 532-36 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Jones, 526 U.S. at 265-71
(Kennedy, J., dissenting).
78. Harris,536 U.S. at 569 (Breyer, J., concurring).
79. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 552-54 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing AlmendarezTorres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 242-43 (1998) and McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477
U.S. 79, 86-90 (1986)); id. at 562-63 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also supra note 56 and
accompanying text.
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conviction" 80--- excludes the fact of the defendant's recidivism from the
requirement that facts that increase the statutory maximum sentence must be
elements of the offense. The consequence of this exception is that, if the fact that
increases the statutory maximum sentence is 8recidivism, then that fact
constitutionally may be proven as a sentencing factor. 1
The proviso developed as a result of the progression of the Court's cases. In
Almendarez-Torres, the Court upheld sentences that were increased above the
otherwise applicable statutory maximum based on a finding of recidivism." Four
justices dissented and argued that the enhanced sentences were unconstitutional
because the fact that increased the maximum sentence was not proven as an
element of the offense. 3 When the majority shifted in Jones, and stabilized in
Apprendi, the Court accepted the position of the previously dissenting justices and
adopted the Apprendi rule. 84 In neither case was recidivism the maximumenhancing fact, however, and the Court apparently felt constrained by this factual
and procedural posture not to overrule Almendarez-Torres.8 5 Yet the Apprendi
Court directly called into question the continuing validity of the recidivism
exception, and Justice Thomas specifically disclaimed his prior participation in the
(five-justice) Almendarez-Torres majority.8 6 Nevertheless, the Court has not yet
granted certiorari to reconsider Almendarez-Torres, and any possible Apprendi rule
issue in the recent "three strikes" cases was mooted because the defendants'
recidivism strikes in fact had been proven as elements of the offense.87
Notwithstanding the seemingly weak support on the Court for retaining the
recidivism exception to the Apprendi rule, the exception is not without justification.
Unlike all other facts used to increase the sentence beyond the otherwise applicable
statutory maximum, reliance on the fact of a prior conviction involves no more than

80. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 476 (quoting Jones, 526 U.S. at 243 n.6 (1999)); see also,
e.g., Harris,536 U.S. at 550 (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490).
81. See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 286 F.3d 47, 51 (1st Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537
U.S. 907 (2003) ("In the post-Apprendi era, we have ruled with a regularity bordering on the

monotonous that, given the explicit exception and the force of Almendarez-Torres, the
rationale of Apprendi does not apply to sentence-enhancement provisions based upon prior
criminal convictions."); United States v. Aparco-Centeno, 280 F.3d 1084, 1088-90 (6th Cir.
2002), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 948 (2002).
82. Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 230, 243-47 (1998); see also
Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721, 728-29 (1998).
83. "However California chooses to divide and label its criminal code, I believe that for
federal constitutional purposes those extra four years are attributable to conviction of a new
crime." Monge, 524 U.S. at 741 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also id. at 739-41 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 248-49, 251, 256, 258-60 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).

84. See Priester, supra note 44, at 291 n.64 (noting shift); Priester, Sentenced, supra
note 45, at 296 & nn.231-32 (same).
85. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490 ("Apprendi does not contest . . . [AlmendarezTorres'] validity and we need not revisit it for purposes of our decision today to treat the
case as a narrow exception to the general rule we recalled at the outset.").
86. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 488-90 & n.14-15; id. at 520-21 (Thomas, J., concurring).
87. See Ewing v. California, 123 S.Ct. 1179, 1182 (2003); Lockyer v. Andrade, 123 S.
Ct. 1166, 1170 (2003). These cases involved the same California "three strikes" statute at
issue in Monge, although without the failure to follow the required procedures that had been
present in that case. Monge, 524 U.S. at 724-25. Similarly, the Ring case also did not raise a
recidivism enhancement issue. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 597 n.4 (2002).

INDIANA LA W JOURNAL

[Vol.79:863

"accepting the validity of a prior judgment of conviction entered in a proceeding in
which the defendant had the right to a jury trial and the right to require the
prosecutor to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt., 88 The prior conviction means
that the defendant already has received the constitutional rights to which he is
entitled when the guilty verdict was obtained in the prior prosecution, and therefore
the fact that the defendant has such a conviction is derivative of that proceeding. 9
Because of its narrow scope, the recidivism exception does nothing more than
avoid "double-dipping" by criminal defendants. That is, the exception serves as a
kind of estoppel: if the defendant previously received the procedural protections
applicable to elements of the offense when convicted of that offense, then he is not
entitled to receive them again in establishing the simple fact that he was so
convicted. Such an exception therefore is perfectly consistent with the Court's
Sixth Amendment analysis.
D. Apprendi's Aftermath
What remained to be seen after Apprendi was whether the majority's Sixth
Amendment originalism would be extended in future cases to further limitations on
the enactment and application of sentencing factors. In a section of his concurring
opinion in Apprendi now-tellingly not joined by Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas had
called for several such extensions, including mandatory minimum sentences and
capital cases. 9° Many observers believed that the Court might apply the Apprendi
principle at least to facts that determine a "prescribed statutory minimum sentence"
as well as the maximum. 9 1 Even if limited to the same formalistic structure as
Apprendi, such a rule would require that findings of fact that determine the low as
well as the high end of the possible statutory term of imprisonment be proven as
elements of the offense. 92 Some observers predicted even greater changes, such as

88. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 496.
89. See Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 249 (1999); see also Apprendi, 530 U.S.
at 488 (discussing "the certainty that procedural safeguards attached to any 'fact' of prior
conviction"). Although the Court has not directly addressed the point, it is possible that the
recidivism exception presumes that the fact of a prior conviction is uncontested or
incontrovertible. See id. at 488-90 (noting that "Almendarez-Torres had admitted the three
earlier convictions" and suggesting that recidivism exception to the Apprendi rule might not
be justified "if the recidivist issue were contested") (emphasis in original). For example, the
defendant might contest identity, arguing that the alleged prior conviction is in fact not his,
but rather a crime committed by a different person of the same name. Cf.Kyron Huigens,
Solving the Apprendi Puzzle, 90 GEO. L.J. 387, 408 & nn.134-35 (2002) (noting that identity
may be a contestable fact).
90. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 518-23 (Thomas, J., concurring).
91. See, e.g., Allenbaugh, supra note 7, at 38 ("Prior opinions by the Supreme Court
Justices indicate strongly that the Court will [perhaps] overrule ...McMillan."); Levine,
supra note 45, at 409-12; Olson, supra note 7, at 813.
92. See Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 579 (2002) (Thomas, J., dissenting). In a
prior article, I proposed an interpretation of the Apprendi principle providing that when a
statute is offense-defining, any mandatory minimum sentences in the statute should be
elements of the offense, but when a statute is not offense-defining the factfinding to increase
a minimum sentence permissibly could be as a sentencing factor. See Priester, supra note 44,
at 291 n.63. Under the view set forth in that article, offense-defining statutes must be clearly
demarcated from sentencing-regulating statutes (or non-statutory regulations like the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines), and so long as this separation is observed a sentencing-regulating
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the outright overruling of McMillan or a holding that the determinate sentencing
effects of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines be elements of the offense rather than
93
sentencing factors.
In 2002, the Court stood behind the Apprendi rule but apparently terminated
any potential expansions of its reasoning. In Ring v. Arizona,94 the Court
abandoned previous dicta 95 and held that the Apprendi rule invalidated the capital
sentencing process of at least five states (overruling the pre-Apprendi precedent of
Walton v. Arizona).96 Applying the Apprendi rule in the manner discussed above, a
divided Court ruled that the "prescribed statutory maximum" penalty for the trial
jury's conviction of a capital offense was life imprisonment because the finding of
additionalstatutory aggravating factors at the sentencing hearing was mandatory
before a death sentence could be imposed--and, therefore, under Apprendi, a jury,
not a judge, must find those additional factors.97
On the other hand, in Harris v. United States,98 the federal firearms statute
provided for a maximum sentence of life imprisonment, and the challenged
factfinding affected only the statute's mandatory minimum sentences of five, seven,
or ten years.99 In Harris, the four-justice plurality opinion applied an originalist

provision may have a determinate effect on the sentence (within the Apprendi-defined
statutory maximum) without thereby becoming an offense-defining provision. See id. at 28486, 289, 301-03. In Harris, the Supreme Court declined to treat statutory mandatory
minimum sentences (even in otherwise offense-defining provisions) differently than nonstatutory requirements (like the Guidelines). As a matter of statutory interpretation, however,
a court might conclude that inclusion of a mandatory minimum in an otherwise offensedefining statute, rather than enactment as a clearly demarcated sentencing-regulating
provision, indicated legislative intent to make that mandatory minimum a statutory element
of the offense.
93. See, e.g., Fuchs, supra note 7, at 1419-26 (discussing the potential effect of
Apprendi on the sentencing guidelines); Glass, supra note 7, at 358-62; Levine, supra note
45; Russell, supra note 7, at 1201.
94. 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
95. See id. at 600-03 (citing Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 497 and Jones v. United States, 526
U.S. 227, 251 (1999)).
96. See Ring, 536 U.S. at 588-89, 609 (overruling Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639
(1990)). The Court apparently invalidated the capital sentencing systems of five states:
Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, and Nebraska. See id. at 608 n.6. Ring also calls into
question the systems of four other states: Alabama, Delaware, Florida, and Indiana. See id.;
see also id. at 620-21 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
97. See id. at 592-93, 597, 600-05, 609. In Ring seven justices joined the result. The
five-justice majority from Apprendi agreed that given the formalism of the challenged
capital sentencing scheme, in which a sentence of death was not available absent findings of
fact above and beyond those necessarily contained in the jury's guilty verdict, those facts
were governed by the Apprendi rule. See id. at 586, 589, 609. The four Apprendi dissenters
each expressly reaffirmed their continued opposition to that holding. See id. at 613
(Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 614 (Breyer, J., concurring); id. at 619 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting); see also Harris, 536 U.S. at 569 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy,

however, agreed that because it did exist, it had to cover the Ring situation. See Ring, 536
U.S. at 613 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Breyer agreed with the Court's result in Ring
for Eighth Amendment reasons only. See id. at 618-19 (Breyer, J., concurring). In dissent,
Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, simply would have retained Walton.
See id. at 619 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
98. 536 U.S. 545 (2002).
99. See id. at 550-5 1, 554.

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol.79:863

analysis of the Sixth Amendment that accepted the reasoning and result in
Apprendi as sound and explained why the original understanding did not extend
any further. The plurality then held that the factfinding used to impose on the
defendant the seven-year mandatory minimum sentence for brandishing the firearm
10°
constitutionally could be made as a sentencing factor and not as an element
Justice Breyer's concurring opinion accepted neither Apprendi nor the plurality's
originalist analysis; instead, he again maintained that fundamental fairness permits
sentencing factfinding that increases the maximum sentence, minimum sentence, or
anything in between.' 0' The four-justice dissenting opinion adopted the much
broader originalist Sixth Amendment interpretation previously set forth in Justice
Thomas's concurring opinion in Apprendi.l0 2 And a majority of the Court agreed
that the difference between the holdings of Harrisand Apprendi is illogical.0 3
The Harris plurality described its interpretation of the Sixth Amendment and
Apprendi rule as follows:
If the grand jury has alleged, and the trial jury has found, all the facts
necessary to impose the maximum, the barriers between the government
and defendant fall. The judge may select any sentence within the range,
based on facts not alleged in the indictment or proved to the jury--even
if those facts are specified by the legislature, and even if they persuade
the judge to choose a much higher sentence than he or she otherwise
would have imposed. That a fact affects the defendant's
sentence, even
1 4
dramatically so, does not by itself make it an element.t 0
So long as the finding of fact does not implicate the maximum-increasing
prohibition of the Apprendi rule, it need not be an element of the offense and
instead may be a sentencing factor.' 0 5 Thus, the plurality limited Apprendi's Sixth
Amendment rule to its exact terms alone: the only facts that constitutionally must
be elements of the offense are those that are used to determine the maximum
sentence for the convicted defendant (as in Jones, Apprendi, and Ring).106 Any
other factfinding-whether pursuant to statute or non-statutory provisions like the
Sentencing Guidelines--that determines the calculation of a sentence less than the
maximum authorized by those elements constitutionally may be established as
sentencing factors. 10 7 The underlying premise of this Sixth Amendment analysis is

100. See id. at 556-68; id at 569 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 570 (Breyer, J.,
concurring); Ring, 536 U.S. at 604 n.5.
101. See Harris, 536 U.S. at 569-72 (Breyer, J., concurring).
102. See id. at 572-73, 575-80 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy's plurality
opinion was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and Scalia; Justice
Thomas's dissenting opinion was joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg.
103. See id. at 583 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Noting the implications of Breyer's
concurring opinion, Justice Thomas concluded that "[t]his leaves only a minority of the
Court embracing the distinction between McMillan and Apprendi that forms the basis of
today's holding." Id.
104. Id. at 566.
105. See id. at 565; see also Ring, 536 U.S. at 604 n.5 (describing Harris).
106. See Harris, 536 U.S. at 557, 562-63, 567-68.
107. See id. at 558-59, 565, 568.
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that when the jury determines the maximum available sentence, it08 thereby
authorizes the imposition of any sentence less severe than that maximum.1
When the scope of the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial is restricted to the
maximum sentence, the Harris plurality's reasoning is easily understood.
Historically, the selection of a sentence less than or up to the jury-authorized
maximum was an exercise of the trial court's discretion, and any findings of fact
that were made were not elements of an offense. 1 9 The plurality reasoned that
findings of fact made pursuant to legislatively enacted determinate sentencing
restrictions on the exercise of the Court's discretion underneath the authorized
maximum, as in McMillan, are equivalent for Sixth Amendment purposes
because-like the exercise of judicial discretion in an indeterminate sentencing
regime--they do not alter the maximum penalty but only the selection of the
specific sentence."10 So long as the maximum-setting procedure required by
Apprendi is observed in determining the "outer limits" of the possible sentence, the
plurality concluded that all other findings of fact relevant to the sentence may be
made as sentencing factors without interfering with or undermining the jury's role
in a criminal case.1"
The dissenting justices in Harris rejected the plurality's interpretation of the
restricted scope of the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury. Instead, they
asserted that the Sixth Amendment applies not merely to the prescribed statutory
maximum sentence covered by the Apprendi rule, but also to the prescribed
statutory minimum sentence---that is, any fact that "alters the statutorily mandated
sentencing range" must be proven as an element of the offense and not a sentencing
factor.11 2 Like the determination of the maximum sentence, the determination of the

108. See id. at 554, 557, 565-66. The jury's "authorization" of the maximum sentence is
metaphorical and purely formal. By serving as the institution that determines which facts
have been proven by the government as elements of the offense, the jury "authorizes" a
maximum punishment for the defendant. Cf. Bibas, Fact-Finding,supra note 45, at 1134
n.249, 1182-83 (noting that the jury does not authorize punishment in any literal sense
because the jury does not consider punishment when adjudicating offenses); Jenia Iontcheva,
Jury Sentencing as Democratic Practice, 89 VA. L. REv. 311, 338 (2003) (criticizing
exclusion of punishment from jury consideration).
109. See Harris, 536 U.S. at 558-59; Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 544 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
110. See Harris, 536 U.S. at 549-50, 560, 565; see also id. at 560-62 (discussing
McMillan); Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 546-47 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); id. at 559 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting). Thus, the HarrisCourt preserved considerable deference to legislative decisions
about regulating the sentencing of offenders. See Harris,536 U.S. at 550, 559-60, 565-69;
see also id. at 569-70 (Breyer, J., concurring); Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 524, 548-59
(O'Connor, J., dissenting); id. at 559 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
111. Harris, 536 U.S. at 564 (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 483 n.10 (2000)); see also
id. at 562, 565, 567.
112. Id. at 577 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Additionally, the dispute over the framing of
the Sixth Amendment analysis in Harris reveals an interesting semantic problem in the
Apprendi line of cases. Various opinions on both sides of the divide have used the word
"range" to describe the restrictions on the court's sentencing authority that the jury must find
and to which the Apprendi nile applies. This confusion may be attributable to Justice
Scalia's use of the word "range" in Jones, which was quoted and relied upon in subsequent
cases. See Jones, 526 U.S. at 253 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("prescribed range of penalties").
While this use of the word "range" easily could be interpreted to mean not only the
maximum penalty (at issue in Jones) but also the corresponding statutory minimum
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statutorily compelled minimum sentence constrains the authority of the sentencing
judge in imposing punishment on the defendant, and both such constraints equally
affect the defendant's constitutional interests." 3 A change in the sentencing range
from five-years-to-life to seven-years-to-life, for example, has this effect .
"Whether one raises the floor or raises the ceiling it is impossible to dispute that the
sentence, in light of Harris it seems that Justice Scalia did not in fact mean anything more
than the maximum sentence. Cf. Levine, supra note 45, at 399, 426 (commenting on
apparent inconsistency between Justice Scalia's language in Jones and joining the plurality
opinion in Harris).

The problem, however, is that this single word-depending on the context-has been
used in at least three ways by the justices. Sometimes the sentencing "range" seemingly
refers only to the crime's prescribed maximum sentence. See Harris, 536 U.S. at 566 ("If the
...trial

jury has found, all the facts necessary to impose the maximum,.

.

. [t]he judge may

select any sentence within the range ....); Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 474 ("The finding is
legally significant because it increased... the maximum range within which the judge could
exercise his discretion ....
");
see also, e.g., Harris, 536 U.S. at 560, 563-64, 567; Apprendi,
530 U.S. at 483 n.10; id. at 543-44 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Jones, 526 U.S. at 233, 24244, 248-51; id. at 258 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 724, 735 n.2
(1998) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
In other instances, the word "range" apparently refers both to the prescribed maximum
and minimum sentences for the offense. See Harris, 536 U.S. at 576 (Thomas, J., dissenting)
("[W]ith a finding that a defendant brandished a firearm, the penalty range becomes
harsher."); id. at 577 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (The plurality's conclusion "is in effect to
claim that the imposition of a 7-year, rather than a 5-year, mandatory minimum does not
change the constitutionally relevant sentence range."); Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 533
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("the Court appears to hold that any fact that increases or alters
the range of penalties to which a defendant is exposed-which, by definition, must include
increases or alterations to either the minimum or the maximum penalties") (emphasis in
original); see also, e.g., Harris, 536 U.S. at 572, 580, 582-83 (Thomas, J., dissenting);
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 470, 488; id. at 513, 519, 521-22 (Thomas, J., concurring); id. at 540,
542, 552, 554 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); id. at 559, 562, 564 (Breyer, J., dissenting);
Monge, 524 U.S. at 737-38 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
And there are many occasions for which the intended meaning is ambiguous or unclear.
See, e.g., Harris,530 U.S. at 549, 558-62, 565; Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 474, 481, 490 n.16; id.
at 501, 503, 519 n.9, 520 (Thomas, J., dissenting); id. at 541, 544, 546-48 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting); Jones, 526 U.S. at 243, 248; id. at 252 (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 253
(Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 267 (Kennedy, J.,dissenting); Monge, 524 U.S. at 729;
Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 235-36, 243, 245 (1998).
It is no surprise, then, that the plurality opinion in Harrisstates that "Apprendi mean[s]
that those facts setting the outer limits of a sentence... are the elements of the crime" while
sentencing factors may be used "[w]ithin the range authorized by the jury's verdict." Harris,
536 U.S. at 567 (emphasis added). By contrast, the Harrisdissent insists that a fact must be
an element "if the fact alters the statutorily mandated sentencing range, by increasing the
mandatory minimum sentence." Id. at 577 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
Given this fundamental disagreement over the definition of the very word used to
describe the relevant constraints on the sentence, the attempt to analyze the issue in Sixth
Amendment terms becomes all the more difficult.
113. See Harris, 536 U.S. at 576-79 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also id. at 575
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 501 (Thomas, J.,concurring))
(emphasizing prosecution's entitlement upon jury verdict).
114. See id. at 575-76 (Thomas, J., dissenting); id. at 579 (Thomas, J., dissenting)
("When a fact exposes a defendant to greater punishment than what is otherwise legally
prescribed, that fact is by definition an element of a separate legal offense.") (internal
citations and quotations omitted).
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defendant is exposed to greater punishment than is otherwise prescribed." ' 5 This
interpretation
of the Sixth Amendment consequently requires that McMillan be
11 6
overruled.
In the 2003 Term, the Court granted certiorari in Blakely v. Washington to
review the constitutionality of the application of the State of Washington's
sentencing guidelines.'' 7 The sentencing judge imposed an "exceptional sentence"
above the presumptive guidelines sentence but less than the nominal maximum
term for the Class B felonies to which Blakely pled guilty." 8 The Court must
determine whether the findings of fact that justified the exceptional sentence are
equivalent to the calculation of a sentence within the statutory maximum as in
Harris, or instead are equivalent to an increase in the prescribed statutory
maximum as in Jones, Apprendi, and Ring."19 The Court's answer in Blakely will

115. Id. at 579 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
116. See id. at 580-83 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also Jones, 526 U.S. at 253
(Stevens, J., concurring). But see Harris, 536 U.S. at 557; Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 533
(O'Connor, J., dissenting); Jones, 526 U.S. at 268 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The extent to
which the four Harris dissenters would extend their constitutional rule beyond the statutory
sentencing range to other legally binding restrictions on sentencing discretion, such as the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, is unclear. See Harris, 536 U.S. at 580 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) ("McMillan ... cannot withstand the logic of Apprendi, at least with respect to

facts for which the legislature has prescribed a new statutory sentencing range."); Apprendi,
530 U.S. at 523 n. 11 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Guidelines 'have the force and effect
of laws."') (quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 413 (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
117. 124 S. Ct. 429 (2003). The opinion below is State v. Blakely, 47 P.3d 149 (Wash.
Ct. App. 2002), appeal denied, 62 P.3d 889 (Wash. 2003).
118. Blakely pled guilty to two Class B felonies: one count of second degree domestic
violence kidnapping and one count of second degree domestic violence assault. See Blakely,
47 P.3d at 153. Under Washington's statutory sentencing guidelines, the presumptive
sentencing range was 49-53 months for the kidnapping count and 12-14 months for the
assault count, served concurrently. See id. at 154. The guidelines provide that a sentencing
judge may impose an exceptional sentence outside this presumptive range, however. See id.
at 157 (citing edition of Washington Code under which Blakely was sentenced, WASH. REV.
CODE § 9.94A.120(l)-(2) (1998)). An exceptional sentence may be justified by findings of
fact from a non-exclusive list of statutory factors, see id. (citing WASH. REV. CODE §
9.94A.390 (1997)), made by the sentencing judge by a preponderance of the evidence, see
id. at 158 (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.370(2) (1998)). Based on two such aggravating
factors, the state appellate court affirmed the sentencing judge's exceptional sentence of 90
months for the kidnapping count, concurrent with 14 months on the assault count. See id. at
154, 158 & n.3. The state appellate court held that the sentence did not violate Apprendi
because the prescribed statutory maximum for the two counts to which Blakely pled guilty
was not the presumptive sentence of the statutory guidelines, but rather the ten-years
maximum sentence available for Class B felonies. See id. at 159 (citing State v. Gore, 21
P.3d 262 (Wash. 2001)); see also Brief for Petitioner at 2-4, Blakely v. Washington, No. 021632 (Dec. 4, 2003).
119. Compare, e.g., Brief of Petitioner at 13-18, Blakely (No. 02-1632) (arguing that
exceptional sentences under Washington's statutory guidelines are governed by Apprendi
and Ring), and Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union and the
American Civil Liberties Union of Washington, in Support of Petitioner at 6-13, Blakely v.
Washington, No. 02-1632 (Dec. 4, 2003) (same), and Brief Amicus Curiae of the National
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and Families Against Mandatory Minimums in
Support of Petitioner at 3-12, Blakely v. Washington, No. 02-1632 (Dec. 3, 2003) (same),
with, e.g., Respondent's Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 11-14,
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continue to elaborate the constitutional criminal procedure of sentencing, but if the
Court persists in its Sixth Amendment analysis its reasoning is likely to add further
confusion, not greater clarity.
E. The Court's Sixth Amendment Impasse
After Ring and Harris, the Court's Sixth Amendment constitutional
jurisprudence for the Apprendi line of cases has reached an interpretive impasse.
The narrow majority of Jones and Apprendi fractured in Ring and Harris,revealing
the troubling nature of the Court's present approach to the constitutional issues
involved.
The fundamental fairness group of four justices continues to repudiate
Apprendi and rejects any Sixth Amendment obstacles to sentencing fact-finding
and sentence enhancements, even those that increase the otherwise applicable
maximum sentence.120 They maintain that only the Due Process Clause restricts
legislative authority to adopt sentencing factors, and they have yet to argue for
invalidation of a statute or sentencing factor under that test.
The originalist group of five justices has splintered. Four justices appear ready
to adopt the broad Sixth Amendment rule advocated by Justice Thomas.12' These
justices assert that a fact must be an element if it "alters the statutorily mandated
sentencing range, by increasing the mandatory minimum sentence" or the
maximum sentence.

Finally, Justice Scalia consistently has followed an originalist position, from
his dissenting opinion in Almendarez-Torres through the Harris plurality.' 23 He
stands alone, however, in limiting
the rule derived from originalism to the
24
maximum-increasing principle. 1

Blakely v. Washington, No. 02-1632 (Sep. 12, 2003) (arguing that Washington's statutory
guidelines are governed by McMillan and Harris).
120. Unlike Justice Breyer, who wrote separately to insist upon the fundamental
fairness analysis, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and Kennedy joined an
originalist opinion in Harris; their Ring opinions rejecting Apprendi, however, signal their
continuing objection to its rule and their preference for evaluating sentencing laws under the
fundamental fairness analysis instead. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
121. Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg consistently joined the opinions proposing
and adopting the Apprendi principle. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 476 (2000);
Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 243 n.6 (1999); Almendarez-Torres v. United States,
523 U.S. 224, 248-49 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721,
740-41 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Jones, 526 U.S. at 253 (Stevens, J.,
concurring). Although they did not join Justice Thomas's concurring opinion in Apprendi,
they subsequently joined his dissenting opinion in Harris grounded in the same reasoning.
See Harris,536 U.S. at 575-77 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 499, 501-18
(Thomas, J., concurring). While there may not be complete agreement among these justices
on methodology, the outcomes for which they have voted strongly suggest that their
(unstated) views extend at least as far as the results for which Justice Thomas has advocated.
Interestingly, Justice Thomas's dissenting opinion in Harris makes reference to a different,
non-originalist theory long espoused by Justice Stevens. See Harris,536 U.S. at 576, 578
(quoting and applying McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 103 (1986) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting)); see also Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 484.
122. Harris,536 U.S. at 577 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
123. See Ring, 536 U.S. at 610 (Scalia, J., concurring); Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 498-99
(Scalia, J., concurring); Jones, 526 U.S. at 253 (Scalia, J., concurring); Monge, 524 U.S. at
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The resolution of this interpretive impasse cannot be found in the modes of
constitutional analysis used by the Court. Instead, a different constitutional theory
for the Apprendi line of cases is needed, one that addresses the constitutional rights
and powers of constitutional criminal procedure in a more stable and cohesive way.
II. A NEW CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION FOR APPRENDI-HARRIS DOcTRINE
The Supreme Court's chosen framework for analyzing the Apprendi line of
cases has resulted in an impasse in constitutional interpretation that is incapable of
resolution on its current terms. Examined as a question involving the Jury Trial
Guarantee of the Sixth Amendment and Due Process Clause principles, the Court
has become mired in disputes over originalism and precedent that are intractable.
Narrow, shifting majorities and pluralities have crafted a constitutional rule that has
thin support on the Court. Legislatures, lower courts, scholars, and attorneys must
wonder about the future of both Apprendi and Harriswhen doctrine arises on such
a closely divided and bitterly contested basis.
Yet the holdings adopted by the Court are sound and eminently defensible as a
matter of constitutional interpretation-with a different method of analysis. From
this alternative perspective, the Apprendi-Harris rule is solidly grounded and
internally consistent. The problems that so far have plagued the Court's cases
disappear, and disputes about the nuances of rough analogies in the history and
case law can be set aside in favor of a constitutional interpretation addressed
specifically to the implications of the new statutes under review in challenges to
modem sentencing practices.
This alternative analytical framework is the constitutional structure of criminal
procedure. It provides a clearer and more persuasive method of analysis for
considering all of the issues raised. Structural constitutional reasoning more
accurately frames the constitutional inquiry not solely in terms of the defendant's
Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, but rather through the rubric of a broader
concept: the defendant's offense of conviction and the constitutional consequences
that follow from the offense's enactment, charge, trial, and punishment. This
perspective not only better explains the necessity of the Apprendi rule but also
reveals why the Harrisdoctrine is equally correct. Accordingly, the constitutional
structure analysis should be the new constitutional interpretation for this hotly
contested area of criminal procedure.
A. Defining the Problem: The ConstitutionalText
In addressing the issues presented in the Apprendi line of cases, the crucial
starting point in the analysis is the proper scope of the constitutional question.
Relying on the text of the Constitution's criminal procedure provisions, the Court
correctly has identified the question as the constitutional implications of the
defendant's "offense of conviction": the crime that is charged and for which the

740-41 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 248-49 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); cf Harris,536 U.S. at 557-68.

124. In hindsight, it appears that Justice Scalia may have foreshadowed this divergence
by joining only parts of Justice Thomas's concurring opinion in Apprendi--and not the part
calling for McMillan to be overruled. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 499-523; cf. supra note 103
and accompanying text.
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jury convicts. Where the Court has gone wrong is the limitation of its consideration
of the implication of the offense of conviction solely in terms of the Sixth
Amendment right to jury trial. The constitutional structure analysis provides a
broader perspective and a superior constitutional interpretation.
1.

So Close and Yet So Far: The Court's Limited Analysis

The Court has recognized that the text of the Constitution establishes the basic
framework for analyzing the Apprendi line of cases. 125 Although of course the
words of the text do not speak in literal terms of "elements of the offense" and
"sentencing factors" as the Court has come to define those categories, the
provisions governing criminal procedure nonetheless identify the locus for
considering the constitutional implications of the challenged statutes.
All of the constitutional provisions relating to criminal procedure have at their
core a single unifying concept: that a criminal prosecution involves an offense that
must be alleged and proved-the offense of conviction. For example, the Fifth
Amendment requires a grand jury allegation for an "infamous crime," proscribes
double jeopardy for the "same offence," and prohibits compulsory selfincrimination "in any criminal case."' 12 6 Similarly, the Sixth Amendment protects a
wide range of procedural rights, including trial by jury and notice of the accusation,
"[i]n all criminal prosecutions." 7 Article II empowers the President to pardon
convicted criminals of their "Offenses against the United States."'' 28 On the other
hand, the text of the Constitution nowhere imposes any similar specific procedural
29
requirements for sentencing an offender who already has been convicted.'
Despite the serious and sometimes spirited differences on the Court concerning
the proper analysis of the Apprendi line of cases under the Sixth Amendment right
to jury trial, the various contrasting perspectives nonetheless agree that the locus of
the analysis is the one suggested by the text of the Constitution: the offense of
conviction. The Apprendi majority, the Harris plurality, and the Harris dissent
each are premised on the necessity of an offense of conviction; what the diverging
opinions dispute is which facts must be established as elements of that offense and
which instead may be sentencing factors. Even the Apprendi dissenters, who
125. See, e.g., Harris,536 U.S. at 549; id. at 574-75 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Apprendi,
530 U.S. at 476-77; id. at 499 (Thomas, J., concurring); see also Priester, Sentenced, supra
note 45, at 271-75. The Apprendi-Harris issue therefore is unlike other areas of
constitutional law in which judicial doctrine has diverged notoriously from the text. See, e.g.,
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999) ("We have, as a result, sometimes referred to the
States' immunity from suit as 'Eleventh Amendment immunity.' The phrase is convenient
shorthand but something of a misnomer, for the sovereign immunity of the States neither
derives from, nor is limited by, the terms of the Eleventh Amendment."); Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719-22 (1997) (describing doctrine of substantive due process).
126. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth

Amendments also proscribe deprivations of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law. See id. amends. V, XIV, § 1.
127. Id. amend. VI; see also id. art. I1, § 2 cl. 3 (requiring trial by jury for "all
Crimes").
128. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
129. Cf.id. amend. VIII (prohibiting excessive fines or bail and cruel and unusual
punishments); id. art. I, § 3, cl. 7 (providing that impeached and removed federal officer
remains "liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to
Law").
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disclaimed any Sixth Amendment limitation on the effect of factfinding at
sentencing, appear to concede that the severity of the offense
30 of conviction might
sometimes be relevant to the fundamental fairness standard.1
But the agreement that the concept of an offense of conviction is necessary to
applying the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial has not answered the specific
question at issue in the Apprendi line of cases: "the seemingly simple question of
what constitutes a 'crime"' and, more specifically, "which facts are 'elements' or
'ingredients' of a crime" to which these rights attach.' 3' If a fact qualifies as an
element of the offense of conviction for purposes of these constitutional provisions,
then the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights attach to that fact. If a fact is instead
a sentencing factor, then by definition its determination is not the establishment of
a "crime" for constitutional purposes and the defendant does not have the right to a
jury trial or proof beyond a reasonable doubt, among others, for that determination.
Whether a fact is an element of the offense or a sentencing factor32has dispositive
1
importance for application of the defendant's constitutional rights.
Thus, the justices agree that the defendant must be convicted of a criminal
offense, after which the sentence may be imposed; they disagree about the
limitation upon the resulting sentence that the offense of conviction creates.
Answering that question of constitutional interpretation requires analysis of which
facts must, as a matter of constitutional law, be elements of the offense of
conviction. The distinction between elements and sentencing factors has
constitutional significance because otherwise "legislatures could evade the
indictment, jury, and proof requirements by labeling almost every relevant fact a
sentencing factor."' 133 Hence, every argument that seeks to resolve the ApprendiHarris constitutional issue, including the Court's hopelessly stalled Sixth
Amendment analysis, necessarily reaches a conclusion about what facts
constitutionally must be elements of the offense of conviction and what facts need
not be.
The enterprise of determining the scope of the offense of conviction for
purposes of the constitutional law of sentencing is not unique to the Apprendi line
of cases. The Supreme Court long has accepted the principle that the punishment
inflicted on a convicted offender may be "cruel and unusual" in violation of the
Eighth Amendment if the sentence imposed is "grossly disproportionate" to the
offense involved. 34 As with Apprendi-Harris doctrine, the application of Eighth

130. See, e.g., Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 552-54 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); id. at 562-63
(Breyer, J., dissenting); Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 242-43.
131. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 499-500 (Thomas, J., concurring); see also Harris,536 U.S.
at 563; id. at 575 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721, 737-38 (1998)
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
132. See, e.g., Harris,536 U.S. at 549-50; Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494 & n.19. Similar
results occur in other areas of criminal procedure when the application of a statute is
determined not to involve adjudication of a criminal offense. For example, the Court has
sustained the use of civil forfeiture against property tainted by its use to facilitate illegal
narcotics activity and has held that such forfeiture-when it is civil, not criminal or punitive,
in nature-does not implicate the Double Jeopardy Clause. See United States v. Bajakajian,
524 U.S. 321, 331-32 (1998); United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 270-71 (1996).
133. Harris,536 U.S. at 550.
134. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted"); Ewing
v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 30-31 (2003); id. at 35 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Lockyer v.
Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 72 (2003); id. at 77 (Souter, J., dissenting); Harmelin v. Michigan,
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Amendment proportionality doctrine turns on the analysis of the constitutional
question in terms of a constitutional concept of an offense of conviction--that is,
the scope of the "offense" against which the proportionality analysis is
performed.135 For this reason, proportionality doctrine provides a useful illustration
of the kind of analysis required in the Apprendi line of cases.
In 2003, a sharply divided Court in Ewing v. California136 upheld a recidivist
sentence imposed under California's "three strikes" law. Ewing had been sentenced
to a term of twenty-five years to life and argued that his sentence was grossly
disproportional to this particular conviction for a $1200 theft. 137 The plurality and
dissenting opinions in Ewing apparently reached agreement on the proper two-step
method for evaluating proportionality claims, but they disagreed on the outcome of
that analysis. 38 And the divergence in application of the proportionality analysis to

501 U.S. 957, 997 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Weems v. United States, 217
U.S. 349 (1910)). Only two Justices on the current Court reject the existence of the
proportionality requirement. See Ewing, 538 U.S. at 31-32 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 32
(Thomas, J., concurring); cf. id. at 32-35 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (responding to concurring
justices).
At the same time, however, the Court candidly has acknowledged that "[o]ur cases
exhibit a lack of clarity regarding what factors may indicate a gross disproportionality."
Andrade, 538 U.S. at 72. The ultimate outcomes of the Court's recent proportionality cases
are relatively easy to describe. The Court has not invalidated a sentence to a term of years
from which the defendant ultimately may be released. In Rummel v. Estelle, the Court
upheld a life sentence with the possibility of parole where the offender had three convictions
for theft in the amounts of approximately $80, $28, and $120. 445 U.S. 263, 263, 265-66,
284-85 (1980). In Hutto v. Davis, the Court similarly upheld consecutive sentences of twenty
years' imprisonment for a recidivist convicted of possession with intent to distribute and
distribution of nine ounces of marijuana. 454 U.S. 370, 370, 374-75 (1982) (per curiam).
Davis had several prior drug convictions. Id. at 372 n.1; id. at 380 n.10 (Powell, J.,
concurring). In Lockyer v. Andrade, the Court ordered the denial of habeas corpus relief to a
state prisoner with eight prior convictions who had been sentenced to consecutive terms of
twenty-five years to life for two thefts totaling about $150. 538 U.S. 63, 65-69, 78 (2003).
And in Ewing v. California,the Court upheld a sentence of twenty-five years to life for theft
of about $1200 in goods by an offender with at least fourteen prior convictions on ten
different occasions (most committed while on probation or parole from a prior offense). 538
U.S. 11, 16-19, 30 (2003).
Even a sentence with no potential for release may be constitutional. In Harmelin v.
Michigan, the Court affirmed a life sentence without the possibility of parole for a first
offense of cocaine possession where an enormous quantity of narcotics was involved. 501
U.S. 957, 961, 997 (1991); see id. at 1002, 1009 (Kennedy, J., concurring). The plurality
opinion noted that the nearly 700 grams involved constituted at least 32,500 (and possibly
over 60,000) individual doses of cocaine. Id. at 1002 (Kennedy, J., concurring). In Solem v.
Helm, however, the Court did hold unconstitutional a life sentence without the possibility of
parole upon the offender's conviction for writing a false check for $100, his seventh nonviolent felony. 463 U.S. 277, 277, 279, 281 (1983).
135. Unlike Apprendi-Harrisdoctrine, which fundamentally concerns the procedures
by which certain facts must (or need not) be proven, proportionality doctrine concerns the
substantiveconstitutionality of a sentence.
136. 538 U.S. 11 (2003).
137. See id. at 14-21 (describing California statute, procedural history of case, and

defendant's criminal history).
138. The first step is a threshold comparison of the severity of the sentence to the
gravity of the offense. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 27-32; id. at 36-37 (Breyer, J., dissenting). In
many cases it will be clear at this first step that the sentence is not grossly disproportional
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the facts of Ewing derived entirely from a dispute over the proper framing of the
constitutional question. More precisely, the two positions disagreed on the
significance of Ewing's status as a recidivist in evaluating the severity of his
sentence in comparison to his offense of conviction for Eighth Amendment
purposes.
Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion expressly noted this dispute by declaring
that "Ewing incorrectly frames the issue" when evaluating "the gravity of the
offense compared to the harshness of the penalty."' 3 9 The plurality insisted that:
The gravity of his offense was not merely "shoplifting three golf clubs."
Rather, Ewing was convicted of felony grand theft for stealing nearly
$1,200 worth of merchandise after previously having been convicted of
at least two "violent" or "serious" felonies.... In weighing the gravity
of Ewing's offense, we must place on the scales not only his current
felony, but also his long history of felony recidivism. 140

Thus, the plurality opinion considered Ewing's recidivism to relate directly to
the gravity of his current "offense." And in light of his long history of recidivism,
dismissing his claim was routine.14' "Profound disappointment with the perceived
lenity of criminal sentencing (especially for repeat felons) led to passage of three
strikes laws in the first place." 2 For Eighth Amendment purposes, the plurality
the crime was as important to evaluating its gravity as what
argued, who committed
43
the crime was.1

and the sentence accordingly will be affirmed. See id. at 30-31 (rejecting claim at first step);
id. at 36 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("[i]f a claim crosses that threshold--itself a rare
occurrence") (emphasis in original). If the threshold analysis does not definitively resolve
the constitutional question but instead leaves doubts as to gross disproportionality, then the
Court proceeds to additional intra-jurisdictional and inter-jurisdictional comparisons of
sentences for comparable offenses. See id. at 23 (citing Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1004-05
(Kennedy, J., concurring)); id. at 36-37 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (same). With this additional
information the Court then considers whether the challenged sentence is grossly
disproportional in violation of the Eighth Amendment. See id. at 42-48 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (performing such comparisons).
Of the seven Justices who applied this analysis to the facts of Ewing in light of the
previously described precedent, three concluded that Ewing's claim failed at the first step,
while four argued that the sentence was grossly disproportional after applying both steps.
See id. at 29-31 (plurality opinion joined three justices); id. at 52-53 (Breyer, J., dissenting
for four justices). Justices Scalia and Thomas refused to apply the proportionality
requirement but concurred in the result with the plurality opinion. See supra note 134.
139. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 28.
140. Id. at 28-29 (emphasis added); see also id. at 30 n.2 (asserting that the California

legislature intended this interpretation of the recidivism sentencing statute).
141. See id. at 28-30.
142. Id. at 24 n. 1.
143. This broader, functional interpretation of the offense of conviction is analogous to
the reasoning of the Harris Court, which emphasized deference to legislative policy choices
subject to the narrow limitation of the Apprendi rule. See supra note 110. In fact, the Ewing
plurality grounded its interpretation of the proportionality analysis partly on this basis: "Any
other approach would fail to accord proper deference to the policy judgments that find
expression in the legislature's choice of sanctions... [in] not merely punishing the offense

of conviction... [but also] in dealing in a harsher manner" with recidivists. Ewing, 538 U.S.
at 29. The functional interpretation also is similar to the Apprendi dissent's assertion that
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Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion, by contrast, examined the issue very
differently by focusing on the "sentence-triggering criminal conduct."'144 Rather
than considering Ewing's recidivism to relate to the gravity of his offense, the
dissent maintained that "the sentence-triggering behavior here ranks well toward
the bottom of the criminal conduct scale."' 145 The dissent rejected the plurality's
claim that recidivism was relevant to the seriousness of the offense:
This case, of course, involves shoplifting engaged in by a
recidivist. One might argue that any crime committed by a recidivist is a
serious crime potentially warranting a 25-year sentence. But this Court
rejected that view .... Our cases make clear that, in cases involving

recidivist offenders, we must focus upon the offense that triggers the
life
sentence, with recidivism playing a relevant, but not necessarily
determinative, role. 146

Unlike the plurality opinion, the dissent evaluated the gravity of the offense
solely on the basis of the conduct and surrounding circumstances of its
commission, not the character or history of the person who committed it.' 47 Facts
relating to the offender and his criminal history ultimately may justify a severe
48
penalty, the dissent conceded, but they do not make the "offense" itself worse. 1
Therefore, the Eighth Amendment analytical dispute concerning
proportionality ultimately concerns the proper definition of the constitutional
offense of conviction. Even though the text of the Eighth Amendment---"nor [shall]
cruel and unusual punishments [be] inflicted"-does not expressly mention it, both
positions in Ewing agreed that proportionality must be evaluated by reference to an
offense of conviction;
the justices disagreed about which facts may be considered
49

part of that offense. 1

The question of constitutional interpretation involved in the Apprendi line of
cases presents the same analytical problem. Notwithstanding the strident
only a Due Process Clause fundamental fairness test should govern challenges to sentences.
See supra notes 79, 107, 108-11, 130 and accompanying text.
144. Id. at 37 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis added; internal citations omitted).
145. Id. at 40 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
146. Id. at 41 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (original emphasis removed and new emphasis
added; internal quotations and brackets omitted).
147. See id. at 37 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (separating "the offender's actual behavior or
other offense-related circumstances" from "the offender's criminal history"). Likewise, the
dissent considered recidivism to be one factor in weighing the offense against the penalty,
not as part of the offense side of the balance only. See id. at 36-42 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Cf.Durden v. California, 531 U.S. 1184, 1184 (2001) (Souter, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari) (describing offense as "a petty theft" in which "the value of the goods taken was
$43"); Riggs v. California, 525 U.S. 1114, 1114 (1999) (opinion of Stevens, J., respecting
denial of certiorari) (describing offense as theft of "a bottle of vitamins from a supermarket"
and separately noting that "petitioner in this case has eight prior felony convictions").
148. This literal, formalistic interpretation of the offense of conviction corresponds to
the similar idea underlying the Apprendi rule, where the offense of conviction is defined by
reference to statutory facts and the jury's guilty verdict. See supra notes 61-76 and
accompanying text.
149. The dispute between the plurality and dissent in Ewing over the meaning of the
"offense" of conviction, see supra notes 140-49 and accompanying text, also might be seen
as something of a semantic one similar to the problematic use of the word "range" in Harris
and other Apprendi cases, see supra note 112.

2004]

STRUCTURING SENTENCING

disagreements over the scope of the offense of conviction for purposes of
Apprendi-Harris doctrine, all sides in the debate presume the requirement of an
offense of conviction. What the dispute concerns, therefore, is which facts
constitutionally must be established as elements of that offense.
Thus, the Court properly has analyzed the Apprendi line of cases in terms of
the constitutional implications of the offense charged in a criminal case and for
which the defendant is convicted by the jury. This analysis has a solid basis in the
text of the Constitution and serves as a useful template for considering the
fundamental principles involved. The Court is asking the right question but
answering it poorly. The constitutional concept of the offense of conviction is the
correct focus for the analysis. It is the Court's narrow reliance solely on the Sixth
Amendment that dooms its search for analytical clarity.
2. The Full Perspective: The Constitutional Structure of Criminal Procedure
The Court has failed because it has not taken full advantage of the insight
provided by analyzing the constitutional issue in terms of the concept of the offense
of conviction. Instead of an exclusive emphasis on what the offense of conviction
means only for the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial, the Court should take a
broader view. Within the framework of the offense of conviction, the Court should
look to the constitutional structure of criminal procedure in analyzing which
institutions-legislature, prosecutor, jury, and judge--must play which roles in
defining criminal offenses, establishing convictions, and imposing sentences for
them.
The questions of constitutional interpretation presented in the Apprendi line of
cases implicate the powers of four traditional institutions of constitutional criminal
procedure and the balance among them. The relationship between elements of the
offense and sentencing factors is considerably more complex than simply an
allocation of decision-making authority between trial jury and sentencing judge.
The prerogatives of the legislature and the role of the prosecutor cannot be
overlooked. The balance of power among these four institutions creates the
constitutional structure of criminal procedure.
The Constitution regulates the constitutional structure of criminal procedure in
a familiar way: preventing the exercise of tyrannical power by any one institution
through a combination of checks, balances, and individual rights. 150 As described
above, the constitutional provisions governing criminal procedure all rely upon the
core concept of an offense of conviction--the criminal offense enacted by the
legislature, charged by the prosecution, tried to a jury, and punished at sentencing.
The concept of an offense of conviction is the heart of the Constitution's structural
framework in criminal procedure and determines the manner in which powers are
separated in the constitutional criminal procedure of sentencing.
First, the legislature ultimately controls the agenda in the constitutional
criminal procedure of sentencing in each jurisdiction. The legislature determines
what criminal offenses will exist and defines the terms of the offenses by providing

150. See, e.g., Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 756-58 (1996); Mistretta v.
United States, 488 U.S. 361, 381-83 (1989); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 710-12
(1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrtIONAL LAW § 2-3
(3d ed. 2000).
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their elements.'15 If the legislature refuses to criminalize certain conduct, then
persons may engage in it freely without fear of criminal sanction; when the
legislature enacts a criminal statute that proscribes specified conduct, individuals
who do not conform their actions to the law will face the consequences.
Constitutional doctrines like the principle of legality and the prohibitions on ex post
facto crimes, for example, ensure that this premise is respected. 152 It is equally
without question that defendants may not be sentenced to a greater punishment than
the legislature has provided. 153 The legislature decides what punishment may be
imposed for violation of the offenses in two ways: first by determining generally
what kind of sentencing scheme will be used and second by determining the
amount of punishment that will be available within that scheme for each offense.
While these legislative powers are significant, each of them is severely constrained
by the fact that participation of other institutions is necessary to implement the
criminal laws against persons who violate them.
Second, action by the executive branch is necessary to enforce criminal
offenses. The Constitution's Bill of Attainder Clauses prohibit Congress and the
states from enacting direct imposition of criminal punishment by legislative
action. 154 Accordingly, even independent of ordinary separation of powers
principles in constitutional law, the constitutional structure of criminal procedure
includes a specific textual mandate of executive branch enforcement of
legislatively enacted crimes. Once an alleged criminal offense is reported,
discovered, or otherwise investigated, a prosecutor must prepare and file charges
against the alleged perpetrator. In the federal system and some states felony
charges must be filed by means of an indictment approved by a grand jury; the
151. At the federal level and in most states, all criminal offenses are statutory. See
generally 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUsTIN W. Scorr, JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 2.1
(2d ed. 2003); see also, e.g., Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 424 (1985) (discussing

lack of federal common law crimes). In those states that have retained judicially defined
common law offenses, the legislature has either expressly or implicitly authorized the
enforcement of such offenses by not abrogating them by statute.
152. See also, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (prohibiting federal ex post facto laws);
id. § 10, cl. 1 (prohibiting state ex post facto laws); Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 421, 46771 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting); United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 264-72 & n.5
(1999). See generally 1 LAFAVE & Scorr, supra note 151, at § 1.2(b); WILLiAM H.
REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE 84 (1998) ("A criminal defendant in a civilian court...
is never at any loss to know not only the criminal acts with which he is charged but also the
exact laws that makes those acts a crime.").
153. See, e.g., Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 481-83 & nn.9-10 (2000) (citing
United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447 (1972) and Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241,
246 (1949)); id. at 544-49 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that legislatively enacted
sentencing factors or findings of fact in determinate sentencing schema need not be elements
of offense); Rutledge v. United States, 517 U.S. 292, 297 (1996) (citing cases); see also
REHNQUIST, supra note 152, at 85 ("In the federal courts, and in most state courts, the
sentence is imposed by the judge, rather than by the jury, but the judge is bound to sentence
within the limits set forth in the statute.").
154. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (prohibiting Congress); id. § 10, cl. 1 (prohibiting the
states); see also, e.g., United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965). Impeachment is not
criminal punishment for such purposes. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 7 (providing that
impeached and removed federal officer remains "liable and subject to Indictment, Trial,
Judgment and Punishment, according to Law"); id. art. H, § 2, cl. 1 (providing that
presidential pardon does not foreclose impeachment); id. art. Ill, § 2, cl. 3 (expressly
excluding cases of impeachment from Article II jury trial guarantee for "all Crimes").
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constitutional requirement that the defendant have notice of the accusation requires
the filing of a charging instrument (usually an information) for all crimes in all
jurisdictions.155 The executive's decision whether to proceed with a prosecution is
virtually unreviewable, although charges may be dismissed after they are filed in
extreme cases of prosecutorial misconduct 56 or if they violate the prohibition
against a defendant being "twice put in jeopardy" for the "same offense."' 57 And
most basically, of course, the prosecutor is constrained to charging criminal
offenses enacted by the legislature, and the charging instrument must delineate the
specific crimes with which a defendant is being charged. 158 Finally, depending on
the sentencing scheme that is in place and the severity of the punishment provided
for the offense, the prosecutor's charging decision may have comparatively greater
or lesser importance in determining the defendant's ultimate punishment.
Third, the charges filed by the prosecution are adjudicated in a court. Unless
the prosecution withdraws the accusation, 159 the charges are resolved under the
extensive procedural protections the Constitution provides for the trial of criminal
offenses. The Apprendi line of cases has focused on the Sixth Amendment right to
trial by jury, but other rights like the Confrontation Clause and Compulsory
Process Clause may be equally relevant to the defendant's defense of the crime
charged in the "criminal prosecution."' 16 0 The Due Process Clause requirement of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt also places a significant limitation on the
prosecution's ability to obtain a conviction. 161 And even in the large percentage of
cases that end with a guilty plea rather than a jury trial verdict, the concept of the
criminal offense matters tremendously. The Court has held that the Due Process
Clause requires that a guilty plea be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, which
155. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amends. V-VI; Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117
(1974); FED. R. CRiM. P. 7(c); 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §§ 19.2(c),
19.2(0, 19.3(a) (1999 & 2002 pocket part).
156. See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996) (regarding selective

prosecution); Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250 (1988) (regarding
prosecutorial misconduct in grand jury); Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974) (regarding
vindictive prosecution). Although the decision whether to prosecute is virtually
unreviewable, most jurisdictions provide a procedure for judicial oversight of the sufficiency
of the allegations in the charge; grand jury approval of federal felony indictments is required
by the Fifth Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. V; see generally 4 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note
155, at chs.14-15.
157. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. V; Rutledge, 517 U.S. at 297-300 (1996) (applying
Double Jeopardy analysis set forth in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932));
United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688 (1993).
158. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 483 n.10 (referring to "statute of indictment"); cf FED.
R. CRIM. P. 7(c)(1) (requiring counts for offenses in indictments or informations).
159. In some cases the presiding judge may dismiss the charges on legal grounds. For
example, the defendant might challenge the court's jurisdiction to try him, argue that the
statute cannot be construed to apply to his conduct, or assert that the statute is
unconstitutional on grounds unrelated to criminal procedure, such as the First Amendment or
substantive due process. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (challenging a
criminal conviction under doctrine of substantive due process); Ashcroft v. Free Speech
Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002) (challenging a criminal statute under First Amendment);
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (challenging the constitutionality of federal
criminal statute); United States v. deVegter, 198 F.3d 1324 (11 th Cir. 1999) (challenging the
interpretation of criminal statute as applied to defendants' conduct).
160. U.S. CONST. amends. V-VI.
161. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
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includes the requirement that the defendant understand the offense charged and the
penal consequences of admitting guilt to it. 162 Whether the defendant is convicted

at trial or63 pleads guilty, the outcome is a judgment of conviction for a specific
offense. 1

Fourth and finally, the convicted offender will be sentenced pursuant to the
sentencing scheme enacted by the legislature. Depending on the nature of that
scheme, the judge's authority at sentencing could vary from ministerial imposition
of a determinate sentence to the exercise of unbridled discretion in selecting a
penalty from a very wide range of available sanctions. Unlike the trial protections,
the Constitution does not contain any provisions that expressly govern the
procedures applicable at sentencing. Instead, at least the minimum requirements of
the Due Process Clause will apply to the extent there is a sentencing proceeding
more meaningful than ministerial imposition of a statutory determinate sentence."
Nonetheless, the constitutional structure of criminal procedure necessarily imposes
another requirement: that whatever occurs at sentencing not constitute a "criminal
prosecution" or amount to convicting the defendant of an additional "offense"
without the protections applicable to trials. While the Constitution does not
prescribe what sentencing must be, by clear implication it does command what
sentencing must not be: a usurpation of the well-defined procedures for enacting,
charging, and convicting defendants of crimes.
It is important, moreover, to clarify the scope of the constitutional structure of
criminal procedure. Although the form of structural constitutional interpretation is
the same, that scope differs in several ways from the archetype of constitutional
structure analysis: the division of power among the three branches of the federal
government. Notably, the constitutional structure of criminal procedure does not

162. See, e.g., Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314 (1999); Bousley v. United States,
523 U.S. 614 (1998); Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637 (1976); see also FED. R. CRIM. P.

11 (c)-(d).
163. Cf. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(d) (providing for entry of judgment for convictions for
counts charged). Professor Bibas argues that consideration of the role of the jury as one of
the institutions holding power in criminal procedure is "anachronistic" because of the nearly
complete predominance of guilty pleas in criminal adjudication. See Bibas, Fact-Finding,
supra note 45, at 1100-01, 1174-78; Stephanos Bibas, How Apprendi Affects Institutional
Allocations of Power, 87 IOWA L. REv. 465, 465-66, 475 (2002) [hereinafter Bibas,
Institutional Allocations). No different from a jury verdict, however, a guilty plea must
establish the elements of an offense of conviction.
164. See, e.g., United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447 (1972); Townsend v. Burke,
334 U.S. 736, 741 (1948). Professor Michaels has thoroughly catalogued the range of
constitutional procedural rights applicable to trials that have been held to apply, or not to
apply, at sentencing. Alan C. Michaels, Trial Rights at Sentencing, 81 N.C. L. REv. 1771
(2003). Michaels concludes that courts have required application of rights aimed at ensuring
the "best estimate" of the appropriate sentence for the offender, but have rejected application
of rights that provide "special protection" for the defendant's liberty or autonomy. Id. at
1775-79, 1855-62. This description is consistent with the results in the Apprendi line of
cases, Michaels explains, because (like the "best estimate" principle) those cases protect the
defendant's "residual liberty interest" in receiving a fair sentence after a conviction, an
interest that is far lesser in magnitude than the liberty interest in the threshold
guilt/innocence determination. Id. at 1858-62; see also id. at 1842 ("Whether the judgment is
discretionary and concerned with rehabilitation, or tightly guided and concerned with
offense characteristics, allowing consideration of more relevant evidence increases the
average accuracy of judgments at a cost of more errors harmful to the defendant.").
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concern the classical "separation of powers" doctrines relating to the allocation of
power by Articles I, II, and Ill of the Constitution. 65 Instead, it derives from the
allocation of power by different provisions: those that govern criminal procedure
and create the constitutional concept of the offense of conviction (primarily the
rights granted in the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, but also the Bill of Attainder
Clauses and other provisions previously mentioned). I66 Although the legislative,
executive, and judicial branches each are implicated, the powers at issue are those
relating to the offense of conviction that must be enacted, charged, proved, and
punished. Furthermore, constitutional criminal procedure commands the
participation of a fourth institution, the trial jury, whose decisionmaking authority
serves as a check on all three other institutions. 167 And perhaps most significantly,
the constitutional structure of criminal procedure derives from provisions that,
168
unlike federal "separation of powers" doctrines, also are binding on the states.
Accordingly, the constitutional structure analysis governs both federal and state
criminal offenses and sentencing laws.
The constitutional structure of criminal procedure involves the balance of
power between the four institutions: legislature, prosecutor, trial jury, and
sentencing judge. Each institution plays a significant role in determining the
defendant's offense of conviction and the punishment that may be imposed for it.
This broader perspective for evaluating the constitutional law of sentencing
provides a better analysis of the issues involved than the narrow Sixth Amendment
focus used by the Court.

165. See, e.g., Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998); Clinton v. Jones, 520
U.S. 681 (1997); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919
(1983).
166. See supra notes 125-33 and accompanying text; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 9,
cl. 3 and 10, cl. 1; id. art. II, § 2, cl. 3.
167. Although the jury is involved in the courtroom proceedings of a criminal case, it is
not merely a subsidiary institution of the judicial branch. Rather, citizen participation in the
adjudication of guilt-and particularly the power of jury nullification-protects against the
abuse of power by legislatures, prosecutors, and judges. For this reason, the jury serves as a
fourth institution in the constitutional structure of criminal procedure that is independent of
the other three. See, e.g., Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 498 (2000) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) ("Judges, it is sometimes necessary to remind ourselves, are part of the
State-and an increasingly bureaucratic part of it at that."); Jones v. United States, 526 U.S.
227, 243-48 (1999) (discussing historical importance of jury and jury nullification); AKHIL
REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

161-78 (1997) (arguing for a

81-118, 268-78 (1998)
(same); Iontcheva, supra note 108 at 314, 338, 381-83 (arguing that legislatures should enact
statutes providing for jury sentencing to increase democratic deliberation about criminal
punishments).
168. The Court has "incorporated" into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment all of the relevant criminal procedure provisions of the Bill of Rights except the
requirement of a grand jury indictment. See generally 1 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 155, at §
2.6(b). The Constitution's text expressly prohibits states from enacting ex post facto crimes
greater role for juries); AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS

and Bills of Attainder. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
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B. The New Framework: ConstitutionalStructure
and InstitutionalBalance of Power
By changing the focus from a single right held by defendants to the broader
level of institutional roles and allocations of power in constitutional criminal
procedure, the Court will find clearer reasoning about the relationship between
criminal offenses and trial rights on the one hand, and sentencing factors and
calculations of punishment on the other. To date the Court has emphasized the
balance between trial juries and sentencing judges without adequately considering
the powers of legislatures and prosecutors at all stages of a criminal case. A fuller
picture of the relevant powers in criminal procedure breaks the Court's impasse and
explains its holdings more effectively.
The constitutional structure analysis justifies the Apprendi-Harrisrule in terms
that withstand scrutiny far better than the ones the Court has used. The Apprendi
requirement that the facts that determine the defendant's maximum sentence be
elements of the offense follows from the allocation of institutional powers by the
Constitution's criminal procedure provisions. Similarly, the Harrisrule permitting
the determination of mandatory minimum sentences or other restrictions on the
imposition of the sentence beneath the maximum established by the offense of
conviction also follows from the same reasoning. Accordingly, the constitutional
structure analysis provides a superior constitutional interpretation for resolving the
questions raised in this area of criminal procedure.
1. Explaining the Apprendi Rule
The constitutional structure analysis provides a cogent explanation for why the
Apprendi rule is a constitutional requirement. The Constitution's provisions
governing criminal procedure establish a system of adjudication in which the
defendant is charged with and tried for an offense that provides a basis for
judgment and punishment. This structure compels the conclusion that the defendant
may not be sentenced except pursuant to that offense, and the Apprendi rule is a
constitutional requirement that protects this principle.
The fundamental premise of the constitutional structure analysis of the
Apprendi rule is the incontestable proposition that the power to impose punishment
for violation of a criminal offense requires an exercise of legislative authority. As
discussed above, defendants may only be charged with, tried for, and convicted of
criminal offenses authorized by the legislature, and defendants may not be
sentenced to a greater punishment than the legislature has provided. Imposing a
higher sentence than was authorized by law would be unconstitutional for the
simple reason that the court lacked the power to take such action.
In light of the requirement that a defendant not be sentenced to a more severe
penalty than the legislature has authorized for the offense of conviction, the dispute
over the Apprendi rule is distilled to a single issue: for constitutional purposes, how
does a court determine what maximum sentence has been authorized by the
legislature for a convicted defendant? The majority and dissent in Apprendi provide
different answers to this question.
The position taken by the Apprendi majority is that the maximum sentence
imposed on the defendant must be defined by reference to the offense of conviction
established by the guilty verdict. As described above, the facts found beyond a
reasonable doubt by a jury (or facts admitted in a guilty plea colloquy) are
compared to the terms of the offenses under which the defendant has been charged
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169
and convicted to determine the maximum sentence authorized by those facts.
Likewise, if a fact is used to increase the maximum sentence beyond an otherwise
applicable statutory level--whether a nested statute like Jones or an add-on
enhancement like Apprendi---then that fact must be proven as an element of the
offense. 170
Under the majority's position, therefore, the specific offense under which the
defendant is charged and convicted is the only statute that may be used to
determine the authorized maximum punishment. This rule does not preclude the
legislature from enacting nested statutes or separate sentencing provisions. By
requiring that the defendant's maximum sentence be determined only by reference
to the findings of fact established by the guilty verdict, however, the rule limits the
sentences that may be imposed. For example, if serious bodily injury is not proven
as an element of the offense in a § 2119 case, or the requisite quantity of cocaine is
not proven as an element in a non-recidivist § 841 case, then the defendant's
maximum sentence must be determined without reference to those facts--that is,
fifteen years under § 2119(1) or twenty years under § 841(b)(1)(C). 7 1 Conversely,
if the prosecution seeks to impose a certain maximum sentence provided by statute,
then it must be certain to prove all the facts that the terms of the statute make
necessary for authorizing that level of punishment.
The Apprendi dissenters, by contrast, reject the significance of the offense of
conviction and determine the legislature's authorized maximum sentence by
reference to any applicable statutes. The jury's verdict of guilty exposes a
defendant to punishment, but the facts found in that verdict are not controlling;
rather, any relevant statute may be considered by the sentencing judge so long as
72
the sentence ultimately imposed on the defendant is consistent with Due Process.1
If the legislature wishes to increase the maximum penalty on the basis 173
of a fact not
proven as an element of the offense, it may enact a statute that does SO.
Under the dissenters' view, the criminal offense for which the defendant has
been charged and convicted is necessary but not sufficient for evaluating what
maximum punishment the legislature has authorized for the offender. Conviction
for an offense is only a threshold step for imposing punishment and not also a
restrictive determination that limits the subsequent penalty. In essence, the
dissenters maintain that the offense of conviction established by a guilty verdict is
formally irrelevant to the determination of the offender's maximum sentence
(although they concede the possibility that in an extreme case a sentencing
provision might violate the Due Process Clause).
Thus, the disagreement between the Apprendi majority and dissent rests on
different conclusions about the relationship between the constitutional concept of
the offense of conviction and the legislature's power to authorize the maximum
penalty for crimes. The majority position maintains that the two are inextricably

169. See supra notes 57-76 and accompanying text.
170. See id.; see also Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 468-69, 491-92 (holding state statute
unconstitutional because statute denied protections of element of offense to finding of fact
that increased defendant's maximum sentence above otherwise applicable statutory
maximum).
171. 18 U.S.C. § 2119; 21 U.S.C. § 841; see also supra notes 68-71 and accompanying
text.
172. See supra notes 56, 77-79, and 120 and accompanying text.
173. See, e.g., Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 564 (Breyer, J., dissenting); id. at 552-54
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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linked: that the legislatively authorized maximum punishment must be a maximum
penalty for the specific offense of which the defendant has been convicted. The
dissenters' position, on the other hand, asserts that maximum punishments may be
authorized independent of offenses and that conviction for a specific offense does
not restrict the application of other relevant laws that increase that penalty above
the maximum otherwise provided in the offense itself.
The question of how a court determines the legislatively authorized maximum
punishment for an offender therefore depends on whether the Constitution's
provisions governing criminal procedure require a connection between the criminal
offense of conviction and the resulting maximum punishment. A constitutional
structure analysis provides a clear answer to this dilemma and explains why the
majority's Apprendi rule is a constitutional requirement.
The constitutional structure of criminal procedure requires that the imposition
of a sentence on a convicted offender not constitute a "criminal prosecution" or
amount to convicting the defendant of an additional "offense" without the
protections applicable to trials. To allow otherwise, as the Apprendi dissent seeks to
do, would distort the constitutional scheme of separating powers in criminal
procedure by nullifying the procedures for enacting, charging, and convicting
defendants of crimes. Contrary to the argument made by the Apprendi dissenters,
the Constitution does not permit the imposition of a sentence completely
independently of the offense of conviction established in the guilty verdict. At the
same time, the constitutional requirement is fairly limited and defined in th
negative: the sentence imposed must not contravene the offense of conviction. The
Constitution does not require a specific kind of sentencing scheme, such as
determinate or wide judicial discretion or narrow judicial discretion. But whichever
scheme is adopted cannot be used to impose convictions on offenders for crimes
that were not properly enacted, charged, or proven as required by the constitutional
structure of criminal procedure.
The Apprendi rule that the maximum sentence must be defined by reference to
the facts established in the guilty verdict is a constitutional requirement that
protects this constitutional structure of criminal procedure and ensures that
sentencing proceedings do not contravene the importance of trial adjudications of
the charged offenses. The rule is necessary not because defendants have a
freestanding "right" to have the jury determine the facts that establish the
maximum penalty for its own sake, but because failing to protect the integrity of
trial verdicts on (or guilty pleas to) specific offenses will destroy the constitutional
structure of criminal procedure. The Apprendi rule is an individual right because
the defendant is the beneficiary and the party who raises the objection, but as a
theoretical matter the rule is best justified not by the defendant's interest in a
particular sentencing range but on this structural basis.
The Apprendi rule is a recent pronouncement by the Supreme Court for the
simple reason that for most of our nation's history, the need to ensure that the
imposition of a sentence did not interfere with or contradict the guilty verdict
simply did not exist. 174 Only in the late twentieth century did legislatures for the
first time begin seriously to attempt a meaningful integration of individualized
punishment with determinate sentencing. Laws such as mandatory minimum
sentences and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines permitted the desired legislative
control of judicial decisionmaking without abandoning the modem enterprise of

174. See supra notes 22-44 and accompanying text (summarizing history).
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making the punishment fit not only the crime but also the offender who committed
it. These new laws placed previously non-existent strains on the constitutional
structure of criminal procedure.
The difficulty the Supreme Court faced in responding to these new concerns
flows from the constitutional structure itself. Legislatures have the power to make
all of the important initial decisions about the criminal law and procedure in their
jurisdiction. Offenses exist and are defined as the legislature chooses. Whether
sentences will be determinate or indeterminate is up to the legislature as well. And
the appropriate level of punishment that should be available for each offense can be
set by statute too. Thus, at least presumptively,
legislatures have power both to
175
define offenses and regulate sentences.
By preserving the integrity of the core concept of the offense of conviction it is
possible to acknowledge these considerable legislative powers without abrogating
the constitutional structure of criminal procedure. Legislatures define the offenses
that prosecutors charge and try before juries, or to which defendants plead guilty.
The fundamental status of the offense of conviction to these three aspects of the
constitutional structure must be carried over to the fourth: sentencing. Just as a
defendant may only be charged with an offense enacted by the legislature, and may
only be convicted of a crime for which he has been charged, 7 a defendant also
may only be sentenced for a crime for which he has been convicted. What the
Constitution's structure commands, therefore, is that legislatures not be permitted
to exercise their offense-defining and sentencing-regulating powers in a way that
contravenes the limitation of the sentence to the terms of the offense of conviction.
Implementing this constitutional structure analysis as a matter of constitutional
law results in a guiding principle for the criminal procedure of sentencing: offenses
must be defined by the legislature with sufficient clarity that courts can determine
their scope and ensure that the sentence imposed on the defendant is consistent
with the offense of conviction. The constitutional structure analysis necessitates a
prohibition on any action at a sentencing hearing that inflicts a punishment not
authorized by the legislature for the offense. Such an action would occur, for
example, if the sentencing judge punished a defendant for an offense for which he
has not been convicted or, conversely, if the judge's sentence amounted to
"convicting" the defendant of an additional offense that was not charged or that is
not supported by a guilty verdict.
If the core concept of the offense of conviction is not protected by this
principle, the entire structure of criminal procedure in the Constitution will be
destroyed. Legislative intent to grade between more serious and less serious crimes
can be defeated if the lower penalties for the less serious offenses do not limit the
sentence. The constitutional requirements of the Indictment Clause and the Notice
Clause would be fruitless if the charging instrument provides no guidance about the
possible penalty because a resulting sentence is not constrained by the offense

175. See Priester, supra note 44, at 284-85, 301-08 (elaborating on offense-defining and
sentencing-regulating powers of the legislature). But see Kyron Huigens, Harris, Ring, and
the Future of Relevant Conduct Sentencing, 15 FED. SENTENCING REP. 88 (2002) (arguing
that normative architecture of criminal law prohibits legislative specification of sentencing
facts except as elements of offenses).
176. By definition, lesser-included offenses are fully encompassed within the charged
offense, and therefore instructing a jury on lesser-included offenses not specifically listed in
the charging instrument is constitutional. See, e.g., Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255
(2000); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 3 1(c).
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charged. And, as the Court itself has noted, the requirement of a trial jury verdict
beyond a reasonable doubt (or of a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary guilty plea)
would become meaningless if the judgment of conviction did not restrict the scope
of the penalty. 177 Only if the offense of conviction binds the range of punishment
available at sentencing can this constitutional edifice be preserved. To do otherwise
would vitiate the significant constitutional protections guaranteed by the
constitutional structure.
The foregoing analysis provides the constitutional structure justification for the
Apprendi rule that the facts that determine the defendant's maximum sentence must
be proven as elements of the offense. To preserve the constitutional structure of
criminal procedure it is necessary for the legislature to differentiate clearly between
laws that define offenses and laws that regulate sentencing. And one necessary
component of that differentiation is the mandate that the defendant's offense of
conviction establish the maximum punishment available at sentencing.
A simple example illustrates the point and reveals why the nuances of the
Court's Apprendi rule are necessary for resolving more complex statutes actually
enacted by legislatures. Consider a hypothetical jurisdiction with unrestricted
judicial discretion at sentencing and two relevant offenses: Robbery, punishable by
up to five years' imprisonment, and Murder, punishable by up to life imprisonment.
Defendant Fred is indicted by a grand jury for one count of robbery. He refuses to
plead guilty and goes to trial, where he is convicted by the jury. At sentencing the
prosecution introduces evidence that Fred not only robbed the victim but also killed
him. Fred vigorously contests the evidence that he caused the death and claims that
the victim died coincidentally of an unrelated ailment, but the judge concludes by a
preponderance of the evidence that Fred caused the victim's death.
Assume first that the judge sentences Fred to imprisonment for five years. The
judge might even give Fred his reasons: for example, as a first-time offender the
judge normally would have sentenced Fred to six months in jail, but because a
death resulted from the robbery the full five years was imposed. In this situation,
there is no constitutional difficulty. For purposes of the constitutional structure
analysis, Fred's offense of conviction was enacted by the legislature, charged by
the prosecution, tried to a jury, and punished within the terms of the offense of
conviction. It is true that the sentencing judge made a finding of fact (that a death
resulted) and exercised judgment (to impose five years rather than some lesser
amount of punishment) in performing the sentencing function, but that has been
part of our system of criminal justice since the beginning. Whenever there is a
sentencing proceeding other than imposition of a literally determinate, ministerial
sentence, there always will be findings of fact and exercises of judgment involved.
A sentencing judge must evaluate whether, compared to other offenders, the
defendant is more or less dangerous to society, deserving of a severe penalty,
capable of rehabilitation, remorseful or unrepentant, likely to offend again, or a
nearly infinite number of other things. What lies at the heart of the conclusion that
there is no constitutional difficulty with the five-years sentence based on a
sentencing finding that a death resulted is this: because the sentence imposed is
authorized by the offense of conviction, the constitutional structure has been

177. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 476-77, 482-84 (2000); Jones v. United
States, 526 U.S. 227, 243-44 (1999) (insisting that "the jury's role [must not] shrink from the
significance usually carried by determinations of guilt to the relative importance of low-level
gatekeeping").
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respected. Fred has not been "sentenced" for murder because five years is an
available punishment for robbery, nor has Fred been "convicted" of homicide
because the finding of a resulting death was used to determine the penalty within
the range available for robbery. Fred's offense of conviction has retained its
significance in his case and the sentence is constitutional.
Now assume instead that the judge sentences Fred to life imprisonment. In this
contrary situation, it is easy to see the constitutional problem. Robbery and murder
are separate offenses enacted by the legislature. Fred was charged with, tried for,
and convicted of only robbery. His offense of conviction is robbery. Yet he has
been sentenced to life imprisonment, a sentence that is not available for robbery as
defined by the legislature. In this simple hypothetical, it is patent that the court has
acted ultra vires-Fred's sentence is simply not authorized by the offense of
conviction established by the verdict in his case. By imposing a sentence of life
imprisonment, the court either has "sentenced" Fred for a murder for which he was
not convicted or has "convicted" Fred of murder without providing him with the
procedural protections in charging and at trial to which he is constitutionally
entitled. The Constitution cannot permit such a violation of the structure of
criminal procedure. Accordingly, Fred's sentence of life imprisonment-or for that
matter any term of imprisonment between five years plus one day and life-is
unconstitutional.
The reality of legislative enactments that define offenses or regulate sentences
is of course far more complex that the simple hypothetical involving Fred.
Nonetheless, the finer points of the Court's Apprendi rule can be seen by reference
to that example. The underlying principle remains that offenses must be defined by
the legislature with sufficient clarity that courts can determine their scope and
ensure that the sentence imposed on the defendant is consistent with the offense of
conviction.
The Court's decision in Jones addressed the clarity with which offenses must
be defined to preserve the integrity of the offense of conviction in each defendant's
case. The nested statutory structure of § 2119 contained three authorized maximum
sentences: fifteen years for simple carjacking, twenty-five years for aggravated
carjacking causing serious bodily injury, and life imprisonment for homicidal
carjacking. 178 Therefore, the legislature's own enactment did not provide for a
sentence of twenty-five years (or life) for every carjacking. Only carjackings with
additional aggravating facts could receive such enhanced penalties. By applying the
(subsequently named) Apprendi rule to § 2119, the Court protected both the
legislature's policy choice and the constitutional structure. The prosecution must
charge serious bodily injury or death in the indictment and the trial jury must find
those facts beyond a reasonable doubt before the sentencing judge may impose a
sentence greater than fifteen years. 179 On the other hand, if the legislature in fact
had intended that all carjackers be exposed to life imprisonment, then it would need
only to repeal the intermediate gradations and provide for a maximum of life
imprisonment for carjacking without the finding of additional facts like injury or
death.' 80

178. Jones, 526 U.S. at 230 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1988 & Supp. V)).
179. See id. at 243 n.6, 251-52.
180. If such an amendment were made, the legislature might be concerned that some
simple caijackers would receive inordinately high sentences. This concern could be
ameliorated by the use of sentencing guidelines or other sentencing-regulating provisions
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Similarly, the Court's decision in Apprendi explained how the Constitution
ensures that the sentence imposed is consistent with the offense of conviction. For
the firearms crime alone the maximum penalty was ten years' imprisonment, and if
the separately enacted biased-motive enhancement was applied it doubled to twenty
years. 181 The charging instrument did not allege a violation of the biased-motive
enhancement, nor did the defendant's guilty plea to a single count of the firearms
crime establish a biased motive as part of the guilty verdict. 82 The Court concisely
stated the issue as "whether the 12-year sentence imposed on count 18 was
permissible, given that it was above the 10-year maximum for the offense charged
in that count" and applied the Apprendi rule to hold the sentence
unconstitutional. 83 Under that rule, only the facts established by the guilty verdict
(whether guilty plea or jury findings beyond a reasonable doubt) can be used to
determine the offense of conviction. Because only the firearms crime was part of
the defendant's verdict for an offense of conviction, imposing a sentence available
only under the increased maximum from the biased-motive enhancement was
improper. For the state to impose that enhanced maximum sentence, the statutorily
requisite fact of biased-motive must be established as an element of the offense.
The Apprendi rule is a necessary constitutional requirement for preserving the
constitutional structure of criminal procedure. If the offense of conviction
determined by the guilty verdict does not constrain the maximum penalty that may
be imposed at sentencing, the separation of powers structure will break down. On
the other hand, when only the facts proven as elements of the offense may be used
to authorize a maximum penalty provided by statute, there is no concern that the
defendant has been sentenced for a crime for which he was not convicted. Nor
would the defendant have been convicted at sentencing of a crime that was not
properly charged and tried. When the legislature's statutes and prosecution's
charges are compared to the facts found by the jury's verdict (or admitted in a
guilty plea), the constitutional offense of conviction is found. By guaranteeing that
the sentence imposed is limited by the statutory terms attached to that offense and
those facts, the Apprendi rule safeguards the constitutional structure of criminal
procedure.
2. Explaining the HarrisRule
Just as the constitutional structure analysis explains the necessity of the
Apprendi rule, it also provides a clear justification for the Harris rule. The
constitutional structure inquiry is the same: whether the sentence imposed on the
defendant is consistent with the offense of conviction. No different from the
consideration of findings of fact that determine or increase the defendant's
maximum sentence for his offense of conviction, the fundamental question is
whether the application of a statutory mandatory minimum sentence (as in Harris)
or other sentencing factors (like the Federal Sentencing Guidelines) is tantamount
to punishing a defendant for an offense for which he has not been convicted or,
conversely, to convicting the defendant of an additional offense that was not

that operate within the maximum (life imprisonment) authorized by the facts found in the
jury's verdict. See supra text accompanying notes 74, 104-11.
181. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 468-69 (describing New Jersey's statutory scheme).
182. See id. at 469-70.
183. Id. at 474.

20041

STRUCTURING SENTENCING

charged or that is not supported by a guilty verdict. Stated more precisely, the
question is what, if any, findings of fact must be elements of the offense if they
determine a defendant's sentence within the maximum sentence authorized by the
offense of conviction in compliance with the Apprendi rule.
The constitutional structure analysis answers this question by determining the
appropriate constitutional scope of the defendant's offense of conviction. That
offense must be enacted by the legislature, charged by the prosecution, and tried to
a guilty verdict before a jury or in a guilty plea. The additional inquiry required by
Harris is whether the offense of conviction must have any consequence at
sentencing beyond the Apprendi rule constraining the maximum punishment that
may be imposed.
The consideration of the constitutional scope of the offense of conviction
begins with two opposing poles of legislative activity in regulating sentencing.
Both of these poles have long-accepted approval of their constitutionality. For this
reason, they serve as bookends for the remainder of the analysis.
On the one hand, the Harrisissue disappears entirely if the legislature adopts
strictly determinate sentences based on the offense of conviction. For example, if
all robbers receive ten years' imprisonment and all carjackers twenty-five years,
then there is no need to consider the constitutionality of intermediate sentencing
factors because they do not exist. Even if the legislature allows some provision for
mitigation of sentences, 184 the underlying system of determinate sentences remains:
the offense of conviction controls the resulting sentence. When the legislature
asserts such dominance for the offense of conviction by statute, the constitutional
question is moot.
On the other hand, for much of our nation's history, legislatures delegated the
determination of each defendant's sentence to the judge, within a broad range
provided in the statute. For example, the range for robbery might be no more than
ten years' imprisonment and the range for carjacking no more than twenty-five
years, and the judge would select each robber's or carjacker's penalty from within

184. Any mitigators enacted by the legislature would have to comply with the Apprendi
rule's requirement that findings of fact that determine the maximum sentence must be
elements of the offense. For example, a statute that provides "Robbery shall be punished by
up to ten years' imprisonment unless the defendant did not brandish a gun, in which case no
more than five years shall be imposed" does not avoid the Apprendi rule. Under the terms of
this statute, a finding of brandishing a gun is necessary to impose a sentence greater than
five years. Accordingly, the Apprendi rule mandates that the finding be an element of the
offense to impose such a sentence. See supra text accompanying notes 66-76; see also
Michaels, supra note 164, at 1859 ("In Ring, the Court rejected a legislative scheme that
purported to establish the maximum sentence in the statute that contained the elements
proven at trial, while simultaneously employing a separate statute that forbade imposition of
the maximum sentence without additional factual finding at sentencing."). This
understanding of the Apprendi rule avoids the contrary interpretation some have suggested,
which would render the rule ineffectual. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 540 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting); Jones, 526 U.S. at 267; see also Bibas, Fact-Finding,supra note 45, at 1131
n.239, 1136; Bibas, Institutional Allocations, supra note 163, at 468-69. A mitigator that
would comply with the Apprendi rule could provide that "Robbery shall be punished by up
to ten years' imprisonment unless the defendant did not brandish a gun, in which case the
sentence may be reduced by up to five years in the court's discretion." By making the
mitigation discretionary rather than mandatory, the statute does not require a finding of
firearm-brandishing to impose a sentence of ten years (as was the case in the prior example).
See also, e.g., Huigens, supra note 89, at 417-19, 427-29; Levine, supra note 45, at 385-87.
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those ranges. Such exercises of judgment and discretion by judges were never
thought to undermine the defendant's offense of conviction, even when the judge
made findings of fact to support the particular sentence chosen.' 85 When the
legislature grants unregulated discretion to sentencing judges to punish defendants
by some term equal to or possibly far less than the maximum sentence authorized
by the offense of conviction, the constitutionality of such a sentencing scheme is
firmly established.
The real question posed by Harris therefore resolves into whether the
legislature has the constitutional power to adopt a sentencing scheme that falls
somewhere between these two poles without creating additional elements of the
offense by doing so. That is, does the Constitution permit the use of sentencing
factors to create a scheme that has neither strictly determinate sentences for each
offense nor unregulated judicial discretion to impose punishment less than the
authorized maximum? The constitutional structure 8 analysis
concludes that the
6
legislature may constitutionally enact such a scheme.'
The constitutional structure analysis of this issue begins with an important
fundamental premise: the constitutional structure of criminal procedure does not
mandate that determining a particular defendant's sentence is exclusively and only
a judicial function. The Supreme Court emphasized this point in the seminal case of
Mistretta v. United States, which upheld the statute creating the Federal Sentencing
Commission and authorizing the promulgation of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines against challenges that the existence and composition of the
87
Commission violated the classical constitutional separation of powers.'
"Historically, federal sentencing-4he function of determining the scope and extent
of punishment--never has been thought to be assigned by the Constitution to the
exclusive jurisdiction of any one of the three Branches of Government."' 88 Like the
comparable systems in many states, "under the [pre-Guidelines] indeterminatesentence system, Congress defined the maximum, the judge imposed a sentence
within the statutory range . . . . and the Executive Branch's parole officer
eventually determined the actual duration of imprisonment."'' 89 Although the
Guidelines system of determinate sentencing greatly restricted judicial discretion
and abolished parole, as well as shifted the goals of federal sentencing away from
rehabilitation toward retribution and deterrence,1 9° the Mistretta Court did not

185. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 390 (1989) ("For more than a
century, federal judges have enjoyed wide discretion to determine the appropriate sentence
in individual cases and have exercised special authority to determine the sentencing factors
to be applied in any given case."); STTH & CABRANES, supra note 2, at 29, 79; Joseph L.
Hoffmann, Apprendi v. New Jersey: Back to the Future?,38 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 255, 259-68
(2001); Stephen A. Saltzburg, Due Process,History, and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 38 AM.
CRIM. L. REv. 243, 243-48 (2001).

186. As the following discussion demonstrates, the constitutional analysis is not simply
that the greater power to enact strictly determinate sentences includes the lesser power to
enact other forms of regulations on judicial sentencing. Cf., e.g., Michael Herz, Justice
Byron White and the Argument That the Greater Includes the Lesser, 1994 BYU L. REv.
227, 238-49 (1994) (discussing potential problems with and misapplications of greaterpower-includes-lesser-power arguments).
187. 488 U.S. 361, 412 (1989).
188. Id. at 364; see also id. at 364-66, 390-91 & n.17.
189. Id. at 365.
190. See id. at 367-68.
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question Congress's authority to legislate these policy changes. Crucial to the
Court's approval of the existence and composition of the Commission was its
conclusion that because sentencing was not exclusively a judicial function, such an
independent agency of the judicial branch with judges as some of its members
neither assumed powers exclusively delegated to one branch nor accumulated
excessive power in one institution to the detriment of the separation of powers
between branches. 191
The rejection of exclusive judicial power over sentencing has great
significance for the constitutional issue in Harris.If sentencing a defendant within
the range authorized for the offense of conviction were solely a judicial power, then
the only constitutionally permissible means for limiting judicial discretion would
be by setting the upper and lower ends of the authorized range with facts proven as
elements of the offense. This is the position asserted by Levine, who argues that all
binding restrictions on judicial sentencing discretion must be elements of the
offense. 192 Similarly, Huigens maintains that all positive law fault provisions must
be elements but the exercise of judicial discretion not controlled by positive law
need not be. 193 But if, as Mistretta holds and historical practice demonstrates,
sentencing is not an exclusively judicial function, then the argument-that the use
of sentencing factors like the Guidelines to restrict the exercise of that discretion
violates the constitutional structure of criminal procedure because it
unconstitutionally interferes with the judicial power-must be rejected.
The constitutional structure analysis next considers whether the constitutional
structure of criminal procedure that defines the scope of the offense of conviction
necessarily requires that restrictions on the lower end of the available sentence be
elements of the offense just as restrictions on the maximum punishment must be.
Stated differently, the Constitution's structure requires the Apprendi rule because
the offense of conviction must limit the harshness of the punishment that can be
imposed on the convicted defendant, and hence a finding of fact must be an
element of the offense if it increases the maximum penalty above what otherwise
would be available without that fact. The issue in Harris is whether that structure
equally requires that facts be found as elements of the offense when they limit the
ability to impose as merciful a sentence as would otherwise be available.
The key to the constitutional structure analysis is that it evaluates the
constitutional inquiry not in terms of the effect of the finding of fact on the
defendant as such, but rather on whether the finding of fact has an effect on the
sentence that is inconsistent with the offense of conviction established by the
statute, charge, and guilty verdict. The Harris dissent and several scholarly
commentaries emphasize that the imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence or
other sentencing factor may have dramatic consequences for the defendant. 94 That

191. See id. at 380-82, 387-88, 390-91.
192. See infra text accompanying notes 252-61.
193. See infra text accompanying notes 262-74.
194. See, e.g., Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 578-79 (2002) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting); Allenbaugh, supra note 7, at 37-40; Nancy J. Gertner, What Harris Has
Wrought, 15 FED. SENTENCING REP. 83, 84-86 (2002); Mark D. Knoll & Richard G. Singer,
Searching for the "Tail of the Dog": Finding "Elements" of Crimes in the Wake of
McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 22 SEATrLE U. L. REv. 1057, 1112-18 (1999); Jacqueline E.
Ross, What Makes Sentencing Facts Controversial? Four Problems Obscured by One

Solution, 47 VnIL. L. REv. 965, 969, 974-88 (2002) (noting that the Apprendi rule does not
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consequence alone, however, is not sufficient to violate the constitutional structure
analysis.
The analysis at either of the poles of legislative activity is simple. In a system
of strictly determinate sentences for offenses, there is no room for mercy and the
constitutional issue is moot. In the opposite system of unregulated judicial
discretion within wide statutory ranges, there also is no constitutional problem with
findings of fact that result in a harsh or unmerciful sentence. For example, suppose
a carjacking offense provided for punishment by no more than twenty-five years'
imprisonment. A candid judge at sentencing might declare that his baseline
sentence for carjackers is ten years, but because he finds by a preponderance of the
evidence that the defendant caused serious bodily injury to the victim and also
discharged a firearm, he accordingly will sentence the defendant to twenty years.
Such determinations and decisions in the exercise of judicial discretion are long
accepted by our constitutional doctrine and practice in the centuries before modem
sentencing regulation efforts. 195 (Were the legislature to choose to enact a
mandatory minimum provision or other restriction on judicial discretion as an
element of the offense, everyone agrees that statute would be constitutional.) 196 The
only constitutional question, therefore, is the application of sentencing factors that
restrict the exercise of judicial discretion within the maximum punishment
determined in compliance with the Apprendi rule.
The restriction of judicial sentencing discretion by a sentencing factor within
the maximum authorized punishment does not violate the constitutional structure of
criminal procedure because it is not inconsistent with the defendant's offense of
conviction to do so. Unlike a finding of fact that increases the defendant's sentence
above the maximum penalty otherwise authorized by the offense of conviction
created by statute, charge, and facts established in a guilty verdict as elements of
the offense, a finding of fact that supports the application of a sentencing factor
beneath that Apprendi maximum does not result in a sentence that was not
authorized by the constitutionally mandated procedures. The resulting sentence was
not precluded by the offense of conviction, but rather was permitted by it. This
distinction is dispositive for the constitutional structure analysis.
The contrast between the facts of Apprendi and Harris illustrates the
importance of the difference. In Apprendi, the question was "whether the 12-year
sentence imposed on count 18 was permissible, given that it was above the 10-year
maximum for the offense charged in that count" to which the defendant pled
guilty. 197 The sentencing factor therefore resulted in a sentence that was precluded

by the offense of conviction--only proof of the biased-motive enhancement
authorized a sentence exceeding ten years. In Harris, on the other hand, the
comparable issue was whether the seven-year mandatory minimum sentence
imposed on the § 924(c) count was permissible, given that even without the finding
preclude sentencing findings from having substantial effect on the sentence, and proposing
four limitations on the use of sentencing findings). See contraHarris, 536 U.S. at 566.
195. In fact, because the example assumes that the injury and firearm findings were not
governed by positive law, even Huigens' highly restrictive view of the constitutional
standard would permit such interstitial fault determinations in the carjacking sentence. See
infra text accompanying notes 268-74.
196. See, e.g., Harris,536 U.S. at 576 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (describing mandatory
minimum sentence as element of aggravated offense); Huigens, supra note 89, at 417-18,
427-29; Levine, supra note 45, at 382-83.
197. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 474 (2000).
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of brandishing, the Apprendi-authorized maximum sentence was life imprisonment
98
and the otherwise applicable mandatory minimum penalty was five years.' The
sentencing factor clearly restricted judicial discretion by increasing the mandatory
minimum penalty, but that restriction fell within the range of penalties already
authorized by the offense of conviction. Had that sentencing factor not existed, a
sentence of seven years nonetheless would have been available under the offense of
conviction established by the statute, charge, and guilty verdict. The application of
the sentencing factor therefore was consistent with the defendant's offense of
conviction and did not violate the constitutional structure analysis.
Furthermore, the fundamental distinction between Apprendi and Harrisreveals
an important insight about sentencing generally: unless the offender is sentenced to
the lowest possible penalty, every sentencing determination results in a deprivation
of some available mercy. If, as in the earlier example, a sentencing judge exercising
unregulated discretion chooses to sentence a carjacker to twenty years rather than
ten based on certain determinations, that choice has imposed on the defendant
twice as great a punishment as other carjackers might have received-and it
certainly has denied the defendant mercy by sentencing him at the high end of the
offense of conviction's available range. The only difference between that example
and Harrisis that the sentencing factor in § 924(c) appears in a statute rather than
emanating from the judge's own discretion. In both situations the judge has
selected a sentence from within the penalties authorized by the offense of
conviction.
In Apprendi, Justice Scalia explained the point in slightly different terms with
characteristic wit:
I think it not unfair to tell a prospective felon that if he commits his
contemplated crime he is exposing himself to a jail sentence of up to 30
years-and that if, upon conviction, he gets anything less than that he
may thank the mercy of a tenderhearted judge (just as he may thank the
mercy of a tenderhearted parole commission if he is let out inordinately
early, or the99mercy of a tenderhearted governor if his sentence is
commuted). 1
The rhetorical device of the prospective offender contemplating his punishment
aside, 2°° the passage identifies the core truth of the constitutional structure analysis
of Harris: when a defendant is convicted of a crime, he indisputably faces the
possibility that the maximum available punishment for the offense of conviction
may be imposed. The Apprendi rule ensures the penalty may not be more severe
than the maximum provided by statute for that offense. On the other hand, any
sentence less severe than the authorized maximum is--from the perspective of the
constitutional structure analysis-a windfall for the defendant. A sentencing factor
that restricts judicial discretion within the penalties authorized by the offense of
conviction is not equivalent to convicting the defendant of an aggravated offense
that was not charged or to sentencing a defendant for a crime that was not charged
or tried to verdict. Rather, it regulates the specific punishment ultimately imposed
from among the penalties already made possible by the conviction for the offense
198. Harris,536 U.S. at 551, 568; id. at 577 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
199. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 498 (Scalia, J., concurring).
200. Cf Standen, supra note 7, at 804-05 (criticizing bargaining analogy as not
reflective of actual criminal behavior).
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involved. Accordingly, the application of such a sentencing factor-for example,
the mandatory minimum sentences in § 924(c) or the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines-does not violate the constitutional structure analysis because it does
not contravene the offense of conviction.
The constitutional structure analysis confirms the doctrine adopted by the
Court in Harris and approves the constitutionality of the legislature's use of
sentencing factors to regulate the discretion of judges in imposing sentences on
convicted defendants. The Constitution does not compel legislatures into an all-ornothing choice between strictly determinate sentences or completely unregulated
judicial discretion. Rather, legislatures may enact both offense-defining statutes
that provide ranges of authorized punishment for convicted offenders and
sentencing-regulating provisions that constrain the judge's selection of the
appropriate sentence for the individual within the offense's terms.
By examining the constitutional inquiry as a matter of the constitutional
structure of criminal procedure and the fundamental significance of the concept of
the offense of conviction, the constitutional structure analysis more clearly explains
the dispositive distinction between Apprendi and Harris.Unlike an enhancement of
the penalty above the statutory maximum, a sentencing factor's restriction on
judicial discretion does not contravene that significance. Every act of sentencing by
a judge, whether unregulated or constrained by mandatory minimums or other
sentencing factors, inherently involves a determination of how much or how little
mercy should be shown to the individual defendant before the court. For this
reason, sentencing factors like the Federal Sentencing Guidelines differ only in
degree of discretion, not kind of governmental action against the defendant, from
the long history of unregulated judicial sentencing. The Court in Mistretta
acknowledged this conclusion when it stated that the Guidelines "do no more than
fetter the discretion of sentencing judges to do what they have done for
generations-impose sentences within broad limits established by Congress."'2°

201. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 396 (1989). Stith and Cabranes argue that
sentencing under the federal Guidelines is "materially different" from the exercise of judicial
discretion. STrrH & CABRANES, supra note 2, at 151. First, they assert that the approval of
"real offense" sentencing in Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949), was inherently
grounded in the rehabilitation-oriented, judicial-discretion sentencing systems in place at
that time. See id. at 29, 150-51. Second, they describe the lack of a theoretical justification
underlying the policy judgments established in the Guidelines actually adopted by the
Sentencing Commission. See id. at 55-57. Third, they maintain that the imposition of a
sentence under the Guidelines is no longer a moral judgment of the offender of the kind
previously made by sentencing judges exercising discretion, but rather is a simple calculus
that lacks moral authority. See id. at 82-84, 147, 150-52, 169-70. Each of these differences,
however, is premised on the rigidity of the current Guidelines and the ad hoc nature of their
initial promulgation and subsequent adoption. See also id. at 143-77 (calling for reforms in,
but not abrogation of, Federal Sentencing Guidelines). For example, "a federal common law
of sentencing" developed through judicial doctrine by judges with conflicting values and
theories of punishment is no more assured of theoretical consistency and moral weight. Id. at
170. Accordingly, the differences do not establish that sentencing factors per se are different
in kind from the exercise of judicial discretion at sentencing, but rather only that the current
federal Guidelines have restricted judicial discretion greatly without any organizing
theoretical grounding for the rules adopted to replace it. See also Klein & Steiker, supra note
33, at 238 (arguing that criticisms of Guidelines as implemented does not undermine validity
of effort to ensure equality and transparency, or moral judgment, through determinate
sentencing system).
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Thus, the constitutional structure analysis concludes that there is only a limited
role for constitutional law in restricting the power of the legislature to enact
sentencing factors to regulate judicial discretion at sentencing. The Sixth
Amendment right to trial by jury, for example, applies only to the determination of
the statutory maximum penalty as defined by the Apprendi rule. The jury's primary
function in the constitutional structure of criminal procedure is to enter verdicts of
conviction or acquittal, thereby establishing the defendant's offense of conviction.
With respect to sentencing, however, the jury's role extends only to establishing the
most severe punishment---the worst-case scenario-faced by the defendant. Within
that maximum exposure, finding of facts pursuant to judicial discretion or
sentencing factors are constitutional, and they do not violate the right to trial by
jury. Similarly, the Indictment Clause and Notice Clause do not mandate inclusion
in the charging instrument of every fact that could be used to calculate the
defendant's ultimate sentence, even if those facts would lead to application of a
mandatory minimum punishment or other sentencing factor. As with the jury's
role, under the constitutional structure analysis the only notice that must be
provided by the charging instrument is the maximum punishment available upon
conviction.20 2 So long as the offense of conviction's statutory maximum penalty is
respected, the constitutional structure analysis does not limit the use of sentencing
factors to determine a defendant's sentence.
The Court's Apprendi-Harris rule is the correct constitutional doctrine for
evaluating the application of sentencing factors to a defendant. Criminal offenses
must be enacted by the legislature, charged by the prosecution, and tried to a jury
or resolved by guilty plea. Those facts that determine the maximum sentence
authorized for the offense of conviction must be proven as elements of the offense
under the mandated constitutional procedures. Once that maximum penalty is
found in compliance with Apprendi, however, sentencing factors may be used to
regulate the exercise of judicial discretion in imposing sentence within that
maximum. Applying such a sentencing factor to the defendant does not violate the
constitutional structure analysis because the verdict handing down the offense of
conviction has made such a punishment available. Nothing in the Constitution's
structure of criminal procedures prohibits a legislature from regulating the exercise
of sentencing authority through provisions of law that are not elements of the
offense.

202. This notice rule is no more detrimental from the defendant's perspective than
under the historical sentencing regime of wide judicial discretion. A defendant charged with
an offense in an indeterminate system can predict the worst possible sentence from the
statutory maximum, but otherwise his actual sentence will depend entirely on the findings of
fact and exercises of judgment made by whichever sentencing judge imposes punishment in
his case. Likewise, under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines the defendant again can predict
the worst possible sentence (the statutory maximum), but he also can predict his ultimate
sentence with considerably more accuracy by determining the base offense level and the
most likely relevant specific offense characteristics, adjustments, criminal history score, and
departures. In neither case, however, does the defendant have any certainty about his
ultimate sentence other than the worst-case scenario. The constitutional structure analysis
affirms that such notice is all the Constitution requires with respect to sentencing.
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C. Responses to Counter-Arguments
The constitutional structure analysis affirms the constitutional doctrine adopted
by the Court in the Apprendi line of cases. By doing so it provides considerable
leeway for legislatures to define crimes and their constituent elements and also to
enact sentencing factors for regulating the exercise of sentencing authority by
judges. At the same time it proscribes an outer limit on legislative power by
commanding that one consequence of establishing a defendant's offense of
conviction is the setting of the maximum punishment to which that defendant is
exposed. And like the Court's decisions, the constitutional structure analysis must
address several important counter-arguments that can be raised in objection to the
Apprendi-Harrisrule.
1. Consistency with Originalism and Precedent
The first objection is that the Apprendi-Harrisrule is inconsistent with either
the original understanding of the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury or the
Court's prior precedent, both of which have become highly contested on their own
terms as the various opinions of the justices sharply disputed them throughout the
Apprendi line of cases. If either of these two common methods of constitutional
interpretation squarely refuted the rule, the constitutional structure analysis would
face a considerable hurdle.20 3 But neither originalism nor precedent stands as an
obstacle to the constitutional structure analysis because it is the interpretive
impasse inherent in and created by their use that requires the adoption of a new
constitutional analysis for the Apprendi line of cases in the first place.
The principal opinions in Jones, Apprendi, and Harris all rely primarily on
originalism to justify the constitutional rules they propose. The opinions examine a
wide variety of British, colonial, Founding-era, and later sources to attempt to
divine what the Framers of the Constitution would have understood to be the
applicable rules and principles. The difficulty, as the scholarly commentary
demonstrates, is that the meaning of this history is far from clear. In fact, even the
two prominent originalist justices on the Court failed to agree on what the original
understanding was. Two significant problems have emerged that defeat the
application of originalism to the Apprendi line of cases.
One is that the content of any rules that might be found in the historical
materials is highly contestable. In Jones, the majority opinion emphasized the
importance of the colonial jury and reasoned that without the (subsequently named)
Apprendi rule the jury's historical role would be fatally undermined. 2°4 The dissent,
by contrast, maintained that nothing about that role suggested, much less mandated,
the rule the majority followed. 20 5 The majority opinion in Apprendi again relied on

203. There is considerable debate about the ultimate theoretical validity of these modes
of constitutional interpretation in the first place. See e.g., RICHARD H. FALLON, JR.,
IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 13-25 (2001); JED RUBENFELD, FREEDOM & TIME 61-65
(2001);

ANTONIN SCALIA,

A

MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW

(1997); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME 234-41 (1999); TRIBE, supra note 150, at
§§ 1-14, 1-16; Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for Original Understanding,60 B.U. L.
REv. 204 (1980). That dilemma is beyond the scope of this Article; even if those modes are
theoretically sound, they cannot resolve the Apprendi-Harrisissue satisfactorily.
204. See Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 244-48 (1999).
205. See id. at 270-71 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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historical argument to explain why the jury must find the facts that determine the
statutory maximum sentence. 206 Justice Thomas's concurrence (in the portions
joined by Justice Scalia) expanded upon this argument with extensive discussion
and analysis of nineteenth century cases and treatises. 207 In dissent, Justice
O'Connor insisted that the historical record did not support the Apprendi rule and
noted that Justice Thomas's post-Founding sources were irrelevant to the meaning
of the Sixth Amendment because they antedated its adoption. 20 8 Finally, in Harris
the plurality endeavored to explain why the historical evidence marshaled to justify
the Apprendi rule did not encompass mandatory-minimum sentencing factors in
addition to the now-invalidated maximum-enhancing sentencing factors. 20 9 Justice
Thomas's dissenting opinion (not joined by Justice Scalia) rejected this
interpretation and argued that the same210sources that required the Apprendi rule also
covered mandatory minimums as well.
The scholarly analysis of these cases and arguments has produced a similar
disagreement over what the historical evidence shows. Professor Bibas, for
example, agrees with Justice O'Connor that the historical evidence does not
support the Apprendi rule 21' and that the nineteenth century sources cited by Justice
Thomas have no value in assessing the original understanding of the Sixth
Amendment in any event.212 Professor Singer, on the other hand, put forward the
historical analysis later accepted by Justice Thomas. 213 And other scholars have
noted the ambiguities of the historical evidence in cautioning against drawing
overly broad conclusions from the relatively weak record.214
The second problem is that the issue presented in the Apprendi line of cases is
one that tests the very utility of originalism as an interpretive methodology. The
statutes involved in the Apprendi-Harriscases are recent innovations that have no
directly relevant analogues in the historical record.2 15 The extensive use of sentence
enhancements and mandatory minimums in federal and state criminal statutes is a
late-twentieth century development, as is the creation of sentencing guidelines to
control the exercise of judicial sentencing authority in a binding way.216 Justice

206. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 477-85 (2000).
207. See id.
at 499-518 (Thomas, J., concurring).
208. Id. at 524-29 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
209. See Harris v.United States, 536 U.S. 545, 558-64 (2002).
210. Id. at 574-77 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
211. See Bibas, Fact-Finding,supra note 45, at 1124-26 & nn.204-09.
212. See id.
at 1128-29 & nn.212, 221.
213. See Knoll & Singer, supra note 194, at 1067-81; see also Apprendi v. New Jersey,
530 U.S. 466, 518 (2000)(Thomas,J.,
concurring) (citation omitted).
214. See, e.g., Herman, supra note 7,at 625-30; Nancy J.King & Susan R.Klein,
EssentialElements, 54 VAND. L. REv. 1467, 1471-77 (2001); Levine, supra note 45, at 444.
215. Some of the cases cited by Justice Thomas and Professor Singer are structured
similarly to statutes like § 2119 or § 841, but most are not. See generally Apprendi v. New
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 499-518 (2000)(Thomas,J., concurring); Knoll & Singer, supra note
194, at 1067-81.
216. See Klein & Steiker, supra note 33, at 255 ("There can be no historical evidence
on these types of statutes because they simply did not exist."); see also, e.g., Herman, supra
note 7, at 628; Huigens, supra note 89, at 412-13; King & Klein, supra note 214, at 1476;
see also Richard G. Singer, The Model Penal Code and TIe Two (Possibly Only One)
Ways Courts Avoid Mens Rea, 4 BuFF. CRIM. L. REv. 139, 146-57 (2000) (discussing and
criticizing historical progression of judicial interpretation of federal drug statutes, including
21 U.S.C. § 841).
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Thomas properly noted in Harris that "[t]he Court has not previously suggested
that constitutional protection ends where legislative innovation or ingenuity
begins.

' 217

But when legislative innovation reaches the level of divergence from

historically recognized practice that it has in this context, the attempt to adjudicate
the constitutionality of those innovations by reference to history is doomed from
the start. No different from other areas of constitutional law where technological,
social, or other forms of innovation have outstripped an eighteenth-century text, the
Court must rely on other interpretive methodologies to evaluate the challenged
legislation.2 I8
In combination these two problems make impossible any truly viable use of
originalism to resolve the constitutional question in the Apprendi line of cases. If
the historical record were clear, perhaps drawing an analogy to the innovative
statutory schemes would be possible. Or if the statutory schemes were not so
different from anything that existed previously, perhaps the lack of clarity about the
historical treatment of such schemes would be easier to unravel. Taken together,
however, attempting to evaluate innovative statutes in light of an ambiguous
historical record is an enterprise that can lead only to the kind of close and sharp
divisions that have permeated the Court's cases. Accordingly, the Apprendi-Harris
rule is not undermined by an inconsistency with the original understanding of the
Constitution.
The same dilemma confounds the application of the Court's own precedent to
the Apprendi line of cases. The innovativeness of the statutory schemes at issue
makes it unsurprising that, just as with originalism's historical record, there is no
prior case law of the Court that directly addresses the constitutional questions
presented. Nonetheless, there are several lines of the Court's precedent to which
rough analogies can be made and from which first principles can be drawn. These
219
include Due Process Clause cases involving proof beyond a reasonable doubt
and the "shifting" of facts from elements of the offense into an affirmative defense
(for which the burden of proof is on the defendant), 220 and the Court's pre-Ring

Eighth Amendment jurisprudence of capital sentencing.221 Until the Apprendi line
of cases began with Almendarez-Torres in 1998, the only prior decision that
directly addressed the issue of elements and sentencing factors was McMillan in
1986.

217. Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 579 (2002) (Thomas, J., dissenting); see
also, e.g., Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 483-84 (2000) ("We do not suggest that
trial practices cannot change in the course of centuries ...[b]ut practice must at least adhere
to the basic principles undergirding the requirements of trying to a jury all facts necessary to
constitute a statutory offense, and proving those facts beyond a reasonable doubt.").
218. See, e.g., H. Jefferson Powell, Rules for Originalists,73 VA. L. REv. 659, 669-72
(1987); David A. Sklansky, The Fourth Amendment and Common Law, 100 COLUM. L. REv.
1739, 1793-813 (2000); David A. Strauss, Common Law ConstitutionalInterpretation,63 U.
CHI. L. REv. 877, 894-900 (1996); see also generally supra note 203.
219. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
220. See, e.g., Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228, 230 (1982); Patterson v. New York, 432
U.S. 197, 198 (1977); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 684-85 (1975); Garfield, supra
note 26, at 1356-80.
221. See, e.g., Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 536-37 (2000) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) (citing Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990); Clemons v. Mississippi, 494
U.S. 738 (1990); Hildwin v. Florida, 490 U.S. 638 (1989) (per curiam)). In Ring, the Court
overruled Walton in light of Apprendi. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 589 (2002).
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As with the disagreements over the meaning of the historical record, the Court
divided sharply on the significance of precedent. The majority opinions in Jones
and Apprendi asserted that the Due Process Clause precedent provided support for
the Apprendi rule.222 The dissenting opinions, by contrast, maintained that those
cases were inapposite and instead emphasized the holdings of McMillan and the
capital sentencing cases.223 Similarly, the plurality in Harrisargued that Apprendi
and McMillan could be reconciled, 24 while the dissent claimed just the opposite
and urged that McMillan be overruled.225 Justice Thomas also explained why stare
decisis ought not preserve McMillan's holding, 226 reaffirming his position in
Apprendi that
it is fair to say that McMillan began a revolution in the law regarding
the definition of 'crime.' [Apprendi], far from being a sharp break with
the past, marks nothing more than a return to the status quo ante--the
status quo that
reflected the original meaning of the Fifth and Sixth
227
Amendments.

The scholarly commentary on the relevance and decisiveness of the preApprendi precedent is equally divided. On one side, Professor Bibas supports an
interpretation of the precedent in line with the position taken by Justice O'Connor's
Apprendi dissent: that these cases do not require or justify the Apprendi rule.228 On
another, Professor Huigens asserts that the same cases demonstrate that the Court
intends for its doctrines to "protect[] the traditional normative architecture of
criminal law" 229 and calls not only for overruling McMillan but also for a rule even
more restrictive of legislative power than Apprendi-Harris.230 Professor Singer also
argues that McMillan should be overruled, although his argument is based
primarily on case law from lower courts. 231 Others in between, including Professor
Hoffmann and Professors King 232
and Klein, treat the precedent as insightful authority
but not decisive in the analysis.
Once again as with originalism, the intractable struggle to reconcile
tangentially related precedent with the complexities of the Apprendi line of cases
demonstrates that precedent does not foreclose the adoption of the Apprendi-Harris
rule. Instead, the interpretive impasse must be broken with a different method of
constitutional interpretation. Originalism and precedent have prominent roles in
constitutional adjudication, but they will not be dispositive--or even useful--in
every situation. Given the demonstrated lack of clarity and agreement both on the

222. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 484-90; Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 240-43,
248 (1999).
223. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 529-39 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Jones, 526 U.S. at
264-70 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
224. See Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 563-68 (2002).
225. See id. at 577-81 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
226. See id. at 581-83 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
227. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 518 (Thomas, J., concurring).
228. See Bibas, Fact-Finding,supra note 45, at 1103-23.
229. See Huigens, supra note 89, at 387.
230. See id. at 393-404, 458-59; see also infra text accompanying notes 262-74.
231. See Knoll & Singer, supra note 194, at 1081-82, 1112 & n.260.
232. See Hoffmann, supra note 185, at 268-79; King & Klein, supra note 214, at 147785; see also Levine, supra note 45, at 390-409.
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Court and in the scholarly literature concerning these methods, neither one is a
barrier to the constitutional structure analysis and the rule it justifies.
2. Possibility for Legislatures to Exploit the Rule
The second objection is that the Apprendi-Harrisconstitutional rule is merely
a technical, statutory-drafting hoop through which the legislature must jump. This
narrow scope of the rule, the objection claims, allows the legislature to "evade" the
protections the Court was attempting to institute by rather simple and formalistic
compliance with the rule.233 The objection is a form of the constant concern in
discussions of constitutional criminal procedure about the extent to which the
limitations imposed on governmental power by the Constitution and judicial
doctrine serve as meaningful protections for criminal defendants that cannot easily
be evaded by creative legislatures, prosecutors, or police officers. If the rule
supported by the constitutional structure analysis really can be easily compromised
simply by more precise statutory drafting, then the objection asserts that it has
little, if any, meaningful value as a constitutional division between elements of the
offense and sentencing factors.
The constitutional structure analysis responds to this objection not by denying
the possibility that legislatures might find ways to "draft around" the ApprendiHarrisrule to achieve the desired results without violating the rule, but rather by
refuting the underlying validity of the objection itself. The objection is invalid
because it is a straw man argument. The alleged defect it sees in the ApprendiHarris rule--the possibility that legislatures can evade the rule by enacting
properly drafted statutes that comply with the rule--is in fact an objection to every
possible constitutionalrule in this area of the constitutional criminal procedure of
sentencing. Whenever the Court defines and refines its precedent, legislatures often
have an opportunity to "exploit" those decisions by amending criminal statutes to
take account of the new holding. For example, after McMillan legislatures created
additional sentencing factors like the visible-firearm-possession mandatory
minimum, the Court upheld in that case, provisions the might previously have
enacted as elements were it not for McMillan's sanction.
It cannot be denied that the Apprendi-Harrisrule can be "drafted around" if
legislatures want to minimize the benefit of the rule to criminal defendants.
Criminal statutes could be amended to increase their maximum penalties, and
therefore to have a greater range for the use of sentencing factors to determine the
defendant's precise punishment, without violating the Apprendi-Harris rule. By
"exploiting" the terms of the rule in this way, legislatures would avoid much of the
significance of the jury's verdict as a restriction on the government's power to
punish the offender. Especially if the maximum penalty authorized by the jury's
verdict is a high one, then there will be considerable leeway for the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines or other sentencing factors to affect the punishment

233. Cf. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 539 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (criticizing Apprendi rule
as "a meaningless formalism"); Bibas, Fact-Finding, supra note 45, at 1131 n.239
(describing Apprendi rule as "simply a hoop through which legislatures must now jump");
Priester, supra note 44, at 308 n.141.
234. See King & Klein, supra note 214, at 1490, 1492.
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imposed. 235 Such amendments thereby would reduce the benefit that the Apprendi
holding might have had for defendants because by amending the statute to raise the
maximum penalty, the legislature has eliminated the previously existing lower
intermediate maximums that Apprendi held created elements of the offense.
In light of the potential impact of Apprendi on the interpretation and possible
amendment of criminal statutes, Professors King and Klein surveyed the legislative
reaction to seven prior decisions of the Court that provided an opportunity for
legislatures to disadvantage defendants and benefit prosecutors by amending
substantive criminal laws. 237 For example, Pattersonv. New York 238 sanctioned the
enactment of the extreme emotional disturbance homicide mitigation as an
affirmative defense for which the defendant bore the burden of proof.239 While the
legislative reaction to the decisions varied, in six of the seven instances (including
Patterson), at least some states changed their laws to provide the prosecution with
the benefit of the Court's decision.240 King and Klein suggested ways in which

235. Cf., e.g., Harris, 536 U.S. at 577-78 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority's
holding that the change in mandatory sentencing under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) from fiveto-life to seven-to-life can be made as a sentencing factor).
236. The possibility for legislatures to exploit the constitutional rule adopted by the
Court would have been even greater, of course, had the Court followed the path urged by the
dissenters and not adopted the Apprendi rule. Under such a holding, it would be
constitutional for "judges to apply sentencing factors-whether those factors lead to a
sentence beyond the statutory maximum (as in Apprendi) or the application of a mandatory
minimum (as [in Harris])."Harris,536 U.S. at 569 (Breyer, J., concurring). The elements of
the offense would be strictly what the legislature defines, subject only to a fundamental
fairness analysis under the Due Process Clause. See supra text accompanying notes 79, 10711,130.
The means by which legislatures could exploit such a holding to disadvantage criminal
defendants is obvious: not only could substantial authority be given to judges in the form of
sentencing factors like the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and mandatory minimums, but
also the use of sentence enhancements to increase the maximum would be permissible. Addon enhancements like the hate crime provision in Apprendi could be used to impose
increased terms of imprisonment. Findings about serious bodily injury or death in a § 2119
carjacking case, or about quantity of drugs in a § 841 drug case, could be used to impose
enhanced sentences. And none of these enhancements would go to a jury beyond a
reasonable doubt. Instead, the sentencing judge could determine them by a preponderance of
the evidence. Legislatures would be able to minimize the number of elements in the offense,
and leave all the significant sentencing determinations--including enhancements of the
maximum penalty--to be made by the judge as sentencing factors. The procedural
protections given to defendants at trial would apply only to those limited number of
elements, and defendants' ability to contest the enhancing facts would be correspondingly
hindered, particularly by the much lower standard of proof.
237. King & Klein, supra note 214, at 1488-93, 1546.
238. 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
239. See King & Klein, supra note 214, at 1490 (discussing Patterson v. New York, 432
U.S. 197 (1977)).
240. See id. at 1491-92, 1546. The sole decision to which no states reacted was Martin
v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228 (1982), which permitted the state to require the defendant to carry the
burden of proof when asserting self-defense in a homicide case. See King & Klein, supra
note 214, at 1490, 1494-95. Professors King and Klein and Professor Hoffmann surmise that
states did not follow Martin's lead because the nature of the self-defense differs from the
provisions involved in the other cases. See id. at 1494-95; Hoffmann, supra note 185, at 27379.
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legislatures similarly might respond to Apprendi's constitutional rule by amending
"nested" sentencing statutes (like § 2119 in Jones) and "add-on" sentence
enhancements (like the provision in Apprendi)
24 1 to increase the relevant statutory
maximum sentences and comply with the rule.
In the four years since Apprendi was decided, it appears that legislatures have
not rushed to enact massive revisions of criminal codes to exploit Apprendi in this
way, probably because the burden Apprendi imposes on prosecutors is not a very
great one and accordingly there has been no great demand to "amend around" the
rule.242 Most notably, although Apprendi altered the previously settled
interpretation of the principal federal drug offense, 21 U.S.C. § 841, to require that
drug type and quantity (when it increases the statutory maximum sentence) 2no
43
longer be proven as a sentencing factor but as an element of the offense,
Congress has not yet amended the statute in response. Although Apprendi has
imposed this additional burden in some federal drug prosecutions, apparently it is
one that Congress and the United States Attorneys are for whatever reason willing
to bear. At least so far, wholesale post-Apprendi revisions of criminal statutes to
enact very high maximum sentences and rely nearly exclusively on sentencing
factors have not come to pass.2 4
More important than the lack of any actual moves by legislatures to exploit the
Apprendi rule, however, is the theoretical rejoinder to the objection. Even had
legislatures responded to Apprendi by amending many criminal statutes to raise the
maximum sentence to comply with the rule, such actions would not be dispositive
against the rule's value as a constitutional protection. No matter what constitutional
rule the Court adopts in the Apprendi line of cases, it is possible for the legislature
to amend criminal statutes to disadvantage criminal defendants despite the
existence of that rule. If a legislature desires to minimize the benefit to the
defendants of the Court's holdings and maximize the substantive and procedural
advantages given to the prosecution by the substantive criminal law, then there will
be a means to "exploit" the terms of the Court's holdings to do so. This aspect of
the constitutional doctrine is endemic to the constitutional question involved.
The objection is a straw man argument because even the opposite ruling in
Harriswould leave open a significant possibility for legislative exploitation of the
alternative Harris rule to enact a sentencing scheme adverse to the interests of
criminal defendants. 245 Accordingly, the objection simply is not a meritorious one.
241. See King & Klein, supra note 214, at 1492-94.
242. See generally id. at 1494-95; Klein & Steiker, supra note 33, at 261 n.158; see
also Hoffmann, supra note 185, at 273-79; Saltzburg, supra note 185, at 249-50.
243. See infra text accompanying notes 294-96; see also Priester, supra note 44, at 297301.
244. See, e.g., Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490 n.16; id. at 540 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see
also, e.g., Bibas, Fact-Finding,supra note 45, at 1136; Hoffmann, supra note 185, at 27779; Huigens, supra note 89, at 406-07; Levine, supra note 45, at 410-12, 424; Saltzburg,
supra note 185, at 249-50; Standen, supra note 7, at 780-83.
245. In the Apprendi line of cases in particular, the Court has been scrupulous about
limiting the scope of its holdings to the facts of each case. See, e.g., supra text
accompanying notes 82-87 (describing how Jones and Apprendi did not overrule
Almendarez-Torres recidivism exception despite apparent majority for doing so); Apprendi,
530 U.S. at 477 n.3 ("Apprendi has not here asserted a constitutional claim based on the
omission of any reference to sentence enhancement or racial bias in the indictment.... We
thus do not address the indictment question separately today."); id. at 497 n.21 ("The
Guidelines are, of course, not before the Court.").
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An alternative Harris rule would adopt the position taken by the Harris
dissenters that all facts that increase either the top or bottom of the "range of
punishment" to which the defendant is exposed must be proven as elements of the
offense. 246 Although the exercise of judicial discretion in selecting a sentence
within that range would be permitted, when findings of fact are used to impose
mandatory restrictions upon the range of penalties available to the judge, those
facts must be elements of the offense. 247 Such a holding not only would overrule
McMillan but also would abolish the use of "sentencing factors" entirely. 248 The
application of a sentencing factor by the sentencing judge "heightens the loss of

It is quite possible, therefore, that an actual alternative holding in Harris would have
been based solely on the facts and the question presented, which concerned the statutory
mandatory minimum provision in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). The Court would have held that
a finding of fact must be made as an element of the offense (and not a sentencing factor) not
only when it increases the statutory maximum sentence but also whenever it "alters the
statutorily mandated sentencing range, by increasing the mandatory minimum sentence."
Harris, 536 U.S. at 577 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). As with the current
Apprendi-Harrisrule, under this version of the alternate Harris holding, the jury's verdict
would establish a set of facts that then would be compared to the criminal statutes under
which the defendant has been charged to determine the statutorily mandated maximum and
minimum penalty, but non-statutory sentencing factors like the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines still would not create new elements of the offense; at sentencing, the judge could
find additional facts by a preponderance of the evidence so long as the ultimate sentence
remains within the statutory bounds defined by the jury's verdict. See supra notes 57-76 and
accompanying text. Cf. also supra note 92 (discussing possible basis for distinguishing
between statutes defining offense and statutes regulating sentencing).
This statutory-range-only rule would be subject to the same criticism that applies to the
current Apprendi-Harrisrule: legislatures could exploit the terms of the rule by enacting
statutes with very broad penalty ranges (for example, five years to life imprisonment) and
reserve all of the truly meaningful findings of fact for the sentencing hearing. Along with a
high statutory maximum sentence to work around the effect of Apprendi, a low statutory
minimum sentence would work around this narrow Harrisalternative. Only if the legislature
wanted a substantial minimum statutory penalty would the protection for elements of the
offense come into play in practice.
Furthermore, the long-term integrity of such a narrow alternative Harrisholding would
require a persuasive distinction between the statutory maximum and minimum penalties
established by the jury's verdict on the one hand and the non-statutory but nevertheless
binding restrictions on judicial sentencing discretion imposed by the Guidelines. Such a
distinction might not be possible because "the Guidelines 'have the force and effect of
laws."' Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 523 n. 11 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Mistretta v. United
States, 488 U.S. 361, 413 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). Given the likely instability of a
statutory-range-only rule, the discussion in the text assumes that an alternative Harris
holding would, in a subsequent case, be expanded at least to all legally binding restrictions
on the judge's sentencing authority. See, e.g., Bibas, Fact-Finding,supra note 45, at 114748; Klein & Steiker, supra note 33, at 257; Levine, supra note 45, at 382-84,435-36.
246. Harris, 536 U.S. at 572 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see id. at 576 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) ("With a finding that the defendant brandished a firearm, the penalty range
becomes harsher.").
247. See id. at 577 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
248. See id. at 580 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("McMillan ...cannot withstand the logic

of Apprendi, at least with respect to facts for which the legislature has prescribed a new
statutory sentencing range."). The mandatory minimum provision at issue in McMillan was a
statute. See McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 81-82 & n.1 (1986).
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liberty and represents the increased stigma society attaches" to the fact at issue.249
Justice Thomas similarly argued that when a defendant is subject to a sentencing
factor, no less than an enhancement that increases the maximum sentence, "it is
impossible to dispute that the defendant is exposed to greater punishment than is
otherwise prescribed. 25 ° Such principles also draw no distinction between
statutory and non-statutory sentencing provisions. Accordingly, the application of
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines would be unconstitutional unless the Guidelines
determinations that increase the defendant's
maximum and minimum sentences are
25 1
proven as elements of the offense.
Although the Court of course has not elaborated what the contours of this
broader alternative Harris rule would be, the scholarly commentary on the
Apprendi line of cases has suggested two analytical approaches that provide a more
complete picture. As the broader interpretation of Justice Thomas's position in
Harrisindicates, both approaches suggest the effect that legislative specification of
sentencing regulations would have as a matter of constitutional law.
Levine rephrases the Apprendi rule to expand its scope: "Any fact... that has
the effect, in real terms, of increasing the maximum or minimum punishment
beyond an otherwise applicable range must be submitted to a jury and proved
beyond a reasonable doubt." 252 Levine defines the "real terms" effect by reference
to the sentencing judge's discretion: any provision that has a fixed result and that
the judge is compelled to obey falls within the rule.2 53 By its focus on the "real
terms" of the provision's effect, Levine's rule therefore covers statutes and the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines.2 4
On the other hand, Levine excludes two kinds of provisions from his rule. The
first are mitigating provisions, which are excluded by definition because they
reduce the defendant's punishment from an otherwise applicable range. 255 The
second are provisions that do not increase the defendant's sentence "in real terms"
because they preserve the sentencing judge's discretion as opposed to imposing a
fixed, specified effect from a finding of fact. 256 For example, the current version of
§ 3B 1.1 of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines provides for upward adjustments to a
defendant's offense level of two, three, or four levels depending on whether the
257
defendant was a manager or leader of the offense and the scope of that role.
Because a finding that the defendant managed more than five other persons in
carrying out the offense would mandate a three-level increase, Levine's rule

249. Harris,536 U.S. at 578 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
250. Id. at 579 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
251. Guidelines provisions that have the effect of reducing the defendant's Guidelines
sentence, such as downward adjustments and downward departures, would not be elements
of the offense under this rule because they make the punishment less harsh, not more harsh;
only aggravating factors, not mitigating ones, would be covered by the rule. See Apprendi,
530 U.S. at 501 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("every fact that is by law a basis for imposing or
increasing punishment (in contrast with a fact that mitigates punishment)"); see also id. at
490 n.16; id. at 541-43 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
252. Levine, supra note 45, at 382-83.
253. See id. at 390, 412-14, 427, 434-35, 453.
254. See id. at 382-84, 412-13, 435-36.
255. See id. at 385-87.
256. See id. at 390, 440-44.
257. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.1.
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requires that this finding be made as an element of the offense. 58 But Levine
proposes that § 3B1.1 could be amended to provide instead that the sentencing
judge could increase a defendant's offense level anywhere from one to four levels
as the court sees fit based on the court's assessment of the defendant's leadership
role. 259 Although that finding does increase the defendant's sentence, it flows from
the exercise of the court's discretion; it is not a fixed, pre-determined result from a
finding of fact.260 For that reason, Levine claims, the increase in the defendant's
sentence is no different than the discretion that judges exercised before the
Guidelines were adopted.261
Thus, under Levine's interpretation of the broader alternative Harris rule, any
fact that has a fixed, aggravating effect on the sentence must be an element. Facts
that have neither fixed effects nor aggravate the penalty, however, need not be.
Professor Huigens candidly proposes a far more radical constitutional rule.262
Huigens begins from the premises that the "Constitution protects the traditional
normative architecture of criminal law" and that "Apprendi attempts to restore" that
architecture.263 Huigens then describes this architecture as containing only two
forms of culpability: fault for wrongdoing and eligibility for punishment. 264 (For
example, Huigens characterizes mistake of fact or lack of mens rea as fault issues,
and infancy or insanity as eligibility issues. 265 ) From this description, Huigens
derives his proposed constitutional rule: all positive law provisions relating to fault
must be elements of the offense because the determination of criminal fault is the
jury's role.26
The rule proposed by Huigens therefore is more expansive in scope than
Levine's. To begin with, Huigens's rule accords with Levine's in abolishing
sentencing factors as they currently exist and in requiring that provisions that have
a determinate effect on sentencing be elements of the offense. But Huigens is far
less deferential to a legislature's labeling of a provision as mitigating than Levine.
While Levine accepts the Court's argument that the political process will serve as a
check against the shifting of facts from elements into sentencing factors,268 Huigens
expressly calls for overruling the Court's affirmative-defenses precedent because
those cases permit the burden of proof for fault-based factors to be shifted to the

258. See id. § 3Bl.l(b); Levine, supra note 45, at 390,453.
259. See Levine, supra note 45, at 453.
260. See id. at 441-44, 453; see also STrrH & CABRANES, supra note 2, at 146-48
(arguing for use of "guided departures" instead of fixed departures under Federal Sentencing
Guidelines regime).
261. See Levine, supra note 45, at 444.
262. See Huigens, supra note 89, at 391-92, 458-59.
263. See id. at 387, 391; see also id. at 393-414 (analyzing Court's precedent and
doctrine). The Court historically has rejected arguments that the Constitution enshrines any
particular theory of punishment or theory of the substantive criminal law. See, e.g., Standen,
supra note 7, at 782-83.
264. See Huigens, supra note 89, at 419-20. Huigens rejects the "consequentialist"
theory of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines in favor of a "virtue ethics theory" of
punishment. See id. at 415, 443-49.
265. See id. at 419-20.
266. See id. at 432; see also Kyron Huigens & Danielle Chinea, "Three Strikes" Laws
and Apprendi's Irrational,Inequitable Exception for Recidivism, 37 CRIM. L. BuLL. 575,
596-600 (2001).
267. See Huigens, supra note 89 at 434-53.
268. See Levine, supra note 45, at 385-87.
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defendant. 269 Instead, the only permissible kind of mitigators are those that relate to
eligibility for punishment, such as insanity or status as a war veteran. 270 Unlike a
mitigator related to fault (such as that the defendant formed an intent to kill under
the influence of an extreme emotional disturbance rather than a clear mind), which
could be rephrased as an aggravator (that is, an increased penalty when the
defendant acted in cold blood), what distinguishes eligibility-based mitigators is
that they have no corresponding aggravator: "[i]t
is inconceivable that any judge or
legislature would increase punishment on the ground that the offender has never
served in a war.'271 Under Huigens's rule, only mitigators based on eligibility for
punishment are not elements of the offense.
Huigens also takes a more restrictive view of the power of the legislature to
regulate a sentencing judge's discretion. Revisiting Levine's proposed revision of
§ 3B1.1 to leave the size of the sentence increase to the court's discretion,
Huigens's rule would reach the contrary result: because playing a managerial role
in the offense is a fact that relates to the defendant's fault in committing the offense
(not his eligibility for punishment), and a sentence increase is specified in the
positive law (the Guidelines), that fact must be an element of the offense. 272 The
only fault determinations at sentencing that Huigens's rule permits are those that do
not come from the positive law, what he calls findings of "interstitial fault" made
by the court.273 For example, a judge may sentence for a contract killing more
harshly than a mercy killing when the positive law homicide statutes do not draw a
distinction between them; although these are facts relating to fault, they are
interstitial.274 By definition, findings of interstitial fault cannot be regulated by the
positive law, making Huigens's rule more restrictive than Levine's.
Despite the apparently more stringent constitutional protections that would be
created if the Court were to adopt either of these two alternative Harris rules,
legislatures nevertheless still have means to exploit the terms of these rules to
disadvantage criminal defendants if they are intent on doing so. Under Levine's
rule, legislatures could rely more heavily on mitigators. For example, the
Sentencing Commission could amend the Guidelines applicable to § 2119 to
provide that a defendant will receive a downward adjustment if the defendant
proves that he did not brandish a firearm or did not cause serious bodily injury,
rather than the current version that requires the prosecution to prove those facts to
obtain upward adjustments in the offense level.275 Similarly, it is not clear how
much discretion must be reserved for the judge under Levine's "real terms"
requirement, and legislatures could test the limits of that reservation.276
More significantly, both Levine and Huigens argue for alternative Harrisrules
that could have dramatic unintended consequences for defendants as legislatures

269. See Huigens, supra note 89, at 427-29 (arguing that Patterson v. New York, 432
U.S. 197 (1977) should be overruled).
270. See id. at 417-18, 427-29.
271. Id. at 418; see also id. at 417-18, 427-29.
272. See id. at 426-33.
273. See id. at 433-34.
274. See id. at 433 n.256.
275. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.3.
276. Levine proposes a range of one to four offense levels in his modified § 3B1.1.
Levine, supra note 45, at 453. Would a choice only between a one-level or two-level
enhancement be sufficient, for example? Levine does not explain the contours of the
discretion a court must have for the provision to fall outside the rule.
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reconsider the punishments provided for criminal offenses. Both rules deliver this
principle to legislatures: Positive law aggravators must be elements, but if the judge
finds the same fact within the range authorized by the jury's verdict and gets to
decide how much severity to attribute to it, then a new element is not created. More
specifically, the lessons for the legislature are the following:
(1) If you wish to increase either the maximum or the minimum
sentence for a crime in a way that binds the sentencing judge, the
facts that determine such maximum or minimum must be proven
as elements of the offense.
(2) Within the range of penalties thereby established, sentencing
judges can exercise their discretion to select the appropriate
punishment for an individual offender, and you cannot bind the
exercise of that authority without using offense elements to do
SO.
A legislature intent on giving the prosecution all lawful advantages and imposing
all constitutionally permissible burdens on defendants will react to these principles
in one of two ways, either of which could be quite harmful to defendants' interests.
On the one hand, legislatures might throw up their hands and abandon the
project of regulating judicial sentencing of offenders altogether. They could
conclude that it simply is not worth the hassle to comply with the rule in a way that
meaningfully restricts judicial decisionmaking. Rewriting the criminal code might
require too much effort, prosecutors might balk at the time and cost necessary to
prove all those additional elements in the thousands of cases they bring every year,
or there might be some other reason. On whatever basis, a legislature might simply
decide to restore the status quo ante before the modem era of regulating sentencing:
repeal the Sentencing Guidelines, eliminate finely tuned sentencing provisions in
criminal statutes, and provide large statutory penalty ranges for offenses. While
prosecutors no doubt would lament the return of lenient judges, defendants equally
would face the prospect of hanging judges now free to revive their old ways. Most
of all, what defendants would lose is the predictability of the abrogated modem
schemes. Many valid criticisms of modem statutes and
Guidelines notwithstanding,
277
a restoration of the prior system is not a sound idea.
On the other hand and even more troubling, legislatures might react in the
opposite direction by aggrandizing all power over sentencing to themselves and
prosecutors. Rather than abandon the sentence-regulation project, they might take it
to its logical extreme: a massively detailed criminal code in which a multitude of
facts are specified and exact sentencing increases assigned to them. If the choice is
between giving judges some discretion or no discretion, a legislature might choose
the latter and adopt a purely determinate sentencing scheme in which judges have
no discretion at sentencing but rather ministerially impose a sentence already pre-

277. See, e.g., STrT & CABRANES, supra note 2, at 143 ("We do not advocate a return
to the pre-Guidelines system."); Klein & Steiker, supra note 33, at 256-59, 262 (criticizing
broad elements rule as too costly and cumbersome to implement in practice and as
compelling legislatures to return to unregulated judicial sentencing in response); Saltzburg,
supra note 185, at 243-51 (arguing that Apprendi "perversely" provides an incentive for
legislatures to restore broad sentencing ranges rather than more narrowly drawn statutes).
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determined by the facts found in the jury's verdict. 278 Whether in statutes or
Guidelines, the legislature could determine the precise sentence to be imposed on
an offender based on the aggregation of facts that the prosecution charges and the
jury finds beyond a reasonable doubt. To the extent such a system would mean that
facts previously proven at sentencing by a preponderance of the evidence now are
proven at trial beyond a reasonable doubt, this is a benefit to defendants. But
defendants give up significant benefits too. For one, if judges no longer had any
discretion at sentencing, there is no opportunity to argue for mercy---and
defendants would no doubt equally be precluded from arguing for jury nullification
as a means of obtaining mercy from determinate sentencing provisions proven as
elements, just as they currently are prohibited from arguing for nullification as a
grounds for acquittal. 279 For another, while the legislature might provide mitigators
as well (to the extent permitted under the Levine or Huigens rules), it would not be
required to do so, which exacerbates the loss of the ability to request the judge to
impose the most lenient sentence available.
Moreover, if legislatures are serious about the endeavor of the last twenty
years to limit and regulate judicial discretion at sentencing in the name of reducing
unfairness and arbitrariness, then the more difficult a constitutional rule makes that
enterprise, the stronger the incentive becomes to abolish judicial discretion entirely
and impose determinate sentences. At a time when most scholars are calling for
increased due process protections for defendants at sentencing, 280 it would be ironic
if the entire process of individualized sentencing was abolished entirely in reaction
to a new constitutional rule imposed by the Court in the Apprendi line of cases. It
would be equally ironic if the desire to protect defendants from the virtually
unchecked power of prosecutors to charge offenses and thereby influence the
ultimate sentence after a guilty plea or trial resulted in an excision of the judge
from sentencing in favor of complete power of the prosecutor to choose among the
determinate-sentencing provisions enacted by the legislature.28' If legislatures
consider truth in sentencing and restricting the ability of judges to be lenient as

278. See Standen, supra note 7, at 802-04; see also STITH & CABRANES, supra note 2, at
38-48 (describing congressional intent to deprive federal judges of discretion in creating
Sentencing Guidelines); Levine, supra note 45, at 441-44 (arguing that findings of fact are
ministerial actions that should be elements, whereas exercise of discretion about significance
of facts is exercise of judicial judgment that does not create new elements).
279. See, e.g., 4 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 155, § 22.1(g) (citing United States v.
Thomas, 116 F.3d 606 (2d Cir. 1997) and United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113 (D.C.
Cir. 1972)).
280. See, e.g., STrrH & CABRANES, supra note 2, at 154-63; Symposium, 12 FED.
SENTENCING REP. 187 (2000) (commentaries by Judge Josd A. Cabranes, Benjamin L.
Coleman, Frank 0. Bowman III, Steven D. Clymer, Barry L. Johnson, Richard SmithMonahan, Jacqueline E. Ross, and Richard Singer & Mark D. Knoll); Sara Sun Beale,
ProceduralIssues Raised by Guidelines Sentencing: The ConstitutionalSignificance of the
"Elements of the Sentence", 35 WM. & MARY L. REv. 147 (1993); Bibas, Fact-Finding,
supra note 45, at 1175-78; Susan N. Herman, The Tail That Wagged the Dog: Bifurcated
Fact-FindingUnder the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Limits of Due Process, 66 S.
CAL. L. REv. 289 (1992); Hoffmann, supra note 185, at 267-68; Saltzburg, supra note 185,
at 253; Deborah Young, Fact-Findingat Federal Sentencing: Why the Guidelines Should
Meet the Rules, 79 CORNELL L. REv. 299 (1994).
281. See, e.g., Bibas, Fact-Finding, supra note 45, at 1100-01, 1170, 1178-79;
Stephanos Bibas, Comment, Apprendi and the Dynamics of Guilty Pleas, 54 STAN. L. REv.
311, 317-18 (2001) [hereinafter Bibas, Dynamics]; Standen, supra note 7, at 785-91, 802-05.
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important policy (or political) goals, however, then these reactions are very
possible indeed. 2
It is worth noting that neither of these possible legislative reactions to the
broad alternative Harris rule is definitively a negative development for all
defendants in all cases. Some defendants might get more leniency if significant
discretion were restored; others might benefit from strictly determinate sentences
because they can prevail under the beyond a reasonable doubt standard at trial and
obtain a low sentence from the jury's verdict. But overall, it cannot be said that the
practical consequences of adopting such a rule would be salutary for criminal
defendants.
Therefore, the objection that the Apprendi-Harris rule, defended by the
constitutional structure analysis, might be exploited by legislatures to disadvantage
criminal defendants is an invalid one because no matter what constitutional rule is
chosen, it always is possible for legislatures to react to that rule by exploiting its
terms to the detriment of criminal defendants. By permitting the use of sentencing
factors within the maximum sentence established in the defendant's offense of
conviction, the Apprendi-Harrisrule may at first blush seem to be insufficiently
protective of criminal defendants. Because all constitutional rules, including a
seemingly more protective alternative Harris rule, can be similarly exploited by
legislatures, however, the objection does not prove that the Apprendi-Harrisrule is
meaningless as a constitutional division between elements of the offense and
sentencing factors.
3. Effect of Apprendi-HarrisRule on Plea Bargaining
The third objection to the Apprendi-Harris rule is that it may detrimentally
alter the balance of power between the prosecution and the defense in plea
bargaining. In an article published shortly after Apprendi was decided, Professor
Bibas asserted the startling claim that the Apprendi rule, rather than benefiting
criminal defendants, in fact harmed their interests. 283 By requiring that maximumenhancing facts be proven as elements of the offense rather than sentencing factors,
Bibas argued, Apprendi deprived defendants of the opportunity to contest those
284
facts at sentencing after a guilty plea, an opportunity they previously had.
Moreover, by making these facts part of the plea allocution rather than the
sentencing hearing, Apprendi increased the leverage held by the prosecution at the
stage because defendants no longer could refuse to allocute to those
bargaining
285
facts.
Professors King and Klein responded to these assertions by emphasizing that
treatment of a fact as an element of the offense under the Apprendi rule works to
the defendant's advantage because the defendant can insist upon proof beyond a
reasonable doubt for convictioh instead of merely proof by a preponderance of the
evidence at sentencing. 286 They also questioned whether defendants had a
meaningful opportunity to contest such facts at sentencing under pre-Apprendi
282. See, e.g., Hoffmann, supra note 185, at 264-65.
283. See Bibas, Fact-Finding,supra note 45, at 1100-01.
284. See id. at 1153-66; see also Bibas, Dynamics, supra note 281, at 311-15.
285. See id.; see also Bibas, Institutional Allocations, supra note 163, at 470-73;
Standen, supra note 7, at 798-801.
286. Nancy J. King & Susan R. Klein, Apprendi and Plea Bargaining, 54 STAN. L.
REv. 295, 296, 298-302, 306 (2001).
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practice anyway, 287 and they concluded that Bibas's complaint about the imbalance
of power in plea bargaining had little to do with Apprendi.2 8
Although the concern about the impact on the allocation of power in plea
bargaining is important, ultimately the Apprendi-Harris rule probably does not
have an appreciable impact on the pre-existing allocation of advantages and
disadvantages in the bargaining process. To the extent it does, King and Klein have
the better argument. Two examples illustrate this conclusion.
Consider first Bibas's hypothetical federal defendant, Al, charged with the
principal drug offense, 21 U.S.C. § 841.289 The prosecution has strong evidence
that Al possessed two kilograms of cocaine, and relatively weaker evidence of an
additional forty kilograms. 290 The provisions of the relevant statute are the
following:
§ 841(b)(1)(C), fewer than 500 g: no more than 20 years' imprisonment
(or no more than 30 years for a recidivist);
§ 841(b)(1)(B), 500 g or more: 5 to 40 years' imprisonment (or 10 years
to life for a recidivist);
§ 841(b)(1)(A), 5 kg or29more:
10 years to life imprisonment (or 20 years
1
to life for a recidivist).

Bibas applies several typical downward adjustments under the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines if Al pleads guilty; correspondingly, he assumes the
prosecution will invoke the statutory recidivist sentencing terms if Al instead
insists on going to trial.292 Bibas calculates Al's possible sentences as follows:
Pleads guilty and Sentenced for 2 kg: 63-78 months.
Pleads guilty and Sentenced for 42 kg: 121-151 months.
Convicted at trial and Sentenced for 2 kg: 120 months (mandatory minimum).
Convicted at trial and Sentenced for 42 kg: 240 months (mandatory
minimum) .293

Prior to Apprendi, when drug quantity was not an element of the offense, the
only quantity that had to be established beyond a reasonable doubt (by a jury
verdict or a plea allocution) was a "detectable" amount. 294 Therefore, Al could have

287. See id. at 298 n.19; see also STrr & CABRANES, supra note 2, at 132-36
(criticizing "fact bargaining" under Federal Sentencing Guidelines regime).
288. See King & Klein, supra note 286, at 308.
289. See Bibas, Fact-Finding,supra note 45, at 1160.
290. See id.

291. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)-(C) (2000).
292. See Bibas, Fact-Finding,supra note 45, at 1162-63. Al has a prior felony drug
conviction. Id.
293. See id.

294. See, e.g., United States v. Zidell, 323 F.3d 412, 429 (6th Cir. 2003)
Indeed, a demand for greater specificity in drug quantity
determinations would be impossible to square with our decisions
rejecting Apprendi-based challenges where the jury found only a
detectable or unspecified amount of a controlled substance, or was not
even asked to make a drug quantity finding, but where the resulting
sentence fell below the default maximum set forth at § 841 (b)(1)(C).
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pled guilty and allocuted to 2 kg of cocaine, or possibly even less. At sentencing,
the judge would have determined the quantity attributable to Al by a preponderance
of the evidence and sentenced him accordingly. If Al prevailed, his sentence was
63-78 months; if he did not, it was 121-151 months. Similarly, if Al went to trial
the jury would have been instructed that it had to find only a detectable quantity of
cocaine and the sentencing judge would have determined by a preponderance of the
evidence whether Al got 120 months (for 2 kg) or 240 months (for 42 kg).
After Apprendi, drug quantity is an element of the offense when it increases
the statutory maximum sentence.295 Thus, if the prosecution is satisfied with a
sentence of no more than twenty years (240 months) under § 841(b)(1)(C), or thirty
years (360 months) if the recidivist term is used, it still only needs to prove beyond
a reasonable doubt a "detectable" quantity of cocaine. 296 Al can plead guilty to
possessing a detectable amount of cocaine, leave to the sentencing judge the
determination whether it was 2 or 42 kg, and will receive the same 63-78 or 121151 months sentences as prior to Apprendi because both sentences are far less than
the statutory maximum for a detectable quantity.
Even if the prosecution refuses a plea agreement of a detectable quantity,
Apprendi still does not make Al's position worse. If the prosecution only offers a
plea agreement for 2 kg, Al has two choices: either take the plea and receive 63-78
months, or reject the plea, go to trial, and risk 120 or 240 months if he is convicted.
Similarly, if the prosecution demands Al plead guilty to 42 kg, Al can accept the
plea and be sentenced to 121-151 months, or run the risk of 120 or 240 months if
he is convicted at trial. These are precisely the same choices he faced prior to
Apprendi. Therefore, Apprendi has no effect on the options Al faces when deciding
whether he should plead guilty or instead go to trial.
The addition of Apprendi to the equation has one effect that could be relevant
if Al does go to trial however. To the extent the prosecution refuses to try Al only
under § 841(b)(1)(C) and forces Al to contest drug quantity at trial, proof of drug

Id.; see also United States v. Sanchez, 269 F.3d 1250, 1266 & nn.28-30 (11 th Cir. 2001) (en
banc); United States v. Promise, 255 F.3d 150, 175-77 (4th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (Luttig, J.,
concurring).
295. Bibas's analysis appears to assume that drug quantity is an element of the offense
because it could increase the statutory maximum sentence, even if the finding does not in
fact increase the maximum for the particular defendant. See Bibas, Fact-Finding,supra note
45, at 1162-63, 1165. The case law developed subsequently in the Courts of Appeals
requires an actual, not potential, increase in the maximum sentence for Apprendi to be
implicated in a defendant's case.
The analysis employed in, and the holding of, Apprendi make clear that
any consideration of a defendant's sentence in light of Apprendi is to be
conducted retrospectively rather than prospectively. . . . In sum,
Apprendi is implicated only when a judge-decided fact actually
increases the defendant's sentence beyond the prescribed statutory
maximum for the crime of conviction.
Sanchez, 269 F.3d at 1263 (emphasis in original); see id. at 1252-53, 1268-70; see also, e.g.,
Zidell, 323 F.3d at 427-29; United States v. Thomas, 274 F.3d 655, 660 & nn.2-3, 663-64
(2d Cir. 2001) (en banc).
296. See supra notes 63, 295 (citing cases); see, e.g., United States v. Peters, 283 F.3d
300, 314 (5th Cir. 2002) ("Ronnie Peters was facing a statutory maximum of 20 years
imprisonment and a $1,000,000 fine under the default sentencing provision. The judge
sentenced him to 78 months' imprisonment on each count, concurrent, and waived any fine.
His sentence is within the statutory maximum and does not run afoul of Apprendi.").
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quantity to apply the maximum sentences authorized by § 841 (b)(1)(B) or (A) must
be beyond a reasonable doubt. If the evidence of 42 kg is weak, then Al very well
may be acquitted under § 841(b)(1)(A), which carries a ten-to-life term (or twentyto-life if the recidivism term is invoked). If he is convicted of the 2 kg beyond a
reasonable doubt, then under § 841(b)(1)(B) he faces a sentence of five to forty
years (or ten-to-life); and should the jury convict Al only for a quantity covered by
§ 841(b)(1)(C) then his sentence would be no more than twenty years (or thirty
years).
Given the very high maximum sentences imposed even under § 841(b)(1)(C),
it is easy to see that this added benefit of Apprendi is of very little practical
significance to Al. Suppose Al goes to trial and is convicted by the jury under
§ 841(b)(1)(B) for possessing 2 kg, but is acquitted by the jury of the
§ 841(b)(1)(A) charge for the 42 kg. The consequence of this verdict after Apprendi
is that Al's maximum sentence is forty years. If the sentencing judge finds no
additional cocaine, then Al will receive the 120 months Bibas calculates. But the
sentencing judge could find not only the 2 kg of cocaine that the jury found beyond
a reasonable doubt but also the additional 40 kg of cocaine by a preponderance of
the evidence. Upon that finding, the 240 months mandatory minimum sentence
applies---and because that sentence is only half of the forty years maximum
sentence (or the life-sentence maximum if the recidivism term is used), the judge
may impose that sentence on Al.
In fact, even if Al were convicted only under § 841(b)(1)(C), the maximum
sentence is still twenty years (or thirty years if the recidivist term is invoked) and
Al still could be sentenced to 240 months. The jury's finding beyond a reasonable
doubt is overwhelmed by the preponderance sentencing findings of the judge.
Thus, as a practical matter Apprendi makes little difference to Al because the
sentences he could receive if he goes to trial and loses are identicalto the sentences
he faced prior to Apprendi. As the next example shows, however, this is not a
function of Apprendi itself but of the very high maximum sentences in § 841 (b)(1).
A second example illustrates how the Apprendi rule, if it has any effect at all
on plea bargaining and decisions whether to go to trial, benefits the defendant.
Consider facts comparable to Jones: a carjacking charge under 18 U.S.C. § 2119.297
The defendant, Dan, faces a maximum sentence of fifteen years' imprisonment for
"simple" carjacking, and a maximum sentence of twenty-five years for
"aggravated" carjacking if serious bodily injury resulted. Assume that evidence of
serious bodily injury exists by a preponderance of the evidence but is questionable
for proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and the prosecution agrees to forgo that and
certain other available upward adjustments to Dan's sentence if he agrees to plead
guilty. Accordingly, assume that when the Federal Sentencing Guidelines are
applied to Dan, his sentence will be five years if he pleads guilty and twenty-three
years if he goes to trial and is convicted (and the prosecution proves all the upward
adjustments, including serious bodily injury, by at least a preponderance of the
evidence).298

297. See supra text accompanying notes 50-54.
298. The following are rough calculations of how five-year and twenty-three-year
sentences might be arrived at under the Guidelines. Many other possible routes are available,
but the basic premise-that the defendant receives a considerably lower sentence by
pleading guilty than he does if he goes to trial and is convicted--holds regardless of the
exact details of the Guidelines calculations for either the plea or upon conviction.

2004]

STRUCTURING SENTENCING

Prior to Apprendi, if Dan were convicted at trial, he would be sentenced to the
calculated twenty-three years, even if the jury never considered the issue of serious
bodily injury. 299 After Apprendi, by contrast, the prosecution must submit the issue
of serious bodily injury to the jury if it seeks a sentence more than fifteen years.
Hence, Dan knows that if the jury finds that fact beyond a reasonable doubt he will
get twenty-three years, but if the jury acquits him of the aggravated charge then the
most he can get is fifteen years even if the prosecution prevails on everything at
sentencing (because Apprendi means the statutory maximum trumps the Guidelines
sentence). 3 °
Dan's situation rebuts Bibas's claim that Apprendi makes a defendant's
position in plea bargaining worse. Prior to Apprendi, Dan faced a choice between a
guaranteed five years if he pled guilty and a certain twenty-three years if he was
convicted at trial. After Apprendi, Dan faces a choice between a guaranteed five
years for the plea and either fifteen years (if the jury acquits on the serious bodily
injury element) or twenty-three years (if the jury finds serious bodily injury beyond
a reasonable doubt). Thus, Apprendi makes Dan's position stronger relative to the
prosecution; the cost of going to trial is lower than it was before Apprendi because
now there is a greater chance that Dan's sentence will be less than twenty-three
years even if he goes to trial. Of course, the value of this benefit to Dan depends on
how strong the proof of serious bodily injury is in his particular case: the weaker
the prosecution's evidence, the greater likelihood that Dan will receive only fifteen
years instead of twenty-three if he is convicted at trial and the more leverage Dan
has for extracting a favorable plea agreement from the prosecution.
What distinguishes these two examples has nothing to do with Apprendi itself
and everything to do with the maximum sentences provided by the statutes at issue.
Under § 841, the maximum sentences are very high even in the lowest tier of
penalties in § 841(b)(1)(C), especially if the recidivist terms are implicated. With a
maximum sentence of twenty or thirty years authorized by a conviction for even a
"detectable" quantity of cocaine, it is hardly surprising that the preponderance of
the evidence findings at sentencing have a far greater impact on the defendant's
fate than the jury verdict, which Bibas acknowledges. 30 1 Under § 2119, by contrast,

Dan is in criminal history category IV and carjacked a cheap car worth less than
$10,000. The applicable Guideline for § 2119 is UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES
§ 2B3. 1, which provides a base offense level of 20, with a 2-level increase for carjacking. By
pleading guilty, Dan earns a 2-level downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility,
for a final offense level of 20. See id. § 3E1.I. In addition, the prosecution agrees not to seek
other available upward adjustments to the sentence. On the Sentencing Table, the range is
51-63 months, so for simplicity I have used 60-months (five-years).
If Dan goes to trial, however, the prosecution will not forgo the other adjustments.
From the base offense level of 20, Dan faces a 2-level increase for carjacking, a 4-level
increase for causing serious bodily injury, and a 5-level increase for brandishing a firearm.
See id. § 2B3.1. Dan gives up the downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility, and
the prosecution also seeks a 4-level increase for Dan's playing a leadership role in
organizing others to commit the carjacking. See id. § 3B1.1. His final offense level is 35,
which produces a range of 235-293 months; for simplicity I have used twenty-three-years
(276-months).
299. In Jones, the defendant actually received the full maximum sentence of twentyfive-years when the judge found serious bodily injury at sentencing. See Jones v. United
States, 526 U.S. 227, 231 (1999).
300. See also UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES § 5G1.1 (2004).
301. See Bibas, InsitutionalAllocations, supra note 163, at 315-16.
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the lower "default" maximum sentence actually could come into play on a
defendant's behalf-and when it does, the Apprendi rule's requirement strengthens
the defendant's position. Considered outside the context of the draconian sentences
in the federal drug statutes, any effect Apprendi might have on plea bargaining is
salutary for defendants.3 °2
By requiring that the prosecution prove additional facts at trial beyond a
reasonable doubt, instead of merely at sentencing by a preponderance of the
evidence, Apprendi gives the defendant greater leverage in negotiations.
Defendants of course will continue to face substantial pressures to plead guilty, and
they will continue to run the risk of significant sentences if they go to trial and
lose.303 And while Apprendi may not be particularly helpful to defendants charged
under statutes like § 841 with high maximum sentences, it certainly does not tilt the
balance of power in plea negotiations in the prosecution's favor--and in many
cases it may strengthen the defendant's position. Accordingly, the third objection to
the Apprendi-Harrisrule fails.
D. Consequences of the ConstitutionalStructure Analysisfor the
ConstitutionalCriminalProcedureof Sentencing

The constitutional structure analysis of the Apprendi-Harris issue does not
impose significant constitutional limitations on the exercise of legislative power in
defining criminal offenses or in regulating the sentences imposed upon conviction

302. See King & Klein, supra note 286, at 302-08. A similar analysis would apply to
the Levine or Huigens alternative Harrisrules discussed above: to the extent the rule creates
additional elements of the offense, the result benefits defendants in plea negotiations.
Similarly, if there were no Apprendi protection at all, defendants would be returned to the
same disadvantageous position they held before Apprendi anyway. Prior to Apprendi, a

defendant had two choices: reach a plea agreement with the prosecution that included an
agreed-upon sentence, or plead guilty without an agreement and hope to prevail in achieving
a favorable sentence at the sentencing hearing. See generally Bibas, Fact-Finding, supra
note 45, at 1151-66; King & Klein, supra note 286, at 296-302. The effect of Apprendi on
the former scenario is discussed in the text. In the latter scenario, prior to Apprendi the

defendant could plead guilty to a charge, but any maximum sentence provided in the statute
charged would not limit the sentence the judge imposed at sentencing because sentence
enhancements above the otherwise applicable statutory maximum were permitted prior to
Apprendi. See, e.g., Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 469-74 (2000) (discussing
sentence and procedural history of case). After Apprendi, if a defendant pleads guilty
without a plea agreement, the statutory maximum sentence will be determined by reference
to the facts to which the defendant allocated at the plea, with those facts taking the place of
the facts found beyond a reasonable doubt in a jury verdict. See supra text accompanying
notes 57-76; Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 469-71, 491-92 (applying Apprendi rule to facts
established by defendant's guilty plea).
303. See, e.g., Bibas, Dynamics, supra note 281, at 315-16; Bibas, Institutional
Allocations, supra note 163, at 473 n.43; King & Klein, supra note 286, at 296-98; Klein &
Steiker, supra note 33, at 236 (arguing that incentives to plead guilty arise from mandatory
minimums and prosecution-controlled "substantial assistance" downward departures under
Federal Sentencing Guidelines); see also Nancy J. King & Susan R. Klein, Acceptance of
Responsibility and Conspiracy Sentences in Drug Prosecutions After Apprendi, 14 FED.
SENTENCING REP. 165 (2002) (arguing that acceptance of responsibility downward
adjustment should be amended in light of Apprendi to clearly provide reduction where
defendant offered to plead guilty to lesser offense and defendant subsequently is acquitted of
greater offense).
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for those offenses. This is a consequence, however, of the shift in focus from the
perspective of the criminal defendant to the structure of the Constitution's criminal
procedure provisions. Ultimately, the Constitution simply does not restrict
governmental power in sentencing the way it does in many other areas. Until a
constitutional amendment changes this structure, the Apprendi line of cases has set
forth the appropriate doctrine.
The constitutional structure analysis emphasizes the allocation of power not
merely between the trial jury and sentencing judge, but also between the legislature
and prosecutor. Even more significantly, the constitutional structure analysis
concludes that the legislature is the body constitutionally vested with the power to
determine the allocation of power among these institutions. 304 Many different
schemes of offenses and sentences are possible, and the constitutional structure
permits the legislature to choose which of them to enact into law.
Viewed at the broadest level, there are four basic types of sentencing schemes
a legislature might enact. Within each of these schemes, some institutions are
relatively weaker and some are relatively stronger depending on the comparative
significance of elements of the offense and sentencing factors.
First, a legislature might adopt the traditional sentencing scheme, in which a
wide range of punishment is available for each crime and judges have discretion to
select the appropriate sentence within that wide range. Under this scheme, the
legislature intentionally has delegated most of the responsibility for determining
punishment, choosing to play a weaker role and granting considerable power to the
sentencing judge. Moreover, by doing so the legislature has allocated
comparatively weak power to the prosecutor and jury: because there are wide
ranges of penalties for offenses and the judge selects the sentence, the influence of
the charging decision and the guilty verdict is lessened. For example, a judge might
choose to be lenient and sentence at the low end of the range for a serious crime
even though the prosecutor and jury would not have wanted mercy; or the judge
might sentence at the high end of the range for a minor offense because he believes
the prosecutor or jury was insufficiently severe. This scheme seeks individualized
punishment for the 30offender
and places that determination almost exclusively in the
5
hands of the judge.
Second, a legislature might enact the opposite scheme, a system of strictly
determinate sentences that follows mechanically from the offense of conviction.
With this scheme, the legislature retains considerable power for itself by mandating
the precise sentence upon conviction for each offense. And the sentencing judge
performs nothing more than a ministerial exercise of imposing the preordained
punishment for the offense of conviction. But the legislature does not retain
complete control, of course, because the prosecutor must charge offenses and juries
must convict them. If the legislature's criminal code contains a limited number of
broad offenses-for example, a list of crimes akin to the traditional common law
304. See also Standen, supra note 7, at 782-83 (arguing that unless the Supreme Court
is willing to adopt a "sweeping constitutional jurisprudence" of crimes and punishments, it
"must accept the ultimate hegemony of the democratic branch over the law of criminal
procedure"); id. at 798-805 (discussing allocation of power among legislature, courts, and
prosecutors and arguing that discretion to control the ultimate sentence imposed must lie
with at least one of them, but also could be shared among the three depending on how the
relevant laws are constructed).
305. See STrrH & CABRANES, supra note 2, at 79 (noting predominance of judge in
determining offender's sentence under traditional discretionary regime).
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offenses without a multitude of modem nuances 3°--then the prosecutor's power to
select the appropriate charge has tremendous significance and the jury's role is
comparatively weaker. The cost of this scheme, however, is in the ability to obtain
individualized sentencing of offenders; only the offense of conviction is
considered, nothing more.307 To the limited extent individualized punishment is
available in this scheme, it rests primarily in the prosecutor's decision about which
offense should be charged against the defendant. The leniency or severity of that
decision dominates the determination of the punishment.
Third, a legislature might desire a strictly determinate sentencing scheme but
retain individualized sentencing through a highly detailed criminal code in which
numerous facts that are relevant to sentencing are included as elements of the
offense. Again, the legislature controls the level of punishment for each conviction,
and the sentencing judge performs no meaningful role. A highly detailed system of
offenses, however, would allocate more power to the jury and less to the
prosecutor. In seeking the punishment it believes appropriate for the defendant, the
prosecution would charge all the offenses and facts that are relevant-for example,
not simply robbery but also, perhaps, the brandishing or discharging of a firearm, a
level of injury caused to the victim, the value of property taken, the leadership role
in organizing others to commit the offense, the biased motive, or any number of
other factors the legislature's code provides. Because all of these features are
elements of offenses (having been enacted as such by the legislature), the jury plays
a substantial role in determining the sentence because it would have to find each
element proven beyond a reasonable doubt. By finding the proof inadequate on
some of the elements, the jury would act as a check against the prosecutor's
charging decision with greater effect than under a scheme with only a limited
number of offenses with determinate sentences. In this way, the legislature could
provide for a greater degree of individualized sentencing, but place the
decisionmaking
authority in the hands of the jury, not the sentencing judge or
30 8
prosecutor.
Fourth, the legislature might hope to achieve a middle ground that balances the
powers of the four institutions without granting any one of them the nearly

306. Compare, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2111 (robbery within territorial jurisdiction of United
States), with, e.g., id. §§ 1951(a) (robbery affecting interstate commerce), 2112 (robbery of
property of United States), 2113 (bank robbery), 2115 (post office robbery), 2116 (railway
or steamboat post office robbery), 2118 (robbery involving controlled substances), 2119
(carjacking robbery).
307. See supra note 184; see also STrrH & CABRANES, supra note 2, at 23, 67 (noting
power of prosecutor and sentencing authority when crimes are broadly defined, and
increased power of prosecutor as sentence is linked more closely to offense).
308. This potential shift in power would be affected in practice, however, by the
prevalence of guilty pleas. A greater number of crimes would allow prosecutors to bargain
for a specific sentence. See Standen, supra note 7, at 798-801 (arguing that Apprendi will
lead legislatures to enact more detailed criminal codes); see also Bibas, Institutional
Allocations, supra note 163, at 470-71 (arguing that greater number of offense elements
means greater shift of power from sentencing judge to prosecutor). This power could be
constrained by a well-drafted criminal code with little overlap between offenses, which
would restrict the ability of prosecutors to manipulate the charge applied to the defendant's
conduct. See Standen, supra note 7, at 802-04. Finally, to the extent that all the facts being
bargained over are (by statute) elements of the offense, the defendant would have a stronger
position relative to the prosecution during plea bargaining than if those facts did not have to
be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. See supra text accompanying notes 283-303.
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complete prominence they respectively have under the first three schemes. Such a
middle ground would involve highly detailed sentencing provisions that produce a
narrow range of punishment from which the judge may select the sentence. The
federal criminal code and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines are an example of this
kind of scheme. 309 Congress sets both the statutory ranges of punishment and,
acting through the power delegated to the Sentencing Commission, the sentencing
effects of the Guidelines provisions. The legislature thus has retained more power
than it has in a scheme of wide judicial discretion, but less power than if sentences
were strictly determinate. Similarly, the prosecution's charging decision has
importance, but many federal statutes have broad ranges of authorized penalties
within which the Guidelines operate. Therefore, like the legislature, the prosecution
has more power than in a scheme of wide judicial discretion, but less power than if
the offense of conviction controlled the sentence rather than separate Guidelines
findings.31° Without question the jury is the weakest institution in the current
federal sentencing system, because the detailed findings are not made as part of the
offense of conviction, but rather afterwards at the sentencing hearing. Finally, the
sentencing judge makes the Guidelines findings and then chooses a punishment
within the range produced by the Guidelines calculation. Because the ranges of
Guidelines punishments are narrow and Guidelines applications are subject to
appellate review, the judge has less power than in a scheme of wide judicial
discretion, but also has more power than in a scheme with strictly determinate
sentences. Operating as a whole, this scheme achieves some degree of
individualized punishment for the offender with more balanced power among the
institutions than any of the other three schemes provides.
And the allocation of power in a middle ground scheme need not be the same
as the one that exists in the federal system today. The sentencing guidelines
regimes of many states, for example, are considerably less complex or permit
noticeably more judicial discretion than the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. The
Washington guidelines before the Supreme Court in Blakely provide for a
presumptive guidelines range from which the sentencing judge may deviate based
upon findings of fact justifying an exceptional sentence of a length determined by
the judge, so long as the ultimate sentence imposed is no greater than the maximum
penalty for the degree of offense for which the defendant was convicted.31' Under
the constitutional structure analysis, the Washington statutory guidelines system is
constitutional. Similarly, the balance of power among prosecutor, jury, and judge

309. Only about one-third of the states have adopted sentencing guidelines along the
federal model, which indicates the extent to which policy arguments about the most
appropriate sentencing scheme continue. See Klein & Steiker, supra note 33, at 230; see also
Bibas, Institutional Allocations, supra note 163, at 467 (describing current federal
sentencing system as a "hybrid" of determinate and indeterminate sentencing).
310. See also STrrH & CABRANES, supra note 2, at 8, 130, 145-46 (arguing that Federal

Sentencing Guidelines have increased power of prosecution and Sentencing Commission
relative to individual sentencing judges and thereby have weakened ability of judges to serve
as check on decisions made by prosecutors); Standen, supra note 7, at 785-91 (arguing that
Federal Sentencing Guidelines in current form are a failure because Guidelines have shifted
too much power from sentencing judge to prosecutor).
311. See State v. Blakely, 47 P.3d 149, 158-59 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that trial
court's decision that appropriate length of exception sentence was 90 months was not an
abuse of discretion); see also supra notes 118-19 (citing sources describing and analyzing
Washington guidelines regime).

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol.79:863

could be altered by enacting the federal Guidelines factors as elements of the
offense-keeping a detailed criminal code but providing for the exercise of some
judicial discretion within a narrow range (rather than none, as in the third scheme).
Shifting the determination of Guidelines sentencing facts from judge to jury would
have the effect of increasing the procedural protections for defendants as well,
which might provide a reason for a legislature with nefarious intentions to prefer
the Guidelines scheme.312 In any event, there are many possible ways the allocation
of power among the four institutions might be balanced in a more nuanced way
than the first three unbalanced schemes discussed, and the constitutional structure
analysis allows this legislative choice.
The key insight provided by the constitutional structure analysis of ApprendiHarris doctrine is that the Constitution does not command the adoption of any
particular scheme of allocating institutional power over sentencing. Questions
about whether sentences should be determinate or indeterminate, how influential
the prosecutor's charge should be on the ultimate sentence, what level of
involvement the jury should have in calibrating the appropriate punishment for the
defendant, and how much discretion the judge should have to select the penalty
imposed are not constitutional law questions. They are policy questions that relate
3 3
to fundamental theoretical goals like retribution, deterrence, and rehabilitation. 1
They are questions of political judgment about which institutions deserve more of
the public trust than others in imposing sentences in light of conditions in
contemporary society. And ultimately they are questions that simply do not have a
single correct answer. Choices must be made, and under the Constitution the
legislature is the body that makes such choices.314
This is not to say that the Constitution places no limits on legislative choices,
because of course the Apprendi-Harrisrule is one such limitation. Nonetheless, the
Constitution's criminal procedure provisions place only a narrow constraint on the
legislature's statutory design of a scheme of criminal offenses and corresponding
punishments. So long as the offense of conviction holds its significance through
legislative enactment, prosecutorial charging, trial or plea to verdict, and judicial

312. Cf Allenbaugh, supra note 2, at 6 (criticizing recent legislation further limiting
judicial discretion under Federal Sentencing Guidelines as contrary to purposes of
Guidelines); supra text accompanying notes 281-82 (noting possibility of legislative
exploitation of constitutional doctrine adverse to interests of criminal defendants).
313. See also Klein & Steiker, supra note 33, at 224-25, 238-39 (arguing that published
guidelines are superior to judicial or jury sentencing discretion because of greater
transparency behind sentencing judgments); cf. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (2000); Herman,
supra note 7, at 628-30; Hoffmann, supra note 185, at 264-68.
314. There is reason to question whether legislatures will make these choices
reasonably, of course, given the alignment of political incentives relating to substantive
criminal law and sentencing. See William J. Stuntz, The PathologicalPolitics of Criminal
Law, 100 MICH. L. REv. 505 (2001). Professor Stuntz argues that one step toward solving
these intractable political concerns would be to require, as a matter of federal constitutional
law, that judges have discretion to sentence convicted defendants. See id. at 594-96. If
mandatory minimum sentences were unconstitutional and judges also had authority to limit
the maximum sentences imposed when multiple charges are stacked on the defendant, for
example, then judges would have considerable ability to serve as a check on the enforcement
discretion exercised by police officers and prosecutors. See id. Stuntz concedes his proposal
is radical and without support in current constitutional doctrines, but he maintains that this
reform and others may be necessary to ensure that legislatures and prosecutors face a
meaningful check against their exercises of power. See id. at 595-96, 600.

20041

STRUCTURING SENTENCING

sentencing, the Constitution permits the legislature to allocate the relative weights
of these stages through a combination of elements of the offense and sentencing
factors. The Apprendi-Harrisdoctrine ensures that offenses have clear maximum
punishments defined by reference to charge and to verdict and thereby guarantees
that the offense of conviction controls the resulting sentence. This doctrine serves
only as an outer limit on the legislature's policy choices of the allocation of powers
and institutional design, and it limits the trial jury's constitutional function to the
determination of the defendant's maximum possible punishment for the offense of
conviction. But that is all the Constitution commands. Requiring that the core
constitutional nature of the offense of conviction be observed does not substantially
impede legislative policy choices about sentencing goals or reform; it simply
preserves the constitutional structure of criminal procedure against abrogation.
It also is important to clarify what the constitutional structure analysis does
and does not mean for the constitutional law of sentencing. The constitutional
structure analysis does resolve the constitutional line between elements of the
offense and sentencing factors for purposes of Apprendi-Harris doctrine. By
concluding that the facts that determine the defendant's maximum possible
sentence must be elements of the offense of conviction, but that other facts that
regulate the particular sentence imposed within that maximum may instead be
sentencing factors, the constitutional structure analysis forecloses constitutional
challenges to the use of sentencing factors to impose punishment based on their
status as sentencing factors. For example, because the application of a sentencing
factor is not a conviction of an "offense" for constitutional purposes, the Double
Jeopardy Clause is not implicated.316 Similarly, because the determinations of
sentencing factors are not "criminal prosecutions" of the defendant, the Sixth
Amendment right to a jury trial is inapplicable. 317 On the other hand, the
constitutional structure analysis does not preclude independent constitutional
challenges to either sentencing provisions unrelated to the issue of the

315. For the same reasons, the constitutional structure analysis supports the holdings of
Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952), and Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977),
which respectively approved the constitutionality of statutes making the insanity defense and
the homicide extreme emotional disturbance mitigation into affirmative defenses for which
the defendant bore the burden of proof. The prosecution still must establish the requisite
mens rea for murder, from which the defendant seeks to escape by asserting that the mental
state was not formed with a rational state of mind (whether insanity or emotional rage). Once
the prosecution has proven the intent element beyond a reasonable doubt, it is not
inconsistent with the offense of conviction to require the defendant to prove an affirmative
defense that excuses or mitigates. Cf. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975) (invalidating
statute that presumed malice aforethought).
316. See United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148 (1997); Witte v. United States, 515 U.S.
389 (1995).
317. Accordingly, the constitutional structure analysis mandates only a narrow,
formalistic role for the trial jury with respect to sentencing. The jury, of course, retains
control over the adjudication of guilt and innocence for the charged offense. But beyond
finding the defendant guilty of the offense of conviction, the jury's constitutional function
includes only the authorization of the maximum possible punishment that the defendant
faces. The application of sentencing factors within that maximum does not violate the Sixth
Amendment right to trial by jury because those factors are not new "offenses" for
constitutional purposes. By defining the constitutional concept of the offense of conviction
by reference to the entire constitutional structure of criminal procedure, the constitutional
structure analysis precludes a Sixth Amendment challenge to the use of sentencing factors.
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constitutional offense of conviction or to the line between offense elements and
sentencing factors. For example, claims that a sentencing provision
unconstitutionally discriminates between defendants in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause, or is unconstitutionally retroactive in violation of the ex post
facto Clause, or is fundamentally unfair in violation of the Due Process Clause,
would be unaffected. 318 The constitutional structure analysis affirms the
constitutionality of sentencing factors and legislative regulation of judicial
sentencing discretion, but it does not extend beyond the constitutional structure of
criminal procedure from which it derives in the first place.
Finally, it is worth noting how the constitutional structure analysis might have
altered the reaction to the Apprendi line of cases had the Court relied upon this
reasoning in its decisions. Had the opinions in Jones and Apprendi emphasized the
fundamental nature of the offense of conviction to the constitutional structure,
rather than the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, the limited scope of the
principle announced in the Apprendi rule would have been far more apparent.
Rather than seeming to initiate a revolution in the constitutional law of sentencing,
the constitutional structure perspective would have demonstrated the narrow scope
of the Court's concern from the beginning. More importantly, the outcome of
Harris would not have seemed to be a retrenchment of the doctrine announced in
Apprendi but rather would have been a natural corollary of its constitutional
structure rule. Adopting the constitutional structure analysis going forward,
therefore, would clarify the nature of the inquiry for lower courts, legislatures,
lawyers, and scholars in a salutary way.
CONCLUSION

The constitutional structure analysis provides a better framework for resolving
the questions of the constitutional criminal procedure of sentencing presented in the
Apprendi line of cases. By examining the constitutional inquiry not only in terms of
the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial but also the entire
constitutional structure of criminal procedure, this analysis focuses the inquiry on

318. See, e.g., United States v. Zimmer, 299 F.3d 710, 717-19 (8th Cir. 2002)
(rejecting ex post facto challenge to application of amended Guidelines provision); United
States v. McKissick, 204 F.3d 1282, 1300-02 (10th Cir. 2000) (rejecting Equal Protection
challenge to application to defendant of U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2); United States v. Parks, 89 F.3d
570, 572-73 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that application of U.S.S.G. § 4Al.l(d) to defendant
violated fundamental fairness guarantee of Due Process Clause).
For example, the multi-factor test proposed by King and Klein, which safeguards a
number of constitutional values including basic Due Process guarantees, could serve as an
additional outer limit on legislative power to define crimes and regulate sentences. See King
& Klein, supra note 214, at 1536-46 (describing and applying test). This test might be used
to supplement the constitutional structure analysis so as to preclude the most egregious
exploitations of the deference to legislative judgment it provides.
As discussed above, a claim that a sentence is grossly disproportional in violation of the
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause implicates the scope of the constitutional offense of
conviction because proportionality is defined by reference to the offense of conviction. See
supra text accompanying notes 134-49. In the Court's most recent "three strikes" cases, the
prior convictions justifying the recidivist sentence were enacted, charged, and proven as
elements of the offense. See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 14 (2003); Lockyer v.
Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 67 (2003). Accordingly, the constitutional structure analysis would
treat those facts as part of the offense of conviction, as the Ewing plurality did.
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the key concept: the defendant's offense of conviction and the constitutional
consequences that follow from that offense's enactment, charge, trial, and
punishment. The consequence of this method of constitutional interpretation is a
clearer and more persuasive justification for both the Apprendi rule requiring that
the defendant's maximum sentence be determined by reference only to facts proven
as elements of the offense and the Harris rule permitting the use of sentencing
factors to regulate the particular punishment to be imposed on the defendant within
that maximum.
An additional consequence of the constitutional structure analysis is the
recognition that the Constitution simply does not compel significant restrictions on
legislative power to adopt criminal offenses and sentencing schemes. So long as the
sentence imposed on the defendants does not contravene the scope of the offense
that was enacted, charged, and established in a guilty verdict by trial or plea, the
structure of constitutional criminal procedure does not proscribe a particular system
for determining the particular punishment. The offenses that exist, the breadth of
penalty ranges for them, and whether sentences will be determinate or
indeterminate or something in between is a matter of legislative policy choice, not
constitutional law.
Within the outer limits mandated by the Apprendi-Harrisrule, the allocation of
power among legislature, prosecution, trial jury, and sentencing judge-and the
corresponding proof by elements of the offense or sentencing factors--is subject to
legislative design. That is all the Constitution requires.

